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РОССИЯ И МИР

АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛИСТОВ

В ОБЛАСТИ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ

САРАТОВСКИЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ ИМЕНИ Н. Г. ЧЕРНЫШЕВСКОГО

SARATOV STATE UNIVERSITY
English for Professional Communication

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Данное учебное пособие представляет сборник текстов статей для чтения на английском языке для студентов, обучающихся по специальности «Международные отношения». Тексты статей снабжены специально разработанными упражнениями для развития навыков аналитического чтения научной литературы, а также совершенствованию профессиональной компетенции студентов на английском языке. Пособие может быть рекомендовано для работы со студентами 3-4 курсов бакалавриата и 1 курса магистратуры гуманитарных вузов, обучающихся по специальности «Международные отношения», а также внеаудиторной и самостоятельной работы.

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САРАТОВСКИЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ ИМЕНИ Н. Г. ЧЕРНЫШЕВСКОГО

Предисловие

Данное учебное пособие представляет сборник текстов статей для чтения на английском языке для студентов, обучающихся по специальности «Международные отношения». В разработке, подготовленной совместно доцентами кафедры английского языка для гуманитарных направлений и специальностей и кафедры международных отношений и внешней политики России Саратовского госуниверситета, содержатся оригинальные тексты научных статей, связанные с политикой России на международной арене.

Пособие содержит интересный материал, являющийся неотъемлемой частью обязательной подготовки студентов к профессиональной деятельности и органично сочетающийся с курсами по программе подготовки бакалавров и магистров в области международных отношений. Тексты статей снабжены специально разработанными упражнениями для развития навыков аналитического чтения научной литературы, а также совершенствованию профессиональной компетенции студентов на английском языке.

Пособие может быть рекомендовано для работы со студентами 3-4 курсов бакалавриата и 1 курса магистратуры гуманитарных вузов, обучающихся по специальности «Международные отношения», а также внеаудиторной и самостоятельной работы. Пособие соответствует требованиям ФГОС ВПО для подготовки бакалавров гуманитарных специальностей по иностранному языку, направлено на формирование навыков аналитического мышления, способности к познавательной деятельности и развитию профессиональной компетенции обучающихся, что соответствует учебным программам, разработанным в университете.

UNIT 1

Pre-reading activities:

1. Give the full names of the organizations under the following abbreviations: *NATO, OSCE, EU, G8, CIS, WTO, UN*. *What is their place on the international arena?*

2. What is meant by the notions of multilateralism, bilateralism and unilateralism? What role do they play in modern diplomacy systems?

3. Look up for the transcriptions of the following words in the dictionary and pronounce them correctly. Pay special attention to the word-stress:

multypolarity, policy, sovereign, transatlantic, record(n), Council of Europe, severely, undermine, hostilities, missile, financial, threaten, budget, drastically, procrastinate, ratification, proliferation, regime, major, nuclear, although, mar(v), preference, cease(v), presidency, status, exert(v), incomplete, veto(n,v), vigor, elites, priority, architecture, exacerbate, vehemently, crucial.

Andrey Makarychev & Viatcheslav Morozov

MULTILATERALISM, MULTIPOLARITY, AND BEYOND: A MENU OF RUSSIA'S POLICY STRATEGIES

//Global Governance No. 17 (2011), Pp 353–373

Transatlantic Multilateralism or Collective Unilateralism?

Multilateralism, *taken abstractly*, views multipolarity through formalized and inclusive institutionalist lenses, presupposing coalitions of different formats among sovereign states. Traditionally, it was in the West that multilateralism gained its popularity as the most “desirable model of multipolarity.” And *the conventional use of the concept usually implies* multilateral frameworks where the transatlantic community plays the leading role such as NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). *To differentiate this from the other types of multilateralism that we discuss below*, we use the term ***transatlantic multilateralism*** to refer to this conventional meaning. The Russian record of cooperation with the multilateral institutions in the transatlantic area is uneven at best. *As mentioned above*, it was in the 1990s that Russia succeeded in entering major international bodies (the

G8 and Council of Europe) and establishing formal cooperation with others (NATO and the European Union). It was also quite active in the OSCE framework, *inter alia*, lobbying for the adoption of the European Security Charter. *However*, by the time that the charter was ready for signature at the Istanbul summit in November 1999, Russia's standing within both the OSCE and the Council of Europe was severely undermined by the hostilities in Chechnya and it has never fully recovered. A brief period of improvement after the September 11 attacks, which resulted in the Rome agreements of May 2002 and the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council, was soon brought to an end by the intervention in Iraq, the "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet space, and the George W. Bush administration's policy on missile defense.

The evolution of the Russian political system since 2000 and the establishment of the "vertical of power" damaged relations even further *because it led to* ever harsher criticism of Russia's democratic record. European institutions have never stopped expressing their concerns over the situation in Russia, and Moscow often pays back by putting a spoke in the wheel. In recent years, it has threatened to reduce its financial contribution to the OSCE's budget; drastically limited the number of OSCE election monitors at the 2007–2008 federal elections; unilaterally suspended the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; procrastinated with the ratification of Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, thus delaying the implementation of the reform of the European Court; and was unable to conclude a new treaty with the EU after the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement expired in December 2007. The only multilateral framework against which Russia seems to have no major reservation is the nuclear nonproliferation regime, *although* its cooperation with the West in this context has been marred by constant disputes over the Iranian nuclear program.

The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 clearly demonstrated Moscow's strong preference for bilateral deals over multilateral frameworks. Georgia's desire to join the transatlantic multilateral institutions, first of all NATO, was in itself *one of the key contributing factors* to the escalation of the conflict (although by no means the only one). *Yet even more characteristic were* the diplomatic developments after the war broke out. The mediation of French president Nicolas Sarkozy was absolutely

decisive for the cease-fire agreement and, *as many analysts point out*, it was fortunate that it was France, a country that Moscow considers one of its key partners within the EU, which happened to hold the rotating EU presidency in the second half of 2008. On the contrary, the multilateral frameworks that had tried to contain the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the early 1990s were ignored and even partly destroyed by Russia after the war. *Thus*, Moscow vetoed the prolongation of the OSCE mission's mandate in Georgia, demanding that it be renamed to acknowledge the sovereign status of the two breakaway regions.

Russia at least could exert some influence in the West-centered multilateral political and security frameworks, even if often it was a type not seen as constructive by the West. In the economy-oriented institutions of the neoliberal global society, Russia's record has been even poorer. Its membership in the G8 remains incomplete because it does not take part in regular meetings of finance ministers (which, thus, remains "the group of seven").²⁴ The most illustrative, however, is perhaps the story of Russia's still unfinished accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). It applied for membership as far back as 1993, and the talks have dragged on without any vigor since 1995. The Putin administration took this matter seriously and managed to achieve significant progress by 2006, when the bilateral talks were largely completed. However, for the past five years, the estimated time of Russia's entry has been defined by phrases like "before the end of next year." *Although* the complications that have remained since 2006 are largely bilateral in nature and concern trade issues with the EU and the United States, *as well as* more politicized disputes with countries like Georgia and Moldova, this situation *is indicative of* how difficult it is for Russian diplomacy to operate in complex multilateral settings.

Characteristically, the most recent complication on the way toward WTO entry arose when, in June 2009, Prime Minister Putin suddenly declared that Russia would join as a member of a Customs Union that also includes Belarus and Kazakhstan. This effectively postpones membership almost indefinitely since Kazakhstan's progress toward the WTO has been much slower than Russia's and, *at best*, Belarus is at the beginning of this road. *Even though* this declaration was revoked (after several months

of hesitation), *it indicated that*, at least for a part of the Russian political elites, multilateral solutions in the space of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have priority over the transatlantic frameworks.

President Medvedev's proposal on the new security architecture in Europe, first formulated in his speech in Berlin in June 2008,²⁶ is also conceptually grounded in the idea of multilateralism. However, the draft European Security Treaty, which was supposed to give legal certainty to this proposal, was negotiated with other great powers, primarily on a bilateral basis. The Western responses to Medvedev contain much more explicit references to the desirability of multilateralist agenda, which is strategically appealing to the EU in particular. Yet multilateralism can certainly be part of Russia's relationship with the EU in a different respect. A **think tank*** close to President Medvedev *argues that* Russia has to accept the prospects of the EU-CIS and China-CIS multilateral relationship, which enables Moscow to give up ambitions of monopolizing the post-Soviet region. In developing its multilateral strategy, Moscow certainly has to react to such proposals by European experts as, for example, the idea of a "European security triad" to include the EU, Turkey, and Russia.

To sum up, the goal of integrating into the Western-dominated multilateral structures is significantly discredited in Russia by the lack of practical results, which is exacerbated by the ideological aversion to the even partial delegation of sovereignty that "thick" multilateral commitments entail. *Nevertheless*, Russia does recognize the validity of "multivector networking diplomacy" and seems to increasingly rebuff the logic of unilateral actions as ineffective and futile. In fact, the suspicions against transatlantic multilateralism are, *to a large extent*, motivated by the fact that Russia does not see this type of solution as truly multilateral. This position solidified during the Kosovo conflict, when Moscow first refused to authorize the use of force by a UN Security Council resolution, and then condemned NATO's action as unilateral and in violation of the UN Charter. According to Moscow, Security Council Resolution 1244, which was claimed by the NATO allies as the legal basis for Operation Allied Force, did not authorize the use of military means against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The differentiation between “true” multilateralism and collective unilateralism was also behind Russia’s position on the US-led interventions in Afghanistan in 2002 (which later came under the auspices of NATO) and Iraq in 2003. The intervention in Iraq was vehemently condemned from the outset: Russia, this time supported by France, Germany, and (less vocally) China, blocked the US attempt to obtain Security Council authorization for the operation and did not spare the harshest words to condemn it as a violation of international law. Moscow’s position on the Afghan case was, *on the contrary*, positively neutral in the beginning and has since evolved into a pragmatic partnership, especially after the Barack Obama administration managed to sign agreements with Russia on the Afghan military transit. A similar trend can be observed in the case of Moscow’s position on Iran. In this case, however, it started from a lower ground: under George W. Bush and Putin, there was obvious and open disagreement on the Iranian nuclear problem. Obama and Medvedev managed to find at least some common ground on the issue. *In the end*, this got as far as Russia’s support of Security Council Resolution 1929 imposing tougher sanctions on Iran in June 2010 and its abandonment of plans to supply Tehran with the S-300 air defense installations in September of that year.

It is almost certain, however, that the latter moves necessitated quite a bit of bilateral horse-trading with Washington, which involved the US plans for missile defense. This indicates that the recent progress in cooperation with NATO and the United States can perhaps be better described not as Russia finally linking up with the transatlantic multilateral frameworks, but as relatively successful instances of GPM. Before moving on to this model, however, we consider the approach that has deeper roots in the Russian foreign policy tradition and, thus, a crucial influence on the understanding of multilateralism.

Notes:

* *A think tank - переводится как научно-исследовательский центр (институт) в данном случае подразумевается конкретный институт: ИНСОР «Институт современного развития».*

Vocabulary exercises:

1. Give Russian equivalents and find words and expressions in the text:

inclusive institutionalist lenses, multilateral frameworks, the transatlantic community, record of cooperation, the multilateral institutions, major international bodies, policy on missile defense, ever harsher criticism, democratic record, financial contribution, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court, the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, constant disputes over, the escalation of the conflict, the cease-fire agreement, the two breakaway regions, the economy-oriented institutions, accession to, ideological aversion, multivector networking diplomacy, obvious and open disagreement on the Iranian nuclear problem, abandonment, bilateral horse-trading.

2. Explain what is the meaning of the following word-combinations, consult English-English dictionary if necessary, combine them with collocations from the text and use in the sentences of your own:

Gain popularity, play the leading role, be uneven at best, succeed in, lobby for, be severely undermined by, result in, damage relations even further, express concerns over, threaten to do smth, limit the number of, procrastinate with, delay the implementation of, conclude a new treaty with, expire in, have no major reservation, consider one of its key partners within, acknowledge the sovereign status, exert some influence, have priority over negotiate on a bilateral basis, contain explicit references to, react to, recognize the validity, rebuff the logic of unilateral actions, refuse to authorize, block the attempt, impose tougher sanctions

3. “Political metaphor” is one of the speech devices used to speak figuratively about certain actions or events. Explain what is meant by the metaphors:

Russia pays back by putting a spoke in the wheel.

The war broke out.

Talks have dragged on without any vigor.

Its cooperation with the West in this context *has been marred by* constant disputes over the Iranian nuclear program.

The latter *moves necessitated quite a bit of bilateral horse-trading* with Washington.

4. The text contains a lot of linking words, conjunctions and expressions which help to connect the ideas logically. They are given in italicized letters. Find those that correspond to the Russian variants:

однако
тем не менее

хотя

так же, как и

напротив

таким образом

в лучшем случае

в результате

в абстрактном смысле

в большей степени

несмотря на то, что

показало, что

служит показателем того, что

можно быть практически

уверенным в том, что

потому, что это привело к

обычно под этим понимается

один из важных факторов,
повлиявших на это

чтобы отделить одно от
другого

чтобы обозначить

то, о чем пойдет речь далее

как упоминалось выше

как отмечают многие
аналитики

суммируя все выше сказанное

помимо всего прочего

прежде, чем мы перейдем к

этой модели

еще более характерными /
показательными были

ставит под сомнение, что

/оспаривает точку зрения

5. Comprehension questions. Give the full answers to the questions analyzing the information in the article. Make notes before you answer.

a) How would you explain the idea of “multilateralism”? Is it possible to say the Russian interpretation of multilateralism somehow differs from the Western understanding of this phenomenon?

b) Why do you think the EU did not accept President Medvedev’s suggestions on the new European security architecture?

c) In accordance to the article, Russia and the US have some similar interests in Afghanistan. In your opinion, what are those interests?

6. Make up a summary of the article.

UNIT 2

Pre-reading activities:

1. When do we use a definite article in front of the geographical name of countries and continents? Look at these names and recollect the grammar rule:
The United States, The Russian Federation, Russia, China, Europe, Cyprus

2. What do you know about the following Russian political bodies? What role do they play in the political life of the country?

the Communists, the Just Russia Party, the United Russia Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, The Federation Council, The State Duma, the Left Front

3. Describe the following political and economic events. When did they take place? What is their impact on political life of Russia and the world?

The Economic Forum in Davos, the Arab Spring/an Arab Awakening, the Cold War, the Magnitsky Act, the Pussy Riot, the Orthodox fundamentalists' movement

4. Pronounce correctly and learn the words. Consult the dictionary for the transcription:

subtle , uncertainty, Europeanizing, emphasize, Eurasian, scenarios, plunge, consequences, sufficiently, corruption, accountability, sluggish, substantially, desperately, police, judiciary, relaunch, adjustment, hibernation, weather(v), affluent, immense, diversity, crucial, chaos, multiplicity, adequate, transactional, controversies, divergent, supplier, humanitarian, livelihood, fraudulent, figureheads, clashes, frustration, toughen, acquiescence, allies, gubernatorial, bailout, decelerate, sufficient, interethnic, efficient, abrupt, circumstance, steady, gestation, constituency, mediation, intricacies, directions, legitimacy, insular

Dmitri Trenin, Maria Lipman and Alexey Malashenko

THE END OF AN ERA IN EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS

// Carnegie Moscow Center. May 2013

The Shifting EU-Russia Relationship

The relationship between the European Union and Russia is undergoing a subtle but immensely important change that is centered, in large part, on the changing Russian

landscape. Russia is no longer *gradually* “Europeanizing” and drawing closer to the EU. Instead, it is entering a period of domestic uncertainty, and the Kremlin is rebalancing the country’s foreign policy to emphasize Russia’s Eurasian neighbors and China.

Economic uncertainty, meanwhile, is playing a part as well, and experts offered several scenarios for Russia’s future, none too rosy, at the 2013 World Economic Forum in Davos. One foresaw a plunge in the price of oil with dire consequences for the budget and social stability of Russia, which is in many ways dependent on its energy exports. Another suggested that even if oil prices stayed *sufficiently* high, public discontent would grow because the Russian people are *increasingly* tired of corruption and the lack of official accountability.

Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin used those scenarios to send a clear message from the Davos forum: rather than seeking to benefit from the global economic recovery, which has proven too sluggish, and high oil prices, which have proven too uncertain, Russia needs to embrace institutional reforms and work to *substantially* improve its investment climate.

Kudrin has a point. The country *desperately* needs to reform a number of its institutions, including pensions, public services, police, and the judiciary, and a better investment climate would certainly help relaunch the flagging Russian economy. But political and social developments will play an *equally* important role in shaping the country’s evolution, *directly* influencing its economic prospects.

Recently, the Russian social environment has *fundamentally* and *irreversibly* changed. Two decades of post-Communist adjustment have produced a new feature: an interest in public affairs on the part of a growing (but still minor) section of society. This development is nothing like the Arab Spring, which is also sometimes referred to as an Arab Awakening. It is neither an anti-Putin revolution nor a prologue to one. Rather, it represents a society that has begun to emerge from its post-Soviet hibernation, when the focus was almost *exclusively* on surviving physically and winning and arranging one’s private space. The Russian people have *overwhelmingly* weathered the harsh transition, and many have managed to become *relatively* affluent.

Yet, the more interesting—and difficult—part still lies ahead. Russia faces the challenge of ensuring robust economic growth and development while *simultaneously* transitioning from arbitrary rule and authoritarianism to a political system based on the rule of law. Given the size and immense diversity of the country, it will be crucial that this momentous transformation does not provoke chaos and civil strife. Russians will have to find a way to agree on the fundamentals, even as they learn to embrace their own diversity and the multiplicity of their interests. Russia also needs to find an adequate position for itself in the global economy and strike the right balance in its relations with key international actors, including the United States, China, and Europe.

It is quite possible that EU-Russia relations will become *largely* transactional and laden with controversies over domestic politics and divergent values. Yet, Europe and Russia continue to matter to each other in many ways. Russia is the EU's largest supplier of natural gas and oil, for instance. And beyond the energy trade, peace and security on the Continent, regional stability, economic development, and humanitarian and cultural ties demand productive EU-Russian interaction.

The EU remains an interested and very close observer of these Russian developments. Even though relations with Moscow have lost some of the vital importance they carried during the Cold War, internal processes in Russia will affect the livelihoods of many Europeans, and not only those in states sharing a border with Russia.

It is time, then, that Europeans looked beyond the headlines and into the very complex mix of issues comprising Russia's medium- and long-term agendas. In order to build a strategic approach toward their biggest neighbor that works, the Europeans need to be keen observers and good listeners. The EU must deepen its understanding of the changing realities in Russia.

Vocabulary exercises:

1.1 Give Russian equivalents and find words and expressions in the text:

domestic uncertainty, Economic uncertainty, dire consequences, social stability, energy exports, public discontent, the lack of official accountability, finance minister, the global economic recovery, investment climate, social environment, social environment,

public affairs, section of society, the harsh transition, arbitrary rule, authoritarianism, momentous transformation, civil strife, key international actors, controversies over domestic politics, divergent values, beyond the energy trade, humanitarian and cultural ties, the vital importance, internal processes, medium- and long-term agendas

1.2 Explain the meaning of the following word-combinations, consult English-English dictionary if necessary, combine them with collocations from the text and use in the sentences of your own:

undergo a subtle but immensely important change, draw closer to, enter a period of, rebalance the country's foreign policy, foresaw a plunge in the price of oil, be dependent on, be increasingly tired of, to send a clear message, to benefit from, to embrace institutional reforms, have a point, relaunch the flagging economy, shape the country's evolution, be nothing like, be referred to as, to emerge from, become relatively affluent, lie ahead, face the challenge of, transition from... to, be based on the rule of law, to find a way to agree on, to find an adequate position for, to strike the right balance, be laden with, demand productive EU-Russian interaction, share a border with, look beyond the headlines, to build a strategic approach, to be keen observers

1.3 Find adverbs, which are given in italicised letters. What role do they play in the sentences? Give the word combinations with them from the text and translate into Russian:

gradually, sufficiently increasingly substantially desperately equally directly fundamentally irreversibly exclusively overwhelmingly relatively simultaneously largely

An Uneasy Calm

Russia recently went through a period of significant domestic upheaval, but the Russian authorities believe that, for now, they have safely weathered the recent storm of public discontent. Mass protests sparked by fraudulent elections in late 2011 peaked in early 2012 and tapered off after the May 2012 presidential inauguration. Civic activism, unstructured and *essentially* leaderless, has not morphed into mass political opposition, and the figureheads of the movement have failed to build a broad support base. Once the election fraud theme became dated, the protesting crowds dwindled.

The government opted for repressive measures against several leaders of these demonstrations. The activist blogger Alexei Navalny has been put on trial, *ostensibly* for economic crimes. Sergey Udaltsov, the firebrand leader of the radical Left Front, has been placed under house arrest. A number of rank-and-file protesters were jailed following clashes with police in May 2012. Blogs and social-network exchanges, which once constituted a powerful medium for organizing mass action, have turned into little more than safety valves. Those who are no longer willing to venture into the street can freely and safely vent their frustration on Facebook or its Russian equivalents.

The Russian government has *carefully* avoided overreaction. The regime has *palpably* toughened but has not degenerated into an outright dictatorship. Broad popular acquiescence remains the bedrock of the authoritarian regime, which stays in power not so much by force as by the consent of the majority of the governed. Its repressive measures were in fact carefully targeted, affecting a handful—dozens, at most hundreds—of people. So far, these measures have *apparently* worked as an effective deterrent.

The State Duma, despite the somewhat significant representation of two nominal opposition parties, the Communists and the Just Russia Party, has come under the Kremlin's control. Both opposition parties have *overwhelmingly* sided with the ruling United Russia Party and its allies in Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party in promulgating repressive legislation.

The Federation Council, the parliament's upper chamber, has demonstrated extreme loyalty to Vladimir Putin. United Russia won all five gubernatorial elections held in 2012, which had been reinstated – with important restrictions – after an eight-year ban that had provoked much criticism in Russia and the West.

In an even more spectacular feat, the Kremlin has been able to tighten its control over Russian elites under the slogan of “nationalizing” them. Loyalty to the Kremlin no longer guarantees immunity from prosecution. Several senior bureaucrats have been charged with corruption, apparently in response to the opposition's condemnation of “crooks and thieves” in power. All senior officials have been barred by law from owning assets (excluding real estate) abroad.

Ironically, this may be seen as Putin's reply to the 2012 Magnitsky Act passed by the U.S. Congress, which imposed sanctions on Russian officials suspected of involvement in the death of imprisoned corporate lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. But whereas the Magnitsky Act sanctioned only a handful of misbehaving officials, Putin's move applies to all. The Kremlin is convinced that if Russian officials keep their money abroad, they become vulnerable to potential pressure from foreign governments. Putin prefers that these officials repatriate their money, placing it out of reach of foreigners, but well within the reach of the Kremlin.

The Kremlin has also made use of the terms of the recent EU bailout of Cyprus to enhance its message. Under the terms of the deal, Cypriots were required to raise billions of euros in exchange for bailout funds, most of which are likely to come from a tax on investors with large deposits in Cypriot banks.

Many of those investors are Russian. The Kremlin harshly criticized the "confiscation" of depositors' money in those banks and ultimately turned the episode into an argument in favor of bringing private Russian money back to Russia. Alas, until the country's domestic legal climate significantly improves, this argument will not carry much weight with wealthier Russian citizens.

The Kremlin's efforts to quell unrest at the political and elite level are helped along by a growing contentment among the general populace on the economic front. Most Russians seem relatively satisfied with their current lots in life. According to Russian pollsters, Russian citizens report the highest-ever degree of satisfaction with their material situation. Almost three-quarters of Russians consider their material condition to be fair, 12 percent feel good, and only 16 percent are unhappy about it. There is also more optimism than pessimism and despair, and the expectations of future improvement in living standards are quite high. The Levada Center, an independent polling organization, notes that more people are planning for their future.

Economic growth has decelerated *significantly* over the past year, but the government has so far managed to deliver on its social obligations. Russia's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is now \$18,570 in purchasing power parity terms, or

just about 15 percent lower than Poland's, roughly equal to Croatia's, and 30 percent above Turkey's. Despite the slower growth, real incomes are rising. Unemployment, officially at 5 percent, is *perfectly* tolerable.

Inflation, currently at 7.1 percent, appears manageable for the time being, although many economists are alarmed. The demographic decline has slowed, at least for now, and Russian life expectancy has risen to seventy years.

Although many international experts are still skeptical, the Russian government now hopes to see the country's population rise to 150 million between 2020 and 2025, up from 143 million in 2012 and far above international projections from several years ago.

A "social explosion"—which some opposition figures hoped for a year ago—is thus unlikely to happen anytime soon unless these economic circumstances *drastically* change. If the Kremlin, however, becomes complacent, it may be in for a bad surprise. The dipping of the benchmark oil price to below \$100 per barrel in April 2013 was one warning. The very real prospect of economic recession—or at least stagnation—in the fall of 2013 is another. As a result, social discontent may resurface. The Russian law-enforcement apparatus is sufficient to neutralize the more active protesters, but it can do little about the steadily changing popular attitudes toward the way the country is run.

In the past, the Russian people were most concerned about their private lives. Now, their demands have changed. Higher incomes and more goods to buy are no longer sufficient. People who can afford to purchase more goods of a higher quality now want better living conditions as well. Housing has become a major and increasingly acute problem – and one that cannot be resolved quickly. People also desire a healthcare system that is universal, professional, and affordable. The same holds true for the education system. The lack of national cohesion and the persistence of interethnic, interconfessional tensions have emerged as key issues as well.

Meanwhile, Russians expect more accountability and respect from those who rule in their name. Small- and medium-sized businesses reel under the crunch of official corruption. In 2012, 400,000 such businesses had to close, unable to pay higher taxes that were levied as a result of the government's determination to find

money to compensate for rising pensions. To many, the Kremlin's recent token fight against corruption looks more like a cover-up.

Cabinet-level figures who have been implicated in criminal investigations as part of the anticorruption push are likely to be spared a trial, and their subordinates are likely to bear the brunt of the accusations.

In reality, the Russian elite continues to rule and largely own the country with the ordinary people's acquiescence. Yet, sociopolitical issues are becoming as pronounced in the public debate as the socioeconomic ones. Increasing numbers of Russians are looking for a government that is more efficient and less corrupt.

And this yearning for change is not wholly confined to the larger metropolitan centers. It has slowly but steadily expanded to some of the bigger industrial cities and the frontier regions in the country's east and west.

And the steady maturing of society presents the long-term possibility of change from below. Indeed, relatively slow but fundamental shifts within society itself are determining the direction in which Russia is headed.

Vocabulary exercises:

2.1. Give Russian equivalents and find words and expressions in the text:

significant domestic upheaval, Mass protests, fraudulent elections, Civic activism, the figureheads of the movement, repressive measures, The activist blogger, the firebrand leader, rank-and-file protesters, safety valves, an outright dictatorship, Broad popular acquiescence, the consent of the majority, an effective deterrent, gubernatorial elections, immunity from prosecution, opposition's condemnation, a growing contentment, the ,general populace, improvement in living standards, per capita gross domestic product (GDP), for the time being, the demographic decline, life expectancy, the dipping of the benchmark oil price, the Russian law-enforcement apparatus, popular attitudes toward, The lack of national cohesion, Cabinet-level figures, the larger metropolitan centers.

2.2 Explain the meaning of the following word-combinations, consult English-English dictionary if necessary, combine them with collocations from the text and use in the sentences of your own:

go through a period of, weather the recent storm of public discontent, peak in, taper off, presidential inauguration, fail to build a broad support base, opt for, be put on trial, be placed under house arrest, be jailed, have turned into, to venture into the street, vent their frustration on, have not degenerated into, remain the bedrock of, come under the Kremlin's control, side with, promulgate repressive legislation, demonstrate extreme loyalty to, tighten control over, be charged with, be barred by law from owning assets, impose sanctions on, be suspected of, become vulnerable to, repatriate smb's money, in exchange for, carry much weight, quell unrest, deliver on its social obligations, be thus unlikely to happen, it may be in for a bad surprise, be concerned about, rule in smb's name, reel under the crunch of official corruption, likely to be spared a trial, bear the brunt of the accusations, be not wholly confined.

2.3 Find adverbs, which are given in italicized letters. What role do they play in the sentences? Give the word combinations with them from the text and translate into Russian:

Essentially, ostensibly, carefully, palpably, apparently, overwhelmingly, Ironically, significantly, perfectly, drastically.

Society Still Stirs

Despite the uneasy calm that has settled over Russia, thanks to the Kremlin's response to unrest and the soothing effects of economic improvement, unrest still bubbles beneath the surface. From nationalism to Islamism to liberalism, many members of society remain eager for change.

Political change, when it comes, may be abrupt or more gradual, depending on the circumstances. Social change, by contrast, is almost always steady and organic. Much of it is generational. Now, for the first time since perestroika, there is a lively debate happening within parts of Russian society itself rather than between a group of self-appointed "friends of the people" (or intelligentsia) and the supreme authority, as in czarist and Soviet times.

There are instances of social innovation, such as volunteer movements that, to a casual observer, appear to arise from nowhere even though they have been in gestation for years.

In fact, this new constituency of post-Soviet Russians that has emerged is full of achievers, people who make their own choices and decisions. Many of them have good professional skills, well-paying jobs, and comfortable lifestyles. Gradually, this community has developed an interest in volunteer activism, such as charitable or environmental activities, and gained experience with collective action and civic organization. “Activists,” according to a Moscow journalist who is herself an activist, “do not demand, they do.” This is a clear change in mentality.

And that action can take any number of forms. The awakening occurring in Russia covers the entire societal spectrum, from Pussy Riot libertarians to Orthodox fundamentalists, from gay activists to Cossacks with their very traditional views not just on the family but also on contemporary art and what constitutes public order. Society is rediscovering diversity at all levels, including regional ones. With this diversity comes conflict in its own midst.

“The people” are no longer united against “the authorities” but fight among themselves as well.

The intelligentsia, previously the figureheads of sociopolitical movements, are still trying to press the “demands of the people” on the authorities, but their mediation is less desirable than it was before. More and more people are finding a voice of their own. Those who call themselves members of the “creative class” are both vocal and independent in formulating their views. Economic, regional, professional, and other special interests are becoming more pronounced and more direct. Inevitably, they compete among themselves. But Russia’s new social movement remains essentially leaderless at this stage. The bloggers, writers, journalists, and cultural figures at the forefront of the debate have not become political leaders. Some aspiring opinion leaders have proven to be ignorant of key details of important public issues or poorly versed in the intricacies of economic or foreign policy.

Much of today's debate revolves around the issues that affect the majority of the population, such as reforming school tests and the higher education system, improving the quality and affordability of healthcare, and rectifying the dire situation of housing and communal services.

All this activity is pointed in different directions at the same time. Sociologists talk about three, even four, Russias existing side by side. There is one Russia composed of the largely modernized metropolitan centers with elements of postindustrial economy, like Moscow and St. Petersburg, and, at a considerable distance, the modernizing large cities of 1 million residents or more. Taken together, these include about 20 percent of the country's population.

There is another Russia that contains the very slowly modernizing industrial areas (25–30 percent of the population) and a third with the small towns and the countryside, which has little or no capacity for modernization (40 percent of the population). A fourth Russia includes the remaining 5 to 10 percent of the population that lives in traditionalist regions, mainly in parts of southern Siberia and the North Caucasus, and is sometimes referred to by Russian scholars as the country's "internal abroad."

In response to these increasing divisions, Russian authorities, who had long pretended to be all things to all people, have moved to the right to frankly embrace social conservatism, which resonates with some 60 percent of the voters, most of whom are in small-town and rural Russia.

The Kremlin, until now proudly pragmatic, has come up with its own rather vague version of Russian patriotism, which its critics liken to the Orthodoxy-autocracy-nationalism formula coined in the first half of the nineteenth century.

In this, the Russian Orthodox Church has emerged for the first time in post-Communist times as an open political ally of the Kremlin. This relationship is now officially termed a partnership. The authorities hope that the church's blessing will shore up their legitimacy, which was questioned during the recent protests. However, a small liberal and proto-reformist trend has developed within the church itself that could introduce a measure of dissent into church life.

As the Orthodox Church takes on a higher public profile, the Islamization of Russia – even outside the traditionally Muslim-majority regions – is spreading. More young Muslims, including in those places such as the Urals and western Siberia, are becoming active supporters of political Islam. This is a new and still poorly understood phenomenon. The Arab Spring, which Russian Muslims interpreted as a symbol of political Islam's success, contributed to the emergence of Islamist radicalism as an element in Russia's political panorama. The North Caucasus and Tatarstan have seen demonstrations in support of the Syrian opposition, and a body of opinion has formed within Russia's Muslim community that advocates advancing Russian interests by reaching out to ruling Islamists in various parts of the Arab world.

These developments are occurring as many well-established Russian political factions find themselves facing serious challenges. Liberals are on the defensive and bitterly bickering among themselves. Radicals are accusing the moderates who cooperate with the authorities of treason. Hardcore nationalists have been making arguments that carry weight with the ruling elite, although not always with society as a whole. Left-leaning populism remains strong, even if the existing political formations, from the Communists to the Just Russia Party to the Left Front, have failed to effectively accommodate it.

And as Russian society continues to grow and expand, the current regime, based as it is on personal power, is becoming more insular. Rather than reaching out to society, it seeks to solidify its base.

Vocabulary exercises:

3.1. Give Russian equivalents and find words and expressions in the text:

instances of social innovation, volunteer movements, a casual observer, constituency, volunteer activism, charitable or environmental activities, collective action, civic organization, the entire societal spectrum, cultural figures at the forefront, the quality and affordability of healthcare, rectifying the dire situation of housing and communal services, the largely modernized metropolitan centers, postindustrial

economy, at a considerable distance, traditionalist regions, an open political ally, an open political ally, a measure of dissent, a body of opinion, well-established Russian political factions, Hardcore nationalists, Left-leaning populism, the current regime.

3.2 Explain the meaning of the following word-combinations, consult English-English dictionary if necessary, and combine them with collocations from the text and use in the sentences of your own:

remain eager for change, arise from nowhere, be in gestation, be ignorant of, poorly versed in, revolve around, have little or no capacity for, be all things to all people, frankly embrace social conservatism, come up with, be now officially termed, shore up their legitimacy, be questioned, take on a higher public profile, contribute to the emergence, advancing Russian interests, find themselves facing serious challenges, carry weight with, solidify its base.

4. Comprehension questions. Give the full answers to the questions analyzing the information in the article. Make notes before you answer.

a) How can you describe the main obstacle on the way of Russia-EU political rapprochement?

b) Do you think that strict measures undertaken by Russian authorities to take under control social activity of protest movements in Moscow and other regional centers were efficient and justifiable?

c) Having in mind the ideological diversity within Russia, outlined in the article, can you describe the ideas and issues that may contribute to unification of Russian society?

5. Make up a summary of an article.

UNIT 3.

Pre-reading activities:

1. Explain the terms: *energy resources, energy exploration, energy exploitation, energy supply*. In what way do the natural resources of a country affect its geopolitical and economic status?

2. What do you know about these documents? When and where were they signed? What kind of relationships do they regulate? the “Malacca Predicament”, “Caspian Coastal Gas Pipeline Agreement”

3. Look up for the transcription and learn the words:

Industrialization, urbanization, , diversification, resource, perspective, accumulation, financial, loan, enlarge, neighboring, uranium, ore, utilization, hydroelectric, exploration, yield, surpasses, exploit, diversification, enterprise, consumption, geopolitical, intervening, indispensable, extensive, profound, comprehensive, dispersing, phenomenon, deficiency, acquisition,

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CENTRAL ASIAN FACTORS IN ENERGY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

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The first twenty years of the Twentieth Century is deemed as the “period of strategic opportunities” in peaceful development of China and also as a crucial period to provide industrialization and urbanization, during which dependency of economic and social development on foreign energy resources continued to increase. Out of consideration of sustainable development of the economy, the primary task of China in conducting international energy cooperation is to establish a diversified, stable and reliable energy supply system and to strengthen cooperation in oil and gas with major areas and countries in the world which are abundant in oil and gas, while deepening cooperation with Russia and neighboring central Asian countries *in terms of* energy exploration and pipeline transport and striving for long-term and stable supply of oil

and gas from onshore neighboring countries is a critical aspect for China to carry out the diversification strategy in importing of energy and resolve the “Malacca Predicament”.

The central Asian region is one of the regions in the world that have abundant reserves of oil and gas and has become the “potential stock” in world energy exploration in the 21st Century that is characterized by large explored reserves and small yield. *Considering* the economic developmental history of the five countries of the central Asian region, the energy industry of oil and gas is the backbone of its economic development. *From the perspective of* trade complementarity, what China imports mostly from the central Asian countries is raw material that is in sufficiency in China, which, in essence, is determined by the natural resource conditions, industrial structure and economic development stage of countries involved and which also complies with the strategic thought of the central Asian countries to attract foreign investment with resources to drive their economic development.

From the perspective of capital, with long-term accumulation of rapid development and foreign exchange reserves of China for three decades, Chinese capital is positively flowing into economy of central Asian countries. Especially since the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2008, both the financial system and substantial economy of Russia and central Asian countries have suffered from massive attack. *Furthermore*, owing to correct train of thought and appropriate measures in reacting to the crisis, China *not only* takes the lead in walking out of the crisis, *but also* has a foreign exchange reserve as high as over 2 trillion US dollars and jumps to be the top in the world. Under the circumstance when western countries and Russia keep a greatly shrunk investment in economy of central Asian countries, China taps its capital superiority and applies the mode of “oil for loan” into its cooperation with central Asian countries *in terms of* energy. In April 2009, China and Kazakhstan signed the loan assistance agreement that China offered a loan worthy of 10 billion US dollars to Kazakhstan; in June of the same year, China and Turkmenistan signed a loan agreement that China offered a loan worthy of 4 billion US dollars to Turkmenistan.

Currently, central Asian countries not only regard China as a major trade partner, but more an important strategic investing country since the loan offered by China not only helps central Asian countries to maintain and enlarge development of oil resources, but also creates favorable conditions for central Asian countries to have long-term and stable supply of oil and gas to China, complying with common interests of both of the parties involved.

Energy interests of China in the central Asian region are listed as follows. *Firstly*, the central Asian region is located in the central area of Eurasia, neighboring to the western China and abundant in resources, so it is an important strategic target cooperation region for China provide stable development of western China and conduct foreign energy cooperation. *Secondly*, the three countries of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are affluent in oil and gas reserves and are expected to become potential countries that supply oil and gas to China. *Thirdly*, uranium ore reserves of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are quite considerable, and there is enormous potential for them to have cooperation with China *in terms of* nuclear energy. *Fourthly*, the status of transit transport of central Asian region is quite significant, and the Eurasia traffic and transportation network that is under construction is of great significance to maintain Chinese energy transportation safety. *Fifthly*, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are extremely abundant in hydro energy resources, yet with low utilization rate, and are one of the regions for China to select in its hydroelectric cooperation in the future. *So far as the current stage is concerned*, the key field for energy cooperation between China and central Asian countries is exploration, development and utilization of oil, gas and uranium ore resources.

Oil that is imported by China from the central Asian region mainly comes from Kazakhstan, and it occupies the top within this region in both reserves and yield of crude oil that has been explored, with enormous potential of export of oil. In 2009, the import volume of crude oil in China broke through 0.2 billion tons for the first time and achieved 0.203 billion tons, exceeding Japan to become the second largest importing country of crude oil in the world. It has been a foregone conclusion that its

dependency on foreign countries *in terms of* crude oil surpasses 50%, which is predicted to increase to 65% by the year 2020. Thus, the task is quite urgent to realize diversification of energy supply. At present, China is able to import a volume of 10 to 20 million tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan each year through the Sino-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, which approximately accounts for 10% of the total importing volume of crude oil. Ever since the financial crisis, China and Kazakhstan have achieved new progress in exploration of oil and gas. In 2008, China-invested enterprises led by CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) exploited 15 million tons of crude oil (approximately 21% of the total crude oil exploited in Kazakhstan within the same year) within the border of Kazakhstan, which was almost 2.5 times of the total exploitation volume by Russian enterprises. *After having successfully acquired* part of oil and gas assets of Kazakhstan, China-invested enterprises exploited as much as 18 million tons of crude oil within the border of Kazakhstan in 2009, which occupied 23% of the total crude oil exploited within the border of Kazakhstan.

In the aspect of natural gas resources, Turkmenistan is not only abundant in reserves, but also has a considerable potential in export, the most important exporting country of natural gas within this region. The natural gas that is produced by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is mainly used for domestic consumption, since their capacity of exporting is limited. In December 2009, Sino-Central Asian gas pipeline was put into operation. *According to* the gas agreement between Turkmenistan and China, Turkmenistan will export a volume of 40 billion cubic meters of gas to China through this pipeline in the 30 years afterwards, whereas China will offer a loan of 4 billion US dollars with a preferential interest rate to Turkmenistan. The whole-line connection of Sino-Central Asian gas pipeline symbolizes that the diversification strategy of host countries of resources in the central Asian region in terms of energy exportation has attained significant progress and excessive dependency on Russian gas pipeline has been reduced. *However, it is obvious* that this does not comply with the entire interests of Russia that is represented by the energy giant “Russian Gas” since

Russia has ever been the monopoly importing country and transit transporting country for gas of Turkmenistan to be exported to foreign countries.

Although energy cooperation between China and the central Asian region has always been led by oil and gas, the tendency of diversification has been gradually manifested in the past several years, which is characterized by nuclear energy cooperation with Kazakhstan, cooperation with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan *in terms of* power station and power grid construction and cooperation with Kyrgyzstan in the field of coal.

Being the major two neighboring nations of central Asian countries, China and Russia attach great importance to commercial interests, national security and geopolitical concern of central Asian countries and depend on each other *in terms of* preventing other great powers from intervening in central Asian affairs and maintaining regional security and stability. *Nevertheless*, the two countries have diverged interests in controlling the energy resources and oil and gas pipelines of this region. *For instance*, as an energy importing country, China is dedicated to realize diversification in importing of energy in order to ensure acquisition of stable energy supply, *whereas* as an energy production country and transit transporting country, Russia attempts to control energy output channels from the upstream so as to exert more influences upon other energy consuming countries. *In the long run*, the central Asian region is the indispensable geostrategic space in development of China and Russia in the future, and mutual competition and negative influences caused *thereby* are inevitable, *but from another perspective*, this has also created opportunities for the two nations to go further into more extensive and profound cooperation.

For the past few years, with stable progressing of the diversification strategy in China's importing of energy in the central Asian region, Russia has felt worried about China's dispersing its economic interests, and especially its energy resources in the central Asian region, believing that the swift penetration of Chinese influence might bring about the following several negative outcomes to development of Russia and the central Asian region in the future. In the first place, capacity of control of Russia on

central Asian energy and other raw materials will be weakened to some extent. *In the long run*, this might damage the energy interests of Russia. If we say that Russian energy industry is seldom affected by situation of central Asian resources in the oil, hydroelectric and coal fields, then the natural gas and uranium ore of the central Asian region are resources that have decisive effects upon economy of Russia. *Especially* at a stage when domestic electric reform of Russia has entered a crucial period, Russian government formulates a plan for comprehensive development of generation of electricity and power grid infrastructure to, *on one hand*, ensure natural gas supply for power stations that are under construction, and, *on the other hand*, provide diversification of energy production and consumption structure. *In addition*, Russian government has established a series of indexes to be attained prior to the year 2030, among which the proportion of nuclear power in electric production structure of Russia will rise from the current 15.8% to 23%-25%.

By this token, a competitive relationship is constituted between China and Russia *in terms of* orientation of energy in the central Asian region. As for China's oil activities in the central Asian region, Russia fully manifests its important status as an energy transit transporting country. On May 12, 2007, the heads of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and the president of Uzbekistan made a joint statement that they would update and innovate the current natural gas pipeline that run from the central Asian region to Russia and lay a new Caspian pipeline.

On December 20 in the same year, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan formally signed "Caspian Coastal Gas Pipeline Agreement" in Moscow, predicting that the newly constructed pipeline from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Russia would be connected with the former pipeline, and designing an annual delivery capacity of 20 billion cubic meters. *Once* the Caspian natural gas pipeline project is put into effect, a natural gas delivery system with the largest scope will be formed in the central Asian region, which may further strengthen Russia's dominant rights to outbound freight of central Asian energy. *Besides*, progress of China and Kazakhstan

and Uzbekistan in exploration and development of uranium ore in the past few years also has aroused high attention of Russia.

In the second place, in view of continuously deepened energy cooperation between China and central Asian countries in terms of both scope and extent, this might make the external competitive environment of the central Asian countries in the field of energy more complicated. That is to say, positive participation of Chinese energy enterprises may intensify struggle of foreign companies including East Asian and western countries for central Asian resources. According to Russian government, excessive competition may necessarily break down the strategic balance between different regions in the Eurasia and stimulate central Asian countries to pursue a policy that makes them go far gradually away from Russia, which may not only cause Russia's efforts promote integration of energy and even economy within this region to be wasted, but also may speed up the trend of regional polarization of the entire post-Soviet.

In the third place, for the time being, the trade structure of “finished products for resource products” that is formed between China and Russia and central Asian countries is not helpful for actual establishment of the strategic collaboration relationship of China and Russia, *but, instead*, has enlarged possibility of the interest conflicts of the two countries. The overall characteristics of industrial structure of central Asian countries is resource intensive. *Compared with* rapid development of China economy, the social and economic development of central Asian countries is relatively low and the phenomenon of deficiency in capital generally exists. This condition makes quite a lot of large-scale cooperation projects within this region dependent on investment of China, as a result of which may not only make it difficult to form a developmental situation of win-win of multiple parties, but also does not comply with long-term interests of China. Just considering China's acquisition of energy supply from this region, in no way, will the serious unbalancedness of economic development can ensure that the central Asian region

will have a secure and stable investment environment. Hence, both Russia and central Asian countries wish that China could make a difference in the field of regional economic cooperation, push forward more balanced import and export trade and bilateral investment, enhance the overall competitive force of this region in the global economy and strengthen the common interests of China and Russia in maintaining security of the central Asian region.

Vocabulary exercises:

1. Give Russian equivalents and find words and expressions in the text:

foreign energy resources, sustainable development, energy supply system, onshore neighboring countries, the diversification strategy, the diversification strategy, abundant reserves of oil and gas, the “potential stock” in world energy exploration, large explored reserves and small yield, the backbone of its economic development, raw material, foreign exchange reserves, the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the financial system, appropriate measures, a loan worthy of 10 billion US dollars, long-term and stable supply of oil and gas, an important strategic target cooperation region, uranium ore reserves, enormous potential for, the status of transit transport, traffic and transportation network, hydro energy resources, low utilization rate, reserves and yield of crude oil, a foregone conclusion, the total importing volume, the financial crisis, the total exploitation volume, oil and gas assets, domestic consumption, a volume of 40 billion cubic meters of gas, a preferential interest rate, excessive dependency on, nuclear energy cooperation, power station and power grid construction, an energy importing country, energy consuming countries, the indispensable geostrategic space, mutual competition, the diversification strategy, the swift penetration, negative outcomes, comprehensive development, generation of electricity, power grid infrastructure, energy production and consumption structure, a series of indexes, an annual delivery capacity, continuously deepened

energy cooperation, in terms of both scope and extent, the external competitive environment, excessive competition, the strategic collaboration relationship, the phenomenon of deficiency in capital, a secure and stable investment environment.

2. Explain what is the meaning of the following word-combinations, consult English-English dictionary if necessary, combine them with collocations from the text and use in the sentences of your own:

conduct international energy cooperation, strengthen cooperation, strive for long-term and stable supply, carry out, be in sufficiency in, be determined by, comply with the strategic thought, attract foreign investment, be positively flowing into, take the lead in walking out of the crisis, jump to be the top in the world, keep a greatly shrunk investment, tap one's capital superiority, sign the loan assistance agreement, regard China as a major trade partner, maintain and enlarge development, create favorable conditions for, be affluent in oil and gas reserves, be under construction, be of great significance, occupy the top within this region, account for 10% of, achieve new progress in exploration, be abundant in reserves, have a considerable potential in export, be put into operation,

offer a loan of 4 billion US dollars, be gradually manifested, attach great importance to, prevent other great powers from, be dedicated to, ensure acquisition of stable energy supply, control energy output channels, exert more influences, create opportunities for, disperse one's economic interests, bring about, be weakened to some extent, damage the energy interests of, have decisive effects upon, enter a crucial period, ensure natural gas supply, make a joint statement, be put into effect, strengthen Russia's dominant rights, arouse high attention of, intensify struggle of foreign companies, break down the strategic balance, pursue a policy, speed up the trend of regional polarization, enlarge possibility, be resource intensive, be relatively low, comply with long-term interests, make a difference in the field of, push forward, enhance the overall competitive force, strengthen the common interests

3. The text contains a lot of linking words, conjunctions and expressions which help to connect the ideas logically. They are given in italicized letters. Find them in the text and give Russian equivalents. What different kinds of ideas do they link? Make up a mind-map of the article's paragraphs.

*In terms of,
Considering,
From the perspective of,
Especially*

*Currently
So far as the current stage is
concerned
After having successfully
acquired
It is obvious, that*

*Not only...but also
Firstly
Secondly
Fourthly*

*In the aspect of
According to*

*However,
Although
Furthermore
Nevertheless
For instance
Whereas
Thereby
In addition
Besides*

*In the long run
But from another perspective
For the past few years
On one hand
On the other hand
By this token
Once
In the second place
In the third place,
For the time being
But, instead
Compared with*

4. Comprehension questions, Give the full answers to the questions analyzing the information in the article. Make notes before you answer.

- a) In accordance to the author, why China recovered from crisis much faster than any other country?
- b) How would you evaluate the potential possibilities for diversification of energy import-export relations between China and Central Asian states?
- c) In which areas of cooperation with Central Asian countries do you think Russia is able to compete successfully with China?

5. Make up a summary of the article.

UNIT 4

Pre-reading activities:

1. What do you know about the following Russian political leader? What role did they play in the political life of the country? *Mikhail Gorbachev, Yevgeny Primakov, Andrei Kozyrev*
2. What is the main point of argument between westernizers and Slavophiles? When did this argument start? Surf the internet to find more about the history of the question?
3. What do you know about the following political alliances? the *Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)*
4. Give the transcription and learn the words:
Putative, resurgent, grandiose, unique, autochthonous, alternative, legatee, precipitate, arsenal, aspiration, priority, exaggerated, stewardship, alienate, incoherence, confusing, genuinely, counterproductive, supplicant, tutelary, inimical, subaltern, transcendence, alignment, bandwagon, reassertion, hegemony, autonomous, indigenous, coherence, geopolitical, accelerated, geopolitics, acknowledging, uniqueness, pursuit, competitor, exhort, prestige, preservation, perception, alternative, sovereign, vulnerable, visceral

Richard Sakwa

‘NEW COLD WAR’ OR TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS?

Russia and international politics

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The debate over the dynamics of Russian foreign policy has become ever more closely tied to controversy over the ‘regime question’: the problem of the nature of the political system that took shape during Vladimir Putin’s two terms as president between 2000 and 2008. Indeed, it appeared that one could not be understood without the other being taken into account. While foreign policy can never be dealt with in isolation from domestic constraints, the collapse of the one category into the other in the discourse of the late Putin years is reminiscent of the essentialism that

characterized debate in the Soviet era. This is just one example of the way in which, in a structural sense, Cold War patterns of thinking have once again surfaced in discussion about Russia and its role in the world. Putin's second term as president from 2004 was accompanied by ever more insistent suggestions that a new Cold War was in the making. This article will try to place these concerns in context and to provide both an empirical and a theoretical analysis of why the notion of 'Cold War' has returned to haunt us once again. It will deal with issues both substantive—namely, whether we are indeed entering a period that can be described as a Cold War—and discursive—why the category of Cold War remains so stubbornly entrenched in our understanding of international politics in general, and in relations with Russia in particular. I will begin by looking at the framework of Russian policy between 2000 and 2006, a period characterized by what we call a 'new realism'. From here I will move on to the unraveling of the new realism from 2006, and will then consider the features and causes of the putative 'new Cold War'.

From the new realism to Russia resurgent

For over two decades since Mikhail Gorbachev launched perestroika in 1985, Russia has been engaged in a grandiose modernization process. While developments in this period can be examined through the prism of theories of 'democratic transition', the transformation in Russia has unique features, above all its autochthonous character and the all-encompassing geopolitical shift involved. From being one of the world's two superpowers and the alternative pole in a bipolar system, Russia (as the legatee state of the USSR) suffered a precipitate geopolitical decline while at the same time engaging in economic and political transformation. An essential part of this transformation has been the attempt to find a new relationship with the developed West; but nearly two decades since the fall of communism it must be concluded that a satisfactory balance between integration and autonomy has not yet been found.

In the 1990s Russia endured one of the greatest economic depressions in peacetime in modern world history. Russia exercised the attributes of a world power,

with a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and the second largest nuclear arsenal, but its weakened economic status opened up a contradiction between aspiration and capacity. Putin sought to transcend this gulf by developing a new approach to foreign policy that combined Russia's traditional orientation towards *real politik* with a recognition of what used to be called interdependence and the priority of international economic integration. Within the framework of the new realism Putin sought to craft a policy that asserted Russia's national interests while integrating it into the world community. Russia's shedding of exaggerated illusions about its status in the world did not, however, itself call forth a willingness from the rest of the world to accept Russia into the international community on its own terms. By the time Putin came to power, moreover, the economic tide had turned, and, buoyed by a resurgent economy, Russia became ever more insistent in spelling out precisely what these terms would be. It is out of this fundamental difference in perceptions that the new realism foundered and the shadow of a new Cold War emerged.

Under the stewardship of Yevgeny Primakov (foreign minister between January 1996 and September 1998, and then prime minister until May 1999) the concept of 'pragmatism' predominated. Primakov's so-called pragmatism in foreign policy achieved few positive results, alienating Russia's friends and confirming the hostility of those traditionally suspicious of its intentions. Foreign policy in this period was imbued with a fatalistic dualism and appeared to operate at two levels: what Russia really wanted (foreign policy A), and what it was forced to do (foreign policy B). The tension led to incoherence and confusing signals. By the time he came to power Putin found himself in a position remarkably reminiscent of that facing Gorbachev when he became general secretary in 1985: associated with sullen allies and opposed by increasingly militant foes (a condition that appears to have been repeated by the end of his presidency). Primakov's zero-sum pragmatism was rooted in a highly traditional understanding of realism, underscored by a heavy dose of anti-western Sovietism and by calls for 'multipolarity', a code word for balancing and Cold War politics. Primakov's multipolarism sought to use the instruments of multilateralism to sustain

and manage a competitive view of the world, a traditional realist approach. This is in contrast to policies that genuinely seek to build on the normative values embedded in multilateral organizations to mitigate great power rivalries.

Putin came to power clearly aware of the counterproductive nature of Primakov's 'competitive pragmatism' as well as the great gulf between rhetoric and reality. Putin's overriding purpose from the very first days of his presidency was the normalization of Russian foreign policy. Russia was to be treated as neither supplicant nor potential disruptor, but as just one more 'normal' great power.

Russia's first foreign minister (1990–96), Andrei Kozyrev, had also talked of Russia as a 'normal great power', and insisted that Russia would achieve its interests 'not through confrontation but through cooperation'. Kozyrev stressed the distinction between 'the normalization of relations with other countries and normal relations with them', noting that while Gorbachev had begun the first task it was up to Russia to complete the second. A decade later Putin was still talking in precisely these terms, and even as he left the presidency Russia's relations with the developed world were far from normal. Russia's view of itself as a great power means that it considers itself to be in a very different category from all other European post-communist states, and hence refuses to accept the tutelary role of western institutions that in one way or another have imposed conditionality processes on its neighbours. Russia stands apart from the European Union's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and its military culture has been inimical to the development of, for example, an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO.

While for the majority of the other post-communist countries these terms of engagement with western institutions signal liberation from former subaltern status and the transcendence of past dependency, for Russia they mean the precise opposite.

However, to leave the discussion at this point would be profoundly misleading, and would do no more than confirm the view of those who believe that Russia's inflated pretensions are the cause of new Cold War problems. It would leave out of account the other half of the equation: that Russia's view of itself as a great power is

complemented by a no less deep desire to ‘normalize’ its relations with the world, and that in pursuit of this end it has actively engaged with existing institutions.

Goldgeier and McFaul have argued that post-communist Russian foreign policy does not follow the pattern anticipated by realist thinking. According to them Russia has become a ‘joiner’, and does not conform to the ‘balancing’ stance anticipated by classical realist theory. For Ambrosio, a state can either try to balance the major power in the international system, or it can bandwagon with it: the choice depends on the structure of the environment and the country’s political culture.

In Russia’s case Ambrosio identifies three strands: the Atlanticists, favouring alignment with the United States and the West (the bandwagoners); the imperialists, who favour the reassertion of Russia’s power in opposition to the West (the balancers); and the neo-Slavophiles, who share the sentiments of the imperialists but stress the development of the country’s identity. Zimmerman argues that the fundamental divide is indeed between westernizers and Slavophiles, in a reprise of nineteenth-century debates, with the Slavophiles intent on counterbalancing American hegemony and finding an autonomous developmental path. Putin is at most a moderate neo-Slavophile, trying to combine adaptation to international norms with a reserved area of autonomy and scope for indigenous development.

It has become almost a commonplace today to assert that Putin adopted a Eurasianist perspective on international affairs, but this is profoundly mistaken. Eurasianists insist that Russia remains the core of a distinctive civilization based on the unique mix of peoples who have shared a common destiny for nearly a millennium. The various strains of neo-Eurasian thinking, drawing on the ideas of the 1920s and 1930s (although in most fundamental respects contradicting them), are based on the belief that Russia’s geopolitical position imbues it with unique geopolitical advantages that effectively force it to be a great power and to make a bid for world leadership. There are many strands of Eurasianism – so many, indeed, that the concept has almost lost any intellectual coherence. There is a pragmatic Eurasianism, which simply reflects the fact that Russia is both a European and an

Asian power; a neo-Eurasianism, with a more imperialist and at times semi-fascist inflection that stresses geopolitical competition while denigrating the West; a civilizational Eurasianism that stresses the ‘ethnogenesis’ of an entirely new society transcending old ethnic divisions in the Eurasian heartland; and an intercivilizational Eurasianism, focusing on Russia’s multi-ethnic identity. Time has moved on, however, and Dmitri Trenin argues that China’s growing strength in the east and the instability of the Islamic south mean that Russia’s only geopolitical future lies with the West, including accelerated integration with the EU and solid relations with the United States. This is something that Putin recognized: his thinking bears little trace of Eurasianism, but contains much to do with Russia’s position in Eurasia. Putin certainly is not at one with the school of critical geopolitics that questions the imperatives of space and geography, but his new realism tried to break free from the traditionally static, monolithic and zero-sum representations of Russia’s role in the world. In short, Putin sought to normalize the debate on Russian foreign policy, stripping it of neo-Eurasian elements rooted in nineteenth century views of competitive advantage and instead acknowledging twenty-first century realities.

Putin’s realism was thus tempered by a continuing strand of idealism, centred on the principle that Russia is part of a European civilizational identity and should be accepted on its own terms as an equal member of the international community. This idealism is accompanied by an instrumental strand of *real politik*, including severe overreaction when Russia’s *amour propre* is perceived to have been slighted.

The fact that these various approaches—the realist, the idealist and the instrumental – jostle cheek by jowl reflects the tension in Putin’s new realism. It is a realism concerned not so much with balancing as with joining, tempered at the same time by neo-Slavophile concerns about autonomy and uniqueness and by pragmatic Eurasianist notions of the distinctive problems facing a country in the heart of the Eurasian landmass. It is more than standard neo-realism, in which the realist concern with power is tempered by issues of identity and consensus, although it certainly accepts some of neo-realism’s basic postulates. As Tsygankov puts it, ‘Russia’s

attitude is essentially accommodationist's', and in contrast to earlier policy the country did not try to exploit the threat posed by unipolarity.

The new realism did not mean giving up aspirations to global influence, but it did mean the pursuit of a far more conscious attempt to match ambitions to resources, accompanied by modifications to the type of influence that the country sought. The new realism has not given up the notion of Russia as a 'great power', but the definition of what it means to be a great power has changed, as has that of the way it should behave. Russia would be a power acting as part of the status quo rather than as a putative revisionist force setting itself up as a competitor for global hegemony. The style and priorities of policy also changed. Putin devoted considerable attention to Russia's image abroad, exhorting the diplomatic corps on numerous occasions, notably when addressing them at the foreign ministry building on 12 July 2002 and again on 12 July 2004, to improve Russia's international prestige. Particular attention was to be paid to the preservation of Russia's leadership role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); but how perceptions of Russian hegemony in the region were to be avoided was not addressed.

While Russia's policy remained within the broad neo-realist tradition, Putin insisted that Russia must join the community of western nations, but should do so in its own way. Russia, in his view, would remain a great power, but it would be a 'normal' one – that is, not claiming to be the centre of an alternative ideological or geopolitical bloc. Russia's broad aim was no longer to set itself up as an alternative to the West but to act as the champion of the autonomy of sovereign states, and above all its own. Russia would work with China but feared becoming trapped in an anti-western alliance with it, and hence took a rather contradictory approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Although it is quite rational for a vulnerable power to embed its security in a broader alliance system, neither Russia nor China is ready to cede sovereignty in security matters to the SCO.

Soviet aspirations to world leadership are gone, but Russia's almost visceral aspiration to be taken seriously in world affairs is not. Russia does not set itself up as an *alternative* to the West; but it does claim *autonomy*.

Vocabulary exercises:

1. Give Russian equivalents and find words and expressions in the text:

controversy over the 'regime question', two terms as president, domestic constraints, Cold War patterns of thinking, ever more insistent suggestions, understanding of international politics, the framework of Russian policy, the putative 'new Cold War', modernization process, democratic transition, the all-encompassing geopolitical shift, the world's two superpowers, a bipolar system, the legatee state of the USSR, an essential part of, a satisfactory balance between, a permanent seat in, a new approach to foreign policy, on its own terms, increasingly militant foes, potential disruptor, former subaltern status, inflated pretensions, a civilizational Eurasianism, an intercivilizational Eurasianism, the heart of the Eurasian landmass, the status quo, a putative revisionist, the champion of the autonomy of sovereign states

2. Explain the meaning of the following word-combinations, consult English-English dictionary if necessary, combine them with collocations from the text and use in the sentences

take shape, be taken into account, be reminiscent of, be surfaced in discussion, be accompanied by, be in the making, be engaged in, suffer a precipitate geopolitical decline, endure one of the greatest economic depressions, exercise the attributes of a world power, open up a contradiction, transcend the gulf, achieve few positive results, confirm the hostility of, be imbued with a fatalistic dualism, operate at two levels, sustain and manage a competitive view of the world, mitigate great power rivalries, be clearly aware of, be up to Russia, be far from normal, impose conditionality processes, be anticipated by, share the sentiments of, counterbalancing American hegemony, combine adaptation to international norms with..., make a bid for, loose any

intellectual coherence, lie with the West, bear little trace of Eurasianism, contain much to do with, break free from, in contrast to earlier policy, give up aspirations to global influence, match ambitions to resources, exhort the diplomatic corps, join the community of western nations, embed one's security in a broader alliance system, cede sovereignty in security matters to

3. Find these word combinations in the Introduction to the article. What role do they play in the organization of the text? Think about the topic you would like to write an article about and compose an introduction, using these word combinations:

it appeared that, in a structural sense, place these concerns in context and to provide both an empirical and a theoretical analysis, the notion of, It will deal with issues, in general, in particular, I will begin by looking at, a period characterized by what we call a 'new realism', From here I will move on to, consider the features and causes of

4. There are more examples of the text structure collocations in the article. Find them in the context, give the Russian variants and make up sentences of your own:

can be examined through the prism of theories, it must be concluded that, within the framework of the new realism, while integrating, it is out of this fundamental difference in perceptions that..., the concept of 'pragmatism' predominated, Primakov's so-called pragmatism,

However, to leave the discussion at this point would be profoundly misleading, confirm the view of,

Goldgeier and McFaul have argued that...,

In Russia's case Ambrosio identifies three strands..., It has become almost a commonplace today..., reflects the fact that..., As Tsygankov puts it..., devoted considerable attention to, was not addressed, remained within the broad neo-realist tradition.

5. “Political metaphor” is one of the speech devices used to speak figuratively about certain actions or events. Explain what is meant by the metaphors, used in the following sentences. Translate them into Russian.

1. The notion of ‘Cold War’ has *returned to haunt us* once again.
2. The category of Cold War remains so *stubbornly entrenched* in our understanding of international politics in general.
3. Within the framework of the new realism Putin sought *to craft a policy* that asserted Russia’s national interests while integrating it into the world community.
4. By the time Putin came to power, moreover, *the economic tide had turned*.
5. It is out of this fundamental difference in perceptions that the new realism *founded* and the *shadow of a new Cold War emerged*.
6. Primakov’s zero-sum pragmatism *was rooted* in a highly traditional understanding of realism.
7. The fact that these various approaches—the realist, the idealist and the instrumental – *jostle cheek by jowl* reflects the tension in Putin’s new realism.

6. Comprehension questions. Give the full answers to the questions analyzing the information in the article. Make notes before you answer.

- a) How do you understand the author’s interpretation of the concept of “New Realism” and “Pragmatism” in Russia?
- b) Do you agree with the Eurasianists’ statement that Russia remains the core of a distinctive civilization based on the unique mix of peoples who have shared a common destiny, culture, values, etc.?
- c) Is it possible, in your opinion, to find a good balance between Russia’s self-proclaimed ‘Eurasian way of development’ and the interest to remain as a member of community of western nations?

7. Make up a summary of the article.

UNIT 5.

Pre-reading activities:

1. What is meant by the following economic terms: *global gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita?*

2. Give the full names of the organizations under the following abbreviations: *NATO, BRIC*. When were they established and what is their role in the International arena?

3. Look up for the transcriptions of the following words in the dictionary and pronounce them correctly:

objectives, allies, Orthodox Christians, Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, the Crimea, the Balkans, the Kremlin, vulnerability, perceived, threat, capabilities, collapse, elite, dimension, assertiveness, macroeconomic, mechanisms, scenario, leverage, successor, fledged, overhaul, confident, expenditures, niche

Andrei P. Tsygankov

RUSSIA'S POWER AND ALLIANCES

// Politics: 2010 VOL 30(S1)

The origins of Russia's great power ambitions

Russia has established itself as a great power by engaging more advanced states in projects of common concern or challenging them to recognise Russia's ambitions and international claims. In so doing, Russian leaders have sought to preserve limited and regional, rather than global, control, yet they have also recognised the importance of acting globally for achieving what are largely regional objectives.

These objectives included defence of its borders and cultural allies – Orthodox Christians in the nineteenth century, communists in the twentieth century and ethnic Russians after the Soviet disintegration – and these objectives required that Russia remain a great power and be recognised as such by the outside world.

Historically, Russia's power status was maintained by addressing diverse international challenges. After the fall of Byzantium in the fifteenth century, Russia emerged as the centre of Eastern Christianity and fought multiple wars with the Ottoman Empire to defend Orthodox Christians in the Crimea and the Balkans.

Russia also challenged European states to recognise its regional ambitions. In the twentieth century, the Kremlin followed largely the same logic when it challenged the United States and Britain to recognise the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

By the late twentieth century, the international context had changed. Ideological confrontation yielded to the logic of economic globalisation, and Russia too had to change methods to defend its position as a great power. Russia now had to shift emphasis from defeating its rivals militarily or through counter-intelligence operations to demonstrating its ability to compete on the global markets.

Two historical forces shaped Russia's behaviour. First, although it has emerged as historically dependent on the West's power and recognition, Russia has never been colonised by Western nations and greatly values its political and spiritual independence (Poe, 2003). Such independence has kept alive Russia's ambitions to preserve its influence in Eurasia and Eastern Europe. Second, being a continental empire with vast borders made Russia wary of multiple and varied challenges to its security.

Russia compensated for this vulnerability by developing a highly centralised political system in order to be able to respond rapidly to threats from abroad. The highly centralised state also gained an upper hand internally – often by suppressing resistance from commercial classes.

Other established and rising powers face relatively few external threats to their security. Russia, however, remains preoccupied with the security of its borders and natural resources and acts as a concerned regional power. Much of this preoccupation has roots in Russia's militarised history and geography of resistance to real and perceived threats from abroad. By contrast, Western states, especially those protected by the oceans from potential invasions, historically have faced fewer security challenges.

Recovering state and power capabilities

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's power capabilities declined substantially. Russia lost one-sixth of its territory, its economy shrank by some 50 per cent and the state was divided by powerful individuals, practically losing the ability to govern. Western states expected Russia to follow their political and economic recommendations, yet programmes of Western assistance served mostly to encourage the destruction of the previous economic system and to build relationships within a narrow and corrupt ruling elite (see Cohen, 2000; Reddaway and Glinski, 2001; Wedel, 1998). For example, the figures of the overall capital flight during 1992–99 exceeded the amount of financial assistance. The so-called reformers in Russia were well aware of this state of affairs, yet they were unable to say 'no' to Western 'assistance'.

The situation has changed since the late 1990s, when Russia began to recover. Russia's economic power, both in terms of share of global gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita, has increased. By 2007 the economy had recovered to its 1990 level growth continued to grow at about 7 per cent per year. Thus during 1999–2007 the overall size of the economy increased about six times in current dollars – from \$200 billion to \$1.3 trillion.

Russia's per capita GDP quadrupled to nearly \$7,000, and about 20 million people were lifted out of poverty (RIA Novosti, 2008).

Another dimension of Russia's recovery is that its middle class now constitutes about 25 per cent of the population (Kommersant, 2008). The social aspect of recovery is essential for preventing internal destabilisation and allowing the state to conduct an active foreign policy. Over 2000–05, the average Russian saw a 26 per cent annual growth in his or her income, relative to only a 10 per cent rise in that of the average Chinese (Crandall, 2006). As a result, the number of Russians who thought that the chosen development course in Russia was correct grew year on year. Even the global financial crisis has not changed the fact that almost 80 per cent of Russians remain satisfied with their living standards (RIA Novosti, 2010a).

Other significant Russian power resources are its oil and gas reserves. Russia has approximately 13 per cent of the world's known oil reserves and 34 per cent of its gas reserves (Arbatov, Belova and Feygin, 2006). This power resource has gained an importance as global energy demand and prices have risen. Russia's main energy markets are in Europe, and Europe is expected to increase considerably its consumption of natural gas over time. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency, Russian gas will account for about 33–34 per cent of European demand compared with the current 25 per cent (RIA Novosti, 2010b). Energy remains Russia's important comparative advantage and, although the global economic recession has seriously affected Russia, energy experts project recovery of the markets within the next several years.

Acting assertively on recovered state and power capabilities

Recovery of state and power capabilities allowed the Kremlin to act assertively in foreign policy. The philosophy behind such assertiveness has been state-led international economic expansion. Rather than becoming wide open to Western economic and political influences – something that the new Russian leadership had experimented with during the 1990s – it now pursued a course of selective openness managed by an increasingly strong and nationalistic state. In the world of growing energy prices, the emphasis shifted from providing macroeconomic discipline and tough fiscal policies toward a desire to capitalise on Russia's reserves of natural gas and oil. As viewed by Vladimir Putin, the role of the energy sector is to work with the state to promote international economic expansion and to reinforce the sovereignty and independence that were undermined during the 1990s.

According to this perspective, relying on market forces is essential, but insufficient: 'Even in developed countries, market mechanisms do not provide solutions to strategic tasks of resource use, protecting nature, and sustainable economic security'. The state therefore has to shape policy outcomes by actively

seeking to control social resources, co-ordinating the activities of key social players and assisting the country in finding its niche in the global economy. Thus the Kremlin insists on the need for Russia to protect its path of development and natural resources.

The economic recovery provided conditions for Russia's active business promotion in Europe, which accounts for 50 per cent of Russia's foreign trade. The Kremlin insisted on long-term contracts with Europeans and greater integration with European markets in order to avoid a repetition of the 1985–86 scenario when a sharp decline in energy prices had contributed considerably to the break-up of the Soviet economy. Outside European markets, Moscow hardly has a choice of not developing its capacity as a global middleman by co-ordinating its production with other key energy producers and offering its expertise in building energy infrastructure across the world.

The Kremlin has also been actively selling weapons abroad, in part to raise revenue for domestic modernisation. The main customers for Russia's armaments are global and include India, China, Algeria, Venezuela, Malaysia and Syria. Despite the global financial crisis, in 2009 Russia exported \$7.4 billion worth of weapons – 10 per cent more than in the previous year (Itar-Tass, 2010).

Furthermore, the Kremlin adopted a more assertive global stance to defend its vision of international rules – partly to reflect Russia's concerns with its sovereignty and independence and partly to respond to dissatisfaction with the United States's invasion of Iraq and the former Soviet region. Soon after the invasion of Iraq, the United States pushed the entire former Soviet region toward transforming its political institutions and was then working on extending membership of its alliance to former Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. Washington also routinely denounced Russia for using energy as political leverage to influence its neighbours' policies. In response, Putin (2007) accused the United States of 'disdain for the basic principles of international law' and of having 'overstepped its national borders in ... the economic, political, cultural and educational policies'.

Putin's successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, built on Putin's vision, seeking to position Russia as a more global player and a maker of new global rules. Russia thus seeks to articulate its concerns using its membership within existing international organisations, particularly its position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and proposing new international treaties, such as a new pan-European treaty to establish a new security architecture, in which Russia would become a fully fledged participant and NATO would cease to serve as the key organisation responsible for European security. Medvedev (2008) also proposed an overhaul of the international economic order so that it was less reliant on the US, which he blamed for causing the global financial crisis by trying to substitute itself for the global commodities and financial markets. The Kremlin, along with China and other BRIC countries, has also advocated steps to reduce reliance on the dollar in international economic transactions. So far, these efforts have not had much success.

Thus Russia has become stronger and more confident since 2000. It has preserved and developed important attributes of a great power and is more recognised as such by the outside world. In the longer run, however, Russia faces multiple challenges to its ambition to remain a great power. Russia's material capabilities are limited.

Although it has recovered from the longest economic depression in its history, much of Russia's recovery has been due to high oil prices. According to World Bank estimates, energy has accounted for about 25 per cent of the Russian economy and for about 50 per cent of its GDP growth (Rutland, 2008, pp. 1063–1064). Moreover, although Russia's economic growth during the seven years preceding the recent financial crisis was impressive, its share of global GDP is a mere 2.3 per cent, and may rise only to 3.5 per cent by 2020 (Kuchins and Weitz, 2008, p. 6). Consequently, Russia is unlikely to close the gap with the United States in terms of GDP during the next 10 to 15 years and the gaps between its GDP and those of China and India will continue to widen. In addition, Russia's military expenditures do not match those of China, France and the United Kingdom, not to mention the US.

Overall, Russia has made some progress in some areas, but continues to stagnate and fall behind in others.

The fact that Russia has managed to muddle through thus far is not a guarantee that it will be able to in the future, and the current economic crisis narrows the Kremlin's options further. During the recent crisis, Russia, which is heavily dependent on energy, including exports, was hit particularly hard and its GDP fell by around 9 per cent in 2009, while China and India continued to grow, albeit at slower rates. Russia has also had to spend a considerable portion of its reserves to bail out domestic enterprises, including non-competitive ones, and to scale down its activist foreign policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Mankoff, 2010). The crisis has therefore slowed down Russia's international assertiveness.

Vocabulary exercises:

1. Give Russian equivalents and find words and expressions in the text:

projects of common concern, the Soviet sphere of influence, Ideological confrontation, counter-intelligence operations, the highly centralised state, external threats, security challenges, challenges to security, political and economic recommendations, a narrow and corrupt ruling elite, the overall capital flight, state of affairs, the social aspect of recovery, the average Russian, annual growth in his or her income, this power resource, global energy demand, important comparative advantage, the global economic recession, state-led international economic expansion, a course of selective openness, tough fiscal policies, the economic recovery, a sharp decline in energy prices, the break-up of the Soviet economy, key energy producers, the main customers for Russia's armaments, political leverage, a fully fledged participant, the global commodities, international economic transactions, important attributes of a great power, share of global GDP

2. Explain the meaning of the following word-combinations, consult English-English dictionary if necessary, combine them with collocations from the text and use in the sentences of your own:

address diverse international challenges, emerge as the centre of, feight multiple wars, yield to, shift emphasis from...to, be dependent on the West's power and recognition, make smb. wary of, compensated for, respond rapidly to, suppress resistance from, face relatively few external threats, remain preoccupied with, have roots in, encourage the destruction of, exceed the amount of, be well aware of, increase about six times in current dollars, quadruple to nearly \$7,000, be lifted out of poverty, constitute about 25 per cent of the population, prevent internal destabilization, conduct an active foreign policy, grow year on year, remain satisfied with, gain an importance, increase considerably its consumption of, account for about 33–34 per cent of European demand, act assertively, pursue a course of, provide macroeconomic discipline, capitalise on Russia's reserves, promote international economic expansion, reinforce the sovereignty and independence, provide solutions to strategic tasks, shape policy outcomes, find one's niche in, insists on the need for Russia, provide conditions for, contribute considerably to, offer one's expertise, build energy infrastructure, raise revenue for, defend one's vision of international rules, denounce smb. for, accuse smb. of, to position Russia as a more global player, propose new international treaties, establish a new security architecture, cease to serve as, propos an overhaul of, be less reliant on, blame for causing the global financial crisis, advocate steps to reduce reliance on the dollar, face multiple challenges, recover from the longest economic depression, due to high oil prices, is unlikely to close the gap with, do not match those of, not to mention the US, stagnate and fall behind, manage to muddle through, narrow the Kremlin's options further, to grow at slower rates, bail out domestic enterprises, scale down a foreign policy

3. Pay attention to the time expressions in the text. How do they organize the chronological order in the article? Give your own examples.

By the late twentieth century, during 1992–99, since the late 1990s, by 2007, over 2000–05, the 1985–86 scenario

4. Find the examples of economic statistics in the text. Draw out charts, diagrams or graphs to illustrate these information.

5. Comprehension questions. Using the information from the text give full answers to the following questions. Make notes before giving an answer.

a) Do you agree or disagree with the author's statement that Russia compensated its size and border vulnerability by developing a highly centralised political system in order to be able to respond rapidly to threats from abroad? Please explain your answer.

b) How can you explain the fact that during the time of economic crisis of 2008, almost 80% of Russians were satisfied with their living standards?

c) In the article author claims that despite the fact of solid economic growth, Russia remains stagnating in comparison with other global competitors. Do you find author's arguments persuasive or not?

6. Make up a summary of the article.

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РОССИЯ И МИР

АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛИСТОВ
В ОБЛАСТИ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ

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