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Учебно-методическое пособие содержит тексты для чтения по организационной психологии, которые могут быть использованы для аудиторной и самостоятельной работы при обучении английскому языку по программам бакалавриата и магистратуры. Отдельно рассмотрены рекомендации для подготовки презентаций на иностранном языке, цель которых – выступление на научных конференциях, симпозиумах и т.д.

Для студентов, аспирантов и специалистов в области преподавания английского языка.

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READING 1

CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS IN MANAGEMENT THEORIES

Geert Hofstede

Executive Overview

Management as the word is presently used is an American invention. In other parts of the world not only the practices but the entire concept of management may differ, and the theories needed to understand it, may deviate considerably from what is considered normal and desirable in the USA. The reader is invited on a trip around the world, and both local management practices and theories are explained from the different contexts and histories of the places visited: Germany, Japan, France, Holland, the countries of the overseas Chinese, South-East Asia, Africa, Russia, and finally mainland China.

A model in which worldwide differences in national cultures are categorized according to five independent dimensions helps in explaining the differences in management found; although the situation in each country or region has unique characteristics that no model can account for. One practical application of the model is in demonstrating the relative position of the U.S. versus other parts of the world. In a global perspective, U.S. management theories contain a number of idiosyncrasies not necessarily shared by management elsewhere. Three such idiosyncrasies are mentioned: a stress on market processes, a stress on the individual, and a focus on managers rather than on workers. A plea is made for an internationalization not only of business, but also of management theories, as a way of enriching theories at the national level.

Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland contains the famous story of Alice's croquet game with the Queen of Hearts.

Alice thought she had never seen such a curious croquet-ground in all her life; it was all ridges and furrows; the balls were live hedgehogs, the mallets live flamingoes, and the soldiers had to double themselves up and to stand on their hands and feet, to make the arches.

You probably know how the story goes: Alice's flamingo mallet turns its head whenever she wants to strike with it; her hedgehog ball runs away; and the doubled-up soldier arches walk around all the time. The only rule seems to be that the Queen of Hearts always wins.

Alice's croquet playing problems are good analogies to attempts to build culture-free theories of management. Concepts available for this purpose are themselves alive with culture, having been developed within a particular cultural context. They have a tendency to guide our thinking toward our desired conclusion.

As the same reasoning may also be applied to the arguments in this article, I better tell you my conclusion before I continue—so that the rules of my game are understood. In this article we take a trip around the world to demonstrate that there are no such things as universal management theories.

Diversity in management practices as we go around the world has been recognized in U.S. management literature for more than thirty years. The term "comparative management" has been used since the 1960s. However, it has taken much longer for the U.S. academic community to accept that not only practices but also the validity of theories may stop at national borders, and I wonder whether even today everybody would agree with this statement.

An article I published in *Organizational Dynamics* in 1980 entitled "Do American Theories Apply Abroad?" created more controversy than I expected. The article argued, with empirical support, that generally accepted U.S. theories like those of Maslow, Herzberg, McClelland, Vroom, McGregor, Likert, Blake and Mouton may not or only very partly apply outside the borders of their country of origin—assuming they do apply within those borders. Among the requests for reprints, a larger number were from Canada than from the United States.

MANAGEMENT THEORISTS ARE HUMAN

Employees and managers are human. Employees as humans was "discovered" in the 1930s, with the Human Relations School. Managers as humans, was introduced in the late 40s by Herbert Simon's "bounded rationality" and elaborated by Richard Cyert and James March's *Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (1963, and recently re-published in a second edition). My argument is that management scientists, theorists, and writers are human too: they grew up in a particular society in a particular period, and their ideas cannot help but reflect the constraints of their environment.

The idea that the validity of a theory is constrained by national borders is more obvious in Europe, with all its borders, than in a huge borderless country like the U.S. Already in the sixteenth century Michel de Montaigne, a Frenchman, wrote a statement which was made famous by Blaise Pascal about a century later: "There are truths on this side of the Pyrenees which are falsehoods on the other".

FROM DON ARMADO'S LOVE TO TAYLOR'S SCIENCE

According to the comprehensive ten-volume Oxford English Dictionary (1971), the words "manage," "management," and "manager" appeared in the English language in the 16th century. The oldest recorded use of the word "manager" is in Shakespeare's "Love's Labour's Lost," dating from 1588, in which Don Adriano de Armado, "a fantastical Spaniard," exclaims (Act I, scene ii, 188):

Adieu, valour! rust, rapier! be still, drum! for your manager is in love; yea, he loveth.

The linguistic origin of the word is from Latin *manus*, hand, via the Italian *maneggiare*, which is the training of horses in the *manege*; subsequently its meaning was extended to skillful handling in general, like of arms and musical instruments, as Don Armado illustrates. However, the word also became associated with the French *menage*, household, as an equivalent of "husbandry" in its sense of the art of running a household. The theatre of present-day management contains elements of both *manege* and *menage* and different managers and cultures may use different accents.

The founder of the science of economics, the Scot Adam Smith, in his 1776 book *The Wealth of Nations*, used "manage," "management" (even "bad management") and "manager" when dealing with the process and the persons involved in operating joint stock companies. British economist John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) followed Smith in this use and clearly expressed his distrust of such hired people who were not driven by ownership. Since the 1880s the word "management" appeared occasionally in writings by American engineers, until it was canonized as a modern science by Frederick W. Taylor in *Shop Management* in 1903 and in *The Principles of Scientific Management* in 1911.

While Smith and Mill used "management" to describe a process and "managers" for the persons involved, "management" in the American sense—which has since been taken back by the British—refers not only to the process but also to the managers as a class of people. This class (1) does not own a business but sells its skills to act on behalf of the owners and (2) does not produce personally but is indispensable for making others produce, through motivation. Members of this class carry a high status and many American boys and girls aspire to the role. In the U.S., the manager is a cultural hero.

Let us now turn to other parts of the world. We will look at management in its context in other successful modern economies: Germany, Japan, France, Holland, and among the Overseas

Chinese. Then we will examine management in the much larger part of the world that is still poor, especially South-East Asia and Africa, and in the new political configurations of Eastern Europe, and Russia in particular. We will then return to the U.S. via mainland China.

Germany

The manager is not a cultural hero in Germany. If anybody, it is the engineer who fills the hero role. Frederick Taylor's Scientific Management was conceived in a society of immigrants—where large numbers of workers with diverse backgrounds and skills had to work together. In Germany this heterogeneity never existed.

Elements of the mediaeval guild system have survived in historical continuity in Germany until the present day. In particular, a very effective apprenticeship system exists both on the shop floor and in the office, which alternates practical work and classroom courses. At the end of the apprenticeship the worker receives a certificate, the *Facharbeiterbrief*, which is recognized throughout the country. About two thirds of the German worker population holds such a certificate and a corresponding occupational pride. In fact, quite a few German company presidents have worked their way up from the ranks through an apprenticeship. In comparison, two thirds of the worker population in Britain have no occupational qualification at all.

The highly skilled and responsible German workers do not necessarily need a manager, American-style, to "motivate" them. They expect their boss or Meister to assign their tasks and to be the expert in resolving technical problems. Comparisons of similar German, British, and French organizations show the Germans as having the highest rate of personnel in productive roles and the lowest both in leadership and staff roles.

Business schools are virtually unknown in Germany. Native German management theories concentrate on formal systems. The inapplicability of American concepts of management was quite apparent in 1973 when the U.S. consulting firm of Booz, Allen and Hamilton, commissioned by the German Ministry of Economic Affairs, wrote a study of German management from an American view point. The report is highly critical and writes among other things that "Germans simply do not have a very strong concept of management." Since 1973, from my personal experience, the situation has not changed much. However, during this period the German economy has performed in a superior fashion to the U.S. in virtually all respects, so a strong concept of management might have been a liability rather than an asset.

Japan

The American type of manager is also missing in Japan. In the United States, the core of the enterprise is the managerial class. The core of the Japanese enterprise is the permanent worker group; workers who for all practical purposes are tenured and who aspire at life-long employment. They are distinct from the non-permanent employees—most women and subcontracted teams led by gang bosses, to be laid off in slack periods. University graduates in Japan first join the permanent worker group and subsequently fill various positions, moving from line to staff as the need occurs while paid according to seniority rather than position. They take part in Japanese-style group consultation sessions for important decisions, which extend the decision-making period but guarantee fast implementation afterwards. Japanese are to a large extent controlled by their peer p rather than by their manager.

Three researchers from the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, Josef Tobin, David Wu, and Dana Danielson, did an observation study of typical preschools in three countries: China, Japan, and the United States. Their results have been published both as a book and as a video. In the Japanese preschool, one teacher handled twenty-eight four-year olds. The video shows one particularly obnoxious boy, Hiroki, who fights with other children and throws teaching materials down from the balcony. When a little girl tries to alarm the teacher, the latter answers "what are you calling me for? Do something about it!" In the U.S. preschool, there is one adult for every nine children. This class has its problem child too, Glen, who refuses to clear away his toys. One of the teachers has a long talk with him and isolates him in a corner, until he changes his mind. It doesn't take much imagination to realize that managing Hiroki thirty years later will be a different process from managing Glen.

American theories of leadership are ill-suited for the Japanese group-controlled situation. During the past two decades, the Japanese have developed their own "PM" theory of leadership, in which P stands for performance and M for maintenance. The latter is less a concern for individual employees than for maintaining social stability. In view of the amazing success of the Japanese economy in the past thirty years, many Americans have sought for the secrets of Japanese management hoping to copy them.

There are no secrets of Japanese management, however; it is even doubtful whether there is such a thing as management, in the American sense, in Japan at all. The secret is in Japanese society; and if any group in society should be singled out as carriers of the secret, it is the workers, not the managers.

France

The manager, U.S. style, does not exist in France either. In a very enlightening book, unfortunately not yet translated into English, the French researcher Philippe d'Iribarne (1989) describes the results of in-depth observation and interview studies of management methods in three subsidiary plants of the same French multinational; in France, the United States, and Holland. He relates what he finds to information about the three societies in general. Where necessary, he goes back in history to trace the roots of the strikingly different behaviors in the completion of the same tasks. He identifies three kinds of basic principles (*logiques*) of management. In the USA, the principle is the fair contract between employer and employee, which gives the manager considerable prerogatives, but within its limits. This is really a labor market in which the worker sells his or her labor for a price. In France, the principle is the honor of each class in a society which has always been and remains extremely stratified, in which superiors behave as superior beings and subordinates accept and expect this, conscious of their own lower level in the national hierarchy but also of the honor of their own class. The French do not think in terms of managers versus nonmanagers but in terms of cadres versus non-cadres; one becomes cadre by attending the proper schools and one remains it forever; regardless of their actual task, cadres have the privileges of a higher social class, and it is very rare for a non-cadre to cross the ranks.

The conflict between French and American theories of management became apparent in the beginning of the twentieth century, in a criticism by the great French management pioneer Henri Fayol (1841-1925) on his U.S. colleague and contemporary Frederick W. Taylor (1856-1915). The difference in career paths of the two men is striking. Fayol was a French engineer whose career as a *cadre superieur* culminated in the position of President-Directeur-General of a mining company. After his retirement he formulated his experiences in a path-breaking text on organization: *Administration industrielle et generale*, in which he focussed on the sources of authority. Taylor was an American engineer who started his career in industry as a worker and attained his academic qualifications through evening studies. From chief engineer in a steel company he became one of the first management consultants. Taylor was not really concerned with the issue of authority at all; his focus was on efficiency. He proposed to split the task of the

first-line boss into eight specialisms, each exercised by a different person; an idea which eventually led to the idea of a matrix organization.

Taylor's work appeared in a French translation in 1913, and Fayol read it and showed himself generally impressed but shocked by Taylor's "denial of the principle of the Unity of Command" in the case of the eight-boss-system.

Seventy years later Andre Laurent, another of Fayol's compatriots, found that French managers in a survey reacted very strongly against a suggestion that one employee could report to two different bosses, while U.S. managers in the same survey showed fewer misgivings. Matrix organization has never become popular in France as it has in the United States.

Holland

In my own country, Holland or as it is officially called, the Netherlands, the study by Philippe d'Iribarne found the management principle to be a need for consensus among all parties, neither predetermined by a contractual relationship nor by class distinctions, but based on an open-ended exchange of views and a balancing of interests. In terms of the different origins of the word "manager," the organization in Holland is more menage (household) while in the United States it is more manege (horse drill).

At my university, the University of Limburg at Maastricht, every semester we receive a class of American business students who take a program in European Studies. We asked both the Americans and a matched group of Dutch students to describe their ideal job after graduation, using a list of twenty-two job characteristics. The Americans attached significantly more importance than the Dutch to earnings, advancement, benefits, a good working relationship with their boss, and security of employment. The Dutch attached more importance to freedom to adopt their own approach to the job, being consulted by their boss in his or her decisions, training opportunities, contributing to the success of their organization, fully using their skills and abilities, and helping others. This list confirms d'Iribarne's findings of a contractual employment relationship in the United States, based on earnings and career opportunities, against a consensual relationship in Holland. The latter has centuries-old roots; the Netherlands were the first republic in Western Europe (1609-1810), and a model for the American republic. The country has been and still is governed by a careful balancing of interests in a multi-party system.

In terms of management theories, both motivation and leadership in Holland are different from what they are in the United States. Leadership in Holland presupposes modesty, as opposed to assertiveness in the United States. No U.S. leadership theory has room for that. Working in

Holland is not a constant feast, however. There is a built-in premium on mediocrity and jealousy, as well as time-consuming ritual consultations to maintain the appearance of consensus and the pretense of modesty. There is unfortunately another side to every coin.

The Overseas Chinese

Among the champions of economic development in the past thirty years we find three countries mainly populated by Chinese living outside the Chinese mainland: Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Moreover, overseas Chinese play a very important role in the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, where they form an ethnic minority. If anything, the little dragons— Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore—have been more economically successful than Japan, moving from rags to riches and now counted among the world's wealthy industrial countries. Yet very little attention has been paid to the way in which their enterprises have been managed. The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism by Gordon Redding (1990), the British dean of the Hong Kong Business School, is an excellent book about Chinese business. He bases his insights on personal acquaintance and in-depth discussions with a large number of overseas Chinese business people.

Overseas Chinese American enterprises lack almost all characteristics of modern management. They tend to be small, cooperating for essential functions with other small organizations through networks based on personal relations. They are family-owned, without the separation between ownership and management typical in the West, or even in Japan and Korea. They normally focus on one product or market, with growth by opportunistic diversification; in this, they are extremely flexible. Decision making is centralized in the hands of one dominant family member, but other family members may be given new ventures to try their skills on. They are low-profile and extremely cost-conscious, applying Confucian virtues of thrift and persistence. Their size is kept small by the assumed lack of loyalty of non-family employees, who, if they are any good, will just wait and save until they can start their own family business.

Overseas Chinese prefer economic activities in which great gains can be made with little manpower, like commodity trading and real estate. They employ few professional managers, except their sons and sometimes daughters who have been sent to prestigious business schools abroad, but who upon return continue to run the family business the Chinese way.

The origin of this system, or—in the Western view—this lack of system, is found in the history of Chinese society, in which there were no formal laws, only formal networks of powerful people guided by general principles of Confucian virtue. The favors of the authorities could change daily, so nobody could be trusted except one's kinfolk—of whom, fortunately, there used

to be many, in an extended family structure. The overseas Chinese way of doing business is also very well adapted to their position in the countries in which they form ethnic minorities, often envied and threatened by ethnic violence.

Overseas Chinese businesses following this unprofessional approach command a collective gross national product of some 200 to 300 billion US dollars, exceeding the GNP of Australia. There is no denying that it works.

MANAGEMENT TRANSFER TO POOR COUNTRIES

Four-fifths of the world population live in countries that are not rich but poor. After World War II and decolonization, the stated purpose of the United Nations and the World Bank has been to promote the development of all the world's countries in a war on poverty. After forty years it looks very much like we are losing this war. If one thing has become clear, it is that the export of Western— mostly American—management practices and theories to poor countries has contributed little to nothing to their development. There has been no lack of effort and money spent for this purpose: students from poor countries have been trained in this country, and teachers and Peace Corps workers have been sent to the poor countries. If nothing else, the general lack of success in economic development of other countries should be sufficient argument to doubt the validity of Western management theories in non-Western environments.

If we examine different parts of the world, the development picture is not equally bleak, and history is often a better predictor than economic factors for what happens today. There is a broad regional pecking order with East Asia leading. The little dragons have passed into the camp of the wealthy; then follow South-East Asia (with its overseas Chinese minorities), Latin America (in spite of the debt crisis), South Asia, and Africa always trails behind. Several African countries have only become poorer since decolonization.

Regions of the world with a history of large-scale political integration and civilization generally have done better than regions in which no large-scale political and cultural infrastructure existed, even if the old civilizations had decayed or been suppressed by colonizers. It has become painfully clear that development cannot be pressure-cooked; it presumes a cultural infrastructure that takes time to grow. Local management is part of this infrastructure; it cannot be imported in package form. Assuming that with so-called modern management techniques and theories outsiders can develop a country has proven a deplorable arrogance. At best, one can hope for a dialogue between equals with the locals, in which the Western partner acts as the expert in Western technology and the local partner as the expert in local culture, habits, and feelings.

Russia and China

The crumbling of the former Eastern bloc has left us with a scattering of states and would-be states of which the political and economic future is extremely uncertain. The best predictions are those based on knowledge of history, because historical trends have taken revenge on the arrogance of the Soviet rulers who believed they could turn them around by brute power. One obvious fact is that the former bloc is extremely heterogeneous, including countries traditionally closely linked with the West by trade and travel, like Czechia, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Baltic states, as well as others with a Byzantine or Turkish past; some having been prosperous, others always extremely poor.

The industrialized Western world and the World Bank seem committed to helping the ex-Eastern bloc countries develop, but with the same technocratic neglect for local cultural factors that proved so unsuccessful in the development assistance to other poor countries. Free market capitalism, introduced by Western-style management, is supposed to be the answer from Albania to Russia.

Let me limit myself to the Russian republic, a huge territory with some 140 million inhabitants, mainly Russians. We know quite a bit about the Russians as their country was a world power for several hundreds of years before communism, and in the nineteenth century it has produced some of the greatest writers in world literature. If I want to understand the Russians—including how they could so long support the Soviet regime—I tend to re-read Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy. In his most famous novel *Anna Karenina* (1876) one of the main characters is a landowner, Levin, whom Tolstoy uses to express his own views and convictions about his people. Russian peasants used to be serfs; serfdom had been abolished in 1861, but the peasants, now tenants, remained as passive as before. Levin wanted to break this passivity by dividing the land among his peasants in exchange for a share of the crops; but the peasants only let the land deteriorate further. Here follows a quote:

(Levin) read political economy and socialistic works ... but, as he had expected, found nothing in them related to his undertaking. In the political economy books—in (John Stuart) Mill, for instance, whom he studied first and with great ardour, hoping every minute to find an answer to the questions that were engrossing him—he found only certain laws deduced from the state of agriculture in Europe; but he could not for the life of him see why these laws, which did not apply to Russia, should be considered universal. . . . Political economy told him that the laws by which Europe had developed and was developing her

wealth were universal and absolute. Socialist teaching told him that development along those lines leads to ruin. And neither of them offered the smallest enlightenment as to what he, Levin, and all the Russian peasants and landowners were to do with their millions of hands and millions of acres, to make them as productive as possible for the common good.

In the summer of 1991, the Russian lands yielded a record harvest, but a large share of it rotted in the fields because no people were to be found for harvesting. The passivity is still there, and not only among the peasants. And the heirs of John Stuart Mill (whom we met before as one of the early analysts of "management") again present their universal recipes which simply do not apply.

Citing Tolstoy, I implicitly suggest that management theorists cannot neglect the great literature of the countries they want their ideas to apply to. The greatest novel in the Chinese literature is considered Cao Xueqin's *The Story of the Stone*, also known as *The Dream of the Red Chamber* which appeared around 1760. It describes the rise and fall of two branches of an aristocratic family in Beijing, who live in adjacent plots in the capital. Their plots are joined by a magnificent garden with several pavilions in it, and the young, mostly female members of both families are allowed to live in them. One day the management of the garden is taken over by a young woman, Tan-Chun, who states:

I think we ought to pick out a few experienced trust-worthy old women from among the ones who work in the Garden—women who know something about gardening already—and put the upkeep of the Garden into their hands. We needn't ask them to pay us rent; all we need ask them for is an annual share of the produce. There would be four advantages in this arrangement. In the first place, if we have people whose sole occupation is to look after trees and flowers and so on, the condition of the Garden will improve gradually year after year and there will be no more of those long periods of neglect followed by bursts of feverish activity when things have been allowed to get out of hand. Secondly there won't be the spoiling and wastage we get at present. Thirdly the women themselves will gain a little extra to add to their incomes which will compensate them for the hard work they put in throughout the year. And fourthly, there's no reason why we shouldn't use the money we should otherwise have spent on nurserymen, rockery specialists, horticultural cleaners and so on for other purposes.

As the story goes on, the capitalist privatization—because that is what it is—of the Garden is carried through, and it works. When in the 1980s Deng Xiaoping allowed privatization in the Chinese villages, it also worked. It worked so well that its effects started to be felt in politics and threatened the existing political order; hence the knockdown at Tienanmen Square of June 1989. But it seems that the forces of privatization are getting the upper hand again in China.

If we remember what Chinese entrepreneurs are able to do once they have become Overseas Chinese, we shouldn't be too surprised. But what works in China—and worked two centuries ago—does not have to work in Russia, not in Tolstoy's days and not today. I am not offering a solution; I only protest against a naive universalism that knows only one recipe for development, the one supposed to have worked in the United States.

A THEORY OF CULTURE IN MANAGEMENT

Our trip around the world is over and we are back in the United States. What have we learned? There is something in all countries called "management," but its meaning differs to a larger or smaller extent from one country to the other, and it takes considerable historical and cultural insight into local conditions to understand its processes, philosophies, and problems. If already the word may mean so many different things, how can we expect one country's theories of management to apply abroad? One should be extremely careful in making this assumption, and test it before considering it proven. Management is not a phenomenon that can be isolated from other processes taking place in a society. During our trip around the world we saw that it interacts with what happens in the family, at school, in politics, and government. It is obviously also related to religion and to beliefs about science. Theories of management always had to be interdisciplinary, but if we cross national borders they should become more interdisciplinary than ever.

Cultural differences between nations can be, to some extent, described using first four, and now five, bipolar dimensions. The position of a country on these dimensions allows us to make some predictions on the way their society operates, including their management processes and the kind of theories applicable to their management.

As the word culture plays such an important role in my theory, let me give you my definition, which differs from some other very respectable definitions. Culture to me is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes one group or category of people from another. In the part of my work I am referring to now, the category of people is the nation.

Culture is a construct that means it is "not directly accessible to observation but inferable from verbal statements and other behaviors and useful in predicting still other observable and measurable verbal and nonverbal behavior." It should not be reified; it is an auxiliary concept that should be used as long as it proves useful but bypassed where we can predict behaviors without it.

The same applies to the dimensions I introduced. They are constructs too that should not be reified. They do not "exist"; they are tools for analysis which may or may not clarify a

situation. In my statistical analysis of empirical data the first four dimensions together explain forty-nine percent of the variance in the data. The other fifty-one percent remain specific to individual countries.

The first four dimensions were initially detected through a comparison of the values of similar people (employees and managers) in sixty-four national subsidiaries of the IBM Corporation. People working for the same multinational, but in different countries, represent very well-matched samples from the populations of their countries, similar in all respects except nationality.

The first dimension is labelled *Power Distance*, and it can be defined as the degree of inequality among people which the population of a country considers as normal: from relatively equal (that is, small power distance) to extremely unequal (large power distance). All societies are unequal, but some are more unequal than others.

The second dimension is labelled *Individualism*, and it is the degree to which people in a country prefer to act as individuals rather than as members of groups. The opposite of individualism can be called Collectivism, so collectivism is low individualism. The way I use the word it has no political connotations. In collectivist societies a child learns to respect the group to which it belongs, usually the family, and to differentiate between in-group members and outgroup members (that is, all other people). When children grow up they remain members of their group, and they expect the group to protect them when they are in trouble. In return, they have to remain loyal to their group throughout life. In individualist societies, a child learns very early to think of itself as "I" instead of as part of "we". It expects one day to have to stand on its own feet and not to get protection from its group any more; and therefore it also does not feel a need for strong loyalty.

The third dimension is called *Masculinity* and its opposite pole Femininity. It is the degree to which tough values like assertiveness, performance, success and competition, which in nearly all societies are associated with the role of men, prevail over tender values like the quality of life, maintaining warm personal relationships, service, care for the weak, and solidarity, which in nearly all societies are more associated with women's roles. Women's roles differ from men's roles in all countries; but in tough societies, the differences are larger than in tender ones.

The fourth dimension is labelled *Uncertainty Avoidance*, and it can be defined as the degree to which people in a country prefer structured over unstructured situations. Structured situations are those in which there are clear rules as to how one should behave. These rules can be written down, but they can also be unwritten and imposed by tradition. In countries which score high on uncertainty avoidance, people tend to show more nervous energy, while in countries which score low, people are more easy-going. A (national) society with strong

uncertainty avoidance can be called rigid; one with weak uncertainty avoidance, flexible. In countries where uncertainty avoidance is strong a feeling prevails of "what is different, is dangerous." In weak uncertainty avoidance societies, the feeling would rather be "what is different, is curious."

The fifth dimension was added on the basis of a study of the values of students in twenty-three countries carried out by Michael Harris Bond, a Canadian working in Hong Kong. He and I had cooperated in another study of students' values which had yielded the same four dimensions as the IBM data. However, we wondered to what extent our common findings in two studies could be the effect of a Western bias introduced by the common Western background of the researchers: remember Alice's croquet game. Michael Bond resolved this dilemma by deliberately introducing an Eastern bias. He used a questionnaire prepared at his request by his Chinese colleagues, the Chinese Value Survey (CVS), which was translated from Chinese into different languages and answered by fifty male and fifty female students in each of twenty-three countries in all five continents. Analysis of the CVS data produced three dimensions significantly correlated with the three IBM dimensions of power distance, individualism, and masculinity. There was also a fourth dimension, but it did not resemble uncertainty avoidance. It was composed, both on the positive and on the negative side, from items that had not been included in the IBM studies but were present in the Chinese Value Survey because they were rooted in the teachings of Confucius. I labelled this dimension: *Long-term* versus *Short-term* Orientation. On the long-term side one finds values oriented towards the future, like thrift (saving) and persistence. On the short-term side one finds values rather oriented towards the past and present, like respect for tradition and fulfilling social obligations.

Table 1

CULTURE DIMENSION SCORES FOR TEN COUNTRIES

	PD	ID	MA	UA	LT
USA	40 L	91 H	62 H	46 L	29 L
Germany	35 L	67 H	66 H	65 M	31 M
Japan	54 M	46 M	95 H	92 H	80 H
France	68 H	71 H	43 M	86 H	30*L
Netherlands	38 L	80 H	14 L	53 M	44 M
Hong Kong	68 H	25 L	57 H	29 L	96 H

Indonesia	78 H	14 L	46 M	48 L	25*L
West Africa	77 H	20 L	46 M	54 M	16 L
Russia	95*H	50*M	40*L	90*H	10*L
China	80*H	20*L	50*M	60*M	118 H

* estimated

PD = Power Distance; ID = Individualism; MA = Masculinity; UA = Uncertainty Avoidance; LT = Long Term Orientation; H = top third; M = medium third; L = bottom third (among 53 countries and regions for the first four dimensions; among 23 countries for the fifth)

Table 1 lists the scores on all five dimensions for the United States and for the other countries we just discussed. The table shows that each country has its own configuration on the four dimensions. Some of the values in the table have been estimated based on imperfect replications or personal impressions. The different dimension scores do not "explain" all the differences in management I described earlier. To understand management in a country, one should have both knowledge of and empathy with the entire local scene. However, the scores should make us aware that people in other countries may think, feel, and act very differently from us when confronted with basic problems of society.

IDIOSYNCRASIES OF AMERICAN MANAGEMENT THEORIES

In comparison to other countries, the U.S. culture profile presents itself as below average on power distance and uncertainty avoidance, highly individualistic, fairly masculine, and short-term oriented. The Germans show a stronger uncertainty avoidance and less extreme individualism; the Japanese are different on all dimensions, least on power distance; the French show larger power distance and uncertainty avoidance, but are less individualistic and somewhat feminine; the Dutch resemble the Americans on the first three dimensions, but score extremely feminine and relatively long-term oriented; Hong Kong Chinese combine large power distance with weak uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, and are very long-term oriented; and so on.

The American culture profile is reflected in American management theories. I will just mention three elements not necessarily present in other countries: the stress on market processes, the stress on the individual, and the focus on managers rather than on workers.

The Stress on Market Processes

During the 1970s and 80s it has become fashionable in the United States to look at organizations from a "transaction costs" viewpoint. Economist Oliver Williamson has opposed "hierarchies" to "markets." The reasoning is that human social life consists of economic transactions between individuals. We found the same in d'Iribarne's description of the U.S. principle of the contract between employer and employee, the labor market in which the worker sells his or her labor for a price. These individuals will form hierarchical organizations when the cost of the economic transactions (such as getting information, finding out whom to trust etc.) is lower in a hierarchy than when all transactions would take place on a free market.

From a cultural perspective the important point is that the "market" is the point of departure or base model, and the organization is explained from market failure. A culture that produces such a theory is likely to prefer organizations that internally resemble markets to organizations that internally resemble more structured models, like those in Germany or France. The ideal principle of control in organizations in the market philosophy is competition between individuals. This philosophy fits a society that combines a not-too-large power distance with a not-too-strong uncertainty avoidance and individualism; besides the USA, it will fit all other Anglo countries.

The Stress on the Individual

I find this constantly in the design of research projects and hypotheses; also in the fact that in the U.S. psychology is clearly a more respectable discipline in management circles than sociology. Culture however is a collective phenomenon. Although we may get our information about culture from individuals, we have to interpret it at the level of collectivities. There are snags here known as the "ecological fallacy" and the "reverse ecological fallacy." None of the U.S. college textbooks on methodology I know deals sufficiently with the problem of multilevel analysis.

Culture can be compared to a forest, while individuals are trees. A forest is not just a bunch of trees; it is a symbiosis of different trees, bushes, plants, insects, animals and micro-organisms, and we miss the essence of the forest if we only describe its most typical trees. In the same way, a culture cannot be satisfactorily described in terms of the characteristics of a typical individual. There is a tendency in the U.S. management literature to overlook the forest for the trees and to ascribe cultural differences to interactions among individuals.

A striking example is found in the otherwise excellent book *Organizational Culture and Leadership* by Edgar H. Schein (1985). On the basis of his consulting experience he compares two large companies, nicknamed "Action" and "Multi." He explains the differences in culture between these companies by the group dynamics in their respective boardrooms. Nowhere in the book are any conclusions drawn from the fact that the first company is an American-based computer firm, and the second a Swiss-based pharmaceuticals firm. This information is not even mentioned. A stress on interactions among individuals obviously fits a culture identified as the most individualistic in the world, but it will not be so well understood by the four-fifths of the world population for whom the group prevails over the individual.

One of the conclusions of my own multilevel research has been that culture at the national level and culture at the organizational level—corporate culture—are two very different phenomena and that the use of a common term for both is confusing. If we do use the common term, we should also pay attention to the occupational and the gender level of culture. National cultures differ primarily in the fundamental, invisible values held by a majority of their members, acquired in early childhood, whereas organizational cultures are a much more superficial phenomenon residing mainly in the visible practices of the organization, acquired by socialization of the new members who join as young adults. National cultures change only very slowly if at all; organizational cultures may be consciously changed, although this isn't necessarily easy. This difference between the two types of culture is the secret of the existence of multinational corporations that employ, as I showed in the IBM case, employees with extremely different national cultural values. What keeps them together is a corporate culture based on common practices.

The Stress on Managers Rather than Workers

The core element of a work organization around the world is the people who do the work. All the rest is superstructure, and I hope to have demonstrated to you that it may take many different shapes. In the U.S. literature on work organization, however, the core element, if not explicitly then implicitly, is considered the manager. This may well be the result of the combination of extreme individualism with fairly strong masculinity, which has turned the manager into a culture hero of almost mythical proportions. For example, he—not really she—is supposed to make decisions all the time. Those of you who are or have been managers must know that this is a fable. Very few management decisions are just "made" as the myth suggests it. Managers are

much more involved in maintaining networks; if anything, it is the rank-and-file worker who can really make decisions on his or her own, albeit on a relatively simple level.

An amusing effect of the U.S. focus on managers is that in at least ten American books and articles on management I have been misquoted as having studied IBM managers in my research, whereas the book clearly describes that the answers were from IBM employees. My observation may be biased, but I get the impression that compared to twenty or thirty years ago less research in this country is done among employees and more on managers. But managers derive their *raison d'être* from the people managed: culturally, they are the followers of the people they lead, and their effectiveness depends on the latter. In other parts of the world, this exclusive focus on the manager is less strong, with Japan as the supreme example.

CONCLUSION

This article started with Alice in Wonderland. In fact, the management theorist who ventures outside his or her own country into other parts of the world is like Alice in Wonderland. He or she will meet strange beings, customs, ways of organizing or disorganizing and theories that are clearly stupid, old-fashioned or even immoral—yet they may work, or at least they may not fail more frequently than corresponding theories do at home. Then, after the first culture shock, the traveller to Wonderland will feel enlightened, and may be able to take his or her experiences home and use them advantageously. All great ideas in science, politics and management have travelled from one country to another, and been enriched by foreign influences. The roots of American management theories are mainly in Europe: with Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Lev Tolstoy, Max Weber, Henri Fayol, Sigmund Freud, Kurt Lewin and many others. These theories were re-planted here and they developed and bore fruit. The same may happen again. The last thing we need is a Monroe doctrine for management ideas.

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READING 2

STRATEGIC JOB ANALYSIS

Benjamin Schneider and Andrea Marcus Konz

The application of job analysis techniques makes the implicit assumption that information about a job as it presently exists may be used to develop programs to recruit, select, train, and appraise people for the job as it will exist in the future. Given a rapidly changing internal and external world it is likely that many jobs will change in the future. This article reviews some new techniques that, when added to traditional job analysis procedures, may facilitate strategic planning for the development of personnel procedures such as selection and training. Examples of the new technique are presented, followed by a discussion of some topics requiring future thought and research.

An important, yet frequently overlooked assumption that underlies the use of job analysis as a basis for the development of personnel practices concerns the stability of the job in question. The implicit assumption has been that specification of the tasks to be performed, and the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for job performance are for a job as it currently exists, and/or has existed in the past. This assumption implies that the job in question is static, a stance that is inconsistent with the need to develop human resource systems for the future (Hall, 1984). Given factors such as the increased use of computers, the expanded capacity of electronic communication systems (Lund and Hansen, 1986), and the need for strategic redirection (Hall, 1984; Schuler, 1988) and the globalization of the U.S. economy, it is unlikely that many jobs will remain static.

The importance placed on job analysis in human resources management has not merely been a function of its multiple uses. The courts have played a role in establishing its importance. In *Albemarle v. Moody* (1975), for example, the Supreme Court disallowed the use of selection tests that were designed without supporting job analysis data. The centrality of job analysis to especially personnel selection was fully documented with the publication of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (Federal Register, 1978). It is clear that the courts have subsequently been following the Guidelines' requirement for a job analysis that establishes the framework for selection programs.

The purposes of this article are to (1) integrate different literatures that have addressed the need for strategic job analysis and, (2) describe our experience to date with a procedure to define jobs as they are likely to exist in the future.

WHY STRATEGIC JOB ANALYSIS

Tichy (1983, p. 3) has noted that, with respect to human resources management in general, "... that no longer were we asking the question: Are human resources important? Rather, the question for the 1980s is: How will we integrate human resource issues into the strategic management of the firm?" Indeed, the 1980s has seen an explosion of the involvement of human resources issues with business strategy. Meshoulam and Baird (1987) note, for example, that compensation systems, staffing practices, and performance management systems all have evolved to become more integrated with corporate strategy. Schuler and Jackson (1987) have gone so far as to chart the kinds of strategic human resources choices organizations need to make including choices regarding staffing, planning, appraising, compensation, and training and development.

There now appears to be some progress in the integration of human resources management with business strategy, although continued progress is needed (Schuler, 1988). For example, few researchers appear to be concerned with the effects on human resources issues of organizational disruptions such as downsizing, mergers and acquisitions, and so forth (for exceptions see Bastien, 1987 on mergers and Sutton, 1983 on downsizing).

From the innovation/technology literatures comes a clearly specified need for addressing organizational disruptions. For example, in Lund and Hansen's (1986) discussion of the emerging computer and telecommunications technologies, they note that the effects of these technologies will be enormous because they are universal; they apply to all industries. Their research indicated that there will be changes in the nature of the skills demanded by advanced technology. The level of skills required for any job, however, will depend on which elements of the work are combined to make up the job (see also Marjchzak and Klein, 1987).

But if technological change and human resources management is all about people working at jobs, then jobs need to be a, if not the, focus of strategic human resources management. Here the literature appears to be quite silent. Thus, while there is a relatively comprehensive literature being produced on the need for a strategic approach to human resources (Schein, 1977), and while there is specification that recruitment, staffing, and training issues need to be addressed (e.g., Latham, 1988), precisely what kinds of people need to be recruited and selected and the kinds of training they should actually receive are not identified.

Hall (1984, p. 159) put the issue of strategic human resource development this way: "fit] is the identification of needed skills and active management of employee learning for the long-range future in relation to explicit corporate and business strategies." In what follows we present our attempts to design a process through which the skills required by jobs in the future can be identified.

STRATEGIC JOB ANALYSIS

The goal of a strategic job analysis is specification of the tasks to be performed and the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) required for effective performance for a job as it is predicted to exist in the future. Any time frame for the future may be an appropriate frame of reference since this may vary as a function of the job in question and as a function of known or predicted strategic redirection of the organization.

The approaches to strategic job analysis described in this article build on traditional job analysis procedures like those described by Goldstein (1986), Levine (1983), and Schneider and Schmitt (1986). The approach taken here is called "Multimethod Job Analysis" and it is summarized in Table I.

Table I

STEPS IN THE MULTIMETHOD JOB ANALYSIS APPROACH

- Conduct interviews (incumbents and supervisors) and on-site observations of the job in question
- Specify job tasks and build task clusters based on expert judgments of task statements
- Develop and administer task surveys; surveys are of tasks not task clusters; tasks rated for importance and time spent
- Conduct statistical analyses of task survey responses:
 - Technical (means and standard deviations; internal consistency analyses of *a priori* task clusters)
 - Comparative (incumbents vs. supervisors; regional or departmental variations for the "same" job)
- Conduct knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) process:

- Specify KSAs through interviews with incumbents (when feasible) and supervisors based on task data
 - Build KSA clusters based on expert judgments of KSA statements
-
- Develop and administer KSA surveys:
 - Rate KSAs for importance, difficulty to learn and when learned for KSA clusters (selection purposes) *or* rate individual KSA statements (training purposes)
 - Gather information on the future
 - Revise tasks and/or task clusters, and KSAs and/or KSA clusters in light of expected future changes:

Because there is little that is particularly unique about the multimethod job analysis approach until the stage of collecting information about the future, we describe that step and subsequent steps.

Gather information on the future. To incorporate strategic issues into a "present" job analysis we first gather information about the kinds of issues in the job, the company, and/or the larger environment that may affect the job in the future. This is accomplished in a workshop composed of subject matter experts (e.g., job incumbents, supervisors, managers, human resource staff, strategic planners) and job analysts. The participants might also include experts in a relevant technical field, economists, demographers, and so forth, depending on the specific job of interest.

Some examples of futures issues that may impact the job that have been suggested in past workshops include changes in: state and federal government legislation, labor markets and demographics, computerization of the job and the company, the predicted state of the general economy, changes in the nature of the physical work environment, improved training, and increased supervisor-subordinate interaction. Obviously this list is not exhaustive. Companies can experience changes in jobs and, thus, requirements for people with particular KSAs for many reasons: mergers and acquisitions, downsizing, automation, and such organizational transformations as a move from a quantity to a quality strategy or a change in emphasis from production to service (Schneider and Rentsch, 1988; Tichy, 1983). In the futures workshops that

have been conducted to date, SMEs (subject matter experts) have consistently mentioned changes in each of the five facets of the environment Katz and Kahn (1978, p. 124) suggest are important features to monitor if an organization is to be effective:

1. Societal values
2. Political/legal
3. Economic/markets/labor
4. Information/technological
5. Physical/geography.

The issues emerge from a general brainstorming session that includes 6-10 persons and takes about two hours. Notes are recorded on large pads of newsprint so that all participants have access to the futures issues being generated. The issues emerging from a project designed to understand how the job of a first-line supervisor might look in the future are shown in Table II.

Table II

FUTURES ISSUES THAT MIGHT CHANGE A SUPERVISORY JOB

- Computerization of the job being supervised:
 - Changes in report preparation procedures
 - Changes in work group size
 - Changes in monitoring capability
 - Changes in personal contact
 - Changes in location of where workers work
 - Changes in speed of, and amount of, work done
- Installation of new subordinate selection and training programs; Changing demographics of subordinates:
 - Changes in competencies (skills and abilities)
 - Changes in attitudes/needs (other characteristics)
- Corporate culture change from service provider to sales organization

- Increased rules and regulations (State and Federal) requiring strict adherence to laws governing the business (e.g., financial services laws)
-

Revise tasks and KSAs in light of expected future changes. Listing the futures issues for all participants provides a shared framework for the workshop participants to then make a series of ratings about the target job in the future: (a) the importance and time spent on each task or task cluster, (b) the importance of the KSAs, the difficulty to learn the KSAs, and when the KSAs will be learned. Thus, the task information and KSAs developed based on the present job are rerated in the light of the changes the workshop participants identify.

A comparison of present and future ratings allows an assessment of the extent to which changes in the internal and external environment of an organization yield significant task and KSA changes for the job of interest. The re-rating process also provides an opportunity for workshop participants to add to the list of tasks and/or KSAs. Thus, jobs may not only change in how important a task or a KSA is but new tasks and/or new KSAs may emerge in the future. These new tasks and KSAs need to be identified and discussions during the re-rating process provide an opportunity for them to emerge.

It may be clear from the different rating options listed in this section (e.g., rate task statements or task clusters) that the process involved in generating information about the future and then using this information to modify an existing job analysis has yet to be finalized. Given the novelty of this futures approach some variations have been tried to facilitate the generation of future issues and to facilitate the re-rating and updating of tasks and KSAs.

For example, in one project SMEs were asked to fill out a job analysis survey for the way the job presently exists and one for the job of the future, prior to attending a workshop to discuss futures issues. So, in this particular variation, the workshop participants were "primed" to discuss futures issues, since they had already been required to independently make the futures ratings. At the actual workshop, generating the futures issues proceeded very quickly. A second workshop was held to further discuss possible changes in the future and then the SMEs, led by one of us, produced consensus ratings of the tasks and KSAs for the job of the future. In this process, group discussion of the implications of the futures issues for tasks and KSAs generated a rich description of what the future is likely to look like, as well as the numerical ratings of tasks and KSAs necessary for the design of human resources programs.

An Example of a Strategic Job Analysis

This example is taken from a job analysis of a first level supervisory position. The task clusters developed on the basis of the standard job analysis were:

1. Sets goals with subordinates (GOALS)
2. Plans and schedules (PLANS)
3. Informs and advises subordinates (INFORMS)
4. Monitors results and updates management (MONITORS)
5. Supervises staff and resources (SUPERVISES)
6. Gives feedback and counsels staff (FEEDBACK)
7. Appraises subordinate performance (APPRAISES)
8. Trains and develops subordinates (TRAINS)
9. Staffs the unit (recruits, selects, terminates) (STAFFS)
10. Handles customers (CUSTOMER)

These clusters are listed in Table III along with mean ratings of *importance* and time spent made by incumbents who rated the job as it presently exists and by workshop participants (SMEs) who rated the job of the future.

It is clear from Table III that there is high agreement among incumbents (in this case supervisors) and SME workshop participants on the rank ordering of the importance of task clusters ($r = .95$). At first glance this would suggest that little if anything about the job is likely to change in the future (in this case "future" meant three to five years). However, notice that the SMEs see a much greater range of importance for task clusters of the future (2.17 - 5.00 as opposed to 3.18 - 4.53 for incumbents). Thus, "goals," "feedback," "appraises," "trains," and "staffs" are predicted to be more important in the future, while "plans," "monitors," "supervises," and "customer" are predicted to be less important in the future. (Only the "informs" task cluster appears highly stable in light of expected environmental changes.) These results indicate a change in the relative importance of different task clusters in the future.

The *time spent* ratings by incumbents (present) and SMEs (future) differ both in terms of means and ranks ($r = .42$). Because the rank order for the future job is not the same as for the present job, knowing where time is spent today provides little information about where time will be spent in the future. According to Table III, the most time will be spent on "feedback" (i.e., Gives feedback and counsels staff) and little time will be spent on "customer" (i.e., Handles customers) and "monitors" (i.e., Monitors results and updates management).

A similar comparative analysis (between present and future) may be conducted for the KSAs necessary to carry out these tasks. An example of these data are shown in Table IV for the Knowledge clusters that emerged from the standard job analysis.

The labels in Table IV for the Knowledge clusters represent seven kinds of knowledge required for this supervisory job:

1. Personnel—knowledge of the personnel and human resources policies and practices of the organization.
2. Budget—planning for budget issues and items in the unit.
3. Product—familiarity with the products and services offered by the company (and sold and serviced by the unit).
4. Rules/Regs—Company guidelines for dealing with the public.
5. CRT—familiarity with the capabilities and operation of the CRT.
6. Competition—knowledge of what competitors were offering.
7. Selling—knowledge of selling techniques and sales principles.

The data in Table IV may be summarized as follows. First, the data for *Difficulty to Learn the Knowledge* shows that the present (supervisors) and future (SMEs) estimates are highly correlated ($r = .79$) although the means are elevated for SMEs for five of seven kinds of knowledge. Second, the data for *When Learned* also revealed strong relationships between the present (supervisors) and the future (SMEs), with $r = .85$. For these latter ratings, it is clear that SMEs expect future Supervisors to come to the job already knowledgeable in four domains: Product, Rules/Regs, CRT, and Competition.

Table III

TASK CLUSTER IMPORTANCE AND TIME SPENT RATINGS BY INCUMBENTS (PRESENT JOB) AND SMES (FUTURE JOB)

		Importance (a)		Time Spent (b)	
		<u>Incumbents (c)</u>	<u>SMEs (d)</u>	<u>Incumbents</u>	<u>SMEs</u>

Task	Mean Rank		Mean Rank		Mean Rank		Mean Rank	
Cluster								
Goals	4.39	2	4.80	2	3.36	3	2.67	7
Plans	3.62	7	2.66	8	3.15	4	2.88	8
Informs	3.82	5	3.77	6	2.92	6	3.22	2
Monitors	3.18	10	2.56	9	2.58	9	2.00	9.5
Supervises	3.5	8	3.04	7	2.84	7	3.18	3
Feedback	4.24	3	4.73	4	3.46	2	4.27	1
Appraises	4.53	1	5.00	1	3.47	1	3.00	4
Trains	3.64	6	4.17	5	2.71	8	2.90	5
Recruits	3.87	4	4.75	3	2.38	10	2.42	8
Customer	3.45	9	2.17	10	2.97	5	2.00	9.5

(a) Five point scale used (1-5) where 1 = Not at all important, 2 = Slightly, 3 = Moderately, 4 = Very, 5 = Extremely important.

(b) Six point scale used (1-6) where 1 = No time spent, 2 = Very little time compared to other tasks, 3 = Somewhat less time, 4 = Same amount of time, 5 = Somewhat more time, 6 = A great deal more time compared to other tasks.

(c) N = 59 supervisors

(d) N = 10 SMEs

Table IV

KNOWLEDGE CLUSTER RATINGS OF DIFFICULTY TO ACQUIRE AND WHERE ACQUIRED BY INCUMBENTS (PRESENT JOB) AND SMES (FUTURE JOB)

Difficulty to Learn (a)

When Learned (b)

Cluster	<u>Incumbents (c)</u>		<u>SMEs (d)</u>		<u>Incumbents</u>		<u>SMEs</u>	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Personnel	2.4	5	3.0	4	4.0	2	4.0	2
Budget	3.4	3	4.0	2	4.6	1	5.0	1
Product	3.5	2	5.0	1	1.6	6	1.0	4
Rules/Regs.	2.6	4	3.0	4	2.0	5	1.0	4
CRT	2.4	5	2.0	5	1.6	6	1.0	4
Competition	2.0	7	3.0	4	2.6	3	1.0	4
Selling	4.0	1	4.0	2	2.2	4	3.0	3

(a) Difficulty to Learn knowledge is rated on a five-point scale where 1 = very easy, 2 = easier than most, 3 = average, 4 = harder than most, 5 = most difficult.

(b) When Learned is rated on a five-point scale where 1 = prior to job, 2 = minimal after job entry, 3 = some after job entry, 4 = normally acquired after job entry, 5 = only acquired after job entry.

(c) N = 59 Supervisors

(d) N = 10 SMEs

SUMMARY

The data presented in Tables III and IV reveal two findings that we have consistently observed:

(1) incumbents' views of tasks and KSAs for today's job are generally highly correlated with SME's projections of the future, and (2) high correlation does not equal agreement. This means that while the rank orders of means for tasks and KSAs for incumbents (present) and SMEs (future) are similar, the means themselves may differ. Sometimes the means differ in their dispersion (e.g., greater variability in the future than present) and sometimes the means have a

ceiling or basement effect (e.g., a particular kind of knowledge is assumed to exist prior to job entry).

These findings caution against using only correlations as a basis for judging the similarity between present and future ratings. As in all profile analysis techniques, similarity in shape (what a Pearson r reveals) is only one index of similarity; the others are elevation and dispersion (Nunnally, 1978). Examination of elevation and dispersion can identify tasks that will become more (or less) important or take more (or less) time or a knowledge that potential supervisors will need to acquire before they are considered for the supervisory role. The latter finding has obvious implications for training.

There are a large number of questions still to be answered about our strategic job analysis process:

1. What is the validity of SME predictions of the future? The issue here is the accuracy of the projections of the future. If the futures ratings made by SMEs turn out to be accurate predictions, then selection and training programs can truly be designed for jobs of the future. Indeed, a validity study that yielded positive findings might also remove the possibility of attacks on an approach to job analysis that is non-traditional and, therefore, potentially not sanctioned by existing standards and guidelines. Of course, the Guidelines do permit the adoption of new procedures where circumstances dictate them [See PP 1607.6 (B)] but it is also important to establish their validity.

2. Who are the most accurate judges of the future? In all forms of job analysis the specification of who the SMEs should be is problematic; the issue is not resolved in strategic job analysis. The approach taken in our work to date is to consult with a variety of individuals and solicit names of people who seem particularly knowledgeable and prescient. These people are then nominated to play the SME role. We have now used a very wide variety of SMEs in our application of the procedure to jobs as different as telephone salespersons, auto repair shop damage adjusters, the first line supervisors described earlier, and the highest levels of management in a telecommunications company. Each time, the SMEs have provided extraordinary insight into how and why the tasks in jobs, and the KSAs required to do them, may or may not change. Our present thoughts suggest a few principles to follow in selecting SMEs for the futures workshop: (1) Choose at least one person who is responsible for corporate strategy most closely tied to the job in question; (2) Choose at least one person who is responsible for monitoring how the competition structures (both technologically and from a human resources standpoint) the tasks done by incumbents in the job in question; (3) Choose at least one incumbent who is known for his/her willingness to suggest and/or try new ideas; (4) Choose a so-called "efficiency expert" in the company (who may be the internal

technology/communication expert); and (5) Choose a person in management who worked him or herself up from the job in question.

3. When SMEs make their judgments about how the job of the future will look (tasks and KSAs), on which facets of the future are they focusing and what is their reasoning? This question is amenable to answer through policy capturing studies but, to this date, such studies have not been accomplished systematically. When informally asked to provide their bases for judgments in the projects conducted to date, SMEs are able to tell us why they think a job and its KSAs will change. For example, in Table III it was shown that the time spent on the task cluster monitors is predicted to drop in the future. The reason SMEs gave for this judgment of a decrease in time spent on monitors was that workers would be monitored by computer in the future.

4. Should more formal techniques for group discussion be used by SMEs? To date, the approach used here has been a roundtable brainstorming discussion with free-flowing conversation for both the identification of futures issues and the subsequent ratings of tasks and KSAs. Perhaps other strategies such as the nominal group technique, or synectics would generate more useful data (see Guzzo, 1982).

5. What role does job analysis play in the larger fabric of organizational effectiveness and the management of human resources? The implicit assumption in the work presented here is that job analysis is critical for the development of personnel practices such as selection, training, and appraisal. But jobs do not exist alone in organizations; jobs exist as parts of total organizational systems. Indeed, when asked to discuss futures issues that might affect jobs, SMEs raised classic systems issues, including both internal organizational and larger environmental concerns (Katz and Kahn, 1978).

The idea that jobs are part of a larger organizational system suggests a number of issues. First, even current, descriptive, job analysis information may play a larger role in the total organization than most current theories of organizational functioning give it. Thus, except for the job characteristics (Hackman and Oldham, 1980) and socio-technical systems approaches (cf. Miller, 1976) to understanding organizational functioning, facets of people's jobs and the KSAs required to perform them seem to only be of concern to more personnel-oriented psychologists and human resource professionals. Second, results of the application of our procedure presented here, as well as others we have collected, suggest that organizations are essentially *tabulas rasa* regarding the anticipation of changes required in human resources as a function of changes known to be planned. Thus, the SMEs who participate in the futures workshops are familiar with many changes that will occur, yet the human resources implications of these changes have rarely been systematically identified. Running the futures workshop sensitizes people in the organizations to the utility of careful specification of these human resources issues. In one

company, the data provided have been used in business planning, budget preparation, and the design of systems for choosing participants into the "fast-track" executive program.

6. Can this procedure be applied to jobs that do not yet exist? The job analysis procedure described here is for how an existing job may change in the future. However, many companies start up new plants to produce new goods or deliver new services. Can a job analysis be accomplished for a future job? The same techniques described here could be employed, with special emphasis on the selection of participants for the task and KSA workshops. Because these SMEs would be literally starting from scratch they would need to be intimately familiar with the goals of the new jobs so they can make projections about what the tasks are likely to be; it is task specification that provides the raw input for specification of the KSAs required.

7. Can the strategic job analysis process be useful for more than selection, training, and appraisal purposes? Hall (1986), in fact, proposed a futures-oriented job analysis process as an aid to career planning for individuals. That is, Hall saw the need for organizations to be able to anticipate future jobs so that the likelihood of different career opportunities could be identified, thus facilitating realistic career planning. Obviously, strategic planning of all kinds takes place in organizations but it is generally at a more macro level. Strategic job analysis brings these macro level plans to the micro, job, level from which specific human resources procedures can be developed.

We are sure the reader can generate additional questions. Our purpose here was to introduce practitioners and researchers to the potential importance of doing strategic job analysis. The ideas and early data presented here strongly suggest the need for research on an approach to job analysis that recognizes the changing nature of work and the possibility of anticipating KSA requirements prior to a crisis. Hopefully some curiosities have been twinged and the needed combinations of research and practice will emerge.

READING 3

A SOLUTION TO THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL FEEDBACK ENIGMA

Herbert H. Meyer

Executive Overview

It is hard to dispute the value of the ubiquitous formal performance appraisal programs used in almost all large organizations. In theory, these programs should serve important organizational objectives. Each employee should be evaluated at least annually and be given feedback to communicate how he or she is performing. In practice, however, most managers find these feedback interviews distasteful. Unless constrained by some sort of administrative pressure, like a subordinate sign-off requirement, managers are likely to ignore the responsibility.

The traditional manager-to-subordinate performance appraisal feedback interview is becoming anachronistic in our culture. The appraisal feedback interview is a very authoritarian procedure—a parent-child type of exchange. Most modern organizations are moving away from authoritarian management toward an involvement-oriented working environment. A performance review discussion based on the subordinate's self review fits an involvement-oriented climate much better than the traditional top-down performance review discussion. It also has the advantage of forcing the manager into a counseling mode, rather than serving as a judge. Research has shown that performance review discussions based on self-review prove to be more productive and satisfying than traditional manager-initiated appraisal discussions.

To say that the performance appraisal feedback problem has been an enigma for managers and personnel specialists is probably a glaring understatement. Formal programs to evaluate and document the job performance of subordinates and then provide feedback to the respective subordinates have been around at least as long as there have been personnel departments in organizations. The appraisal and feedback program is one of the psychologists' and personnel specialists' popular topics in the personnel literature. There have been literally thousands of articles on this topic in journals in their personnel field during the last seventy-five years. Most of these articles generally applaud the virtues of the performance appraisal and

feedback process, lament their lack of success, then present suggested solutions to the program. This format has not changed much over the years.

Problems experienced with performance appraisal programs are myriad. Significant evidence has shown that most managers find the program onerous and distasteful. The following scenario depicts a situation that many managers have probably faced in dealing with the performance appraisal feedback problem:

Jane Novak was preparing for the annual performance appraisal review discussion scheduled with Henry Buckner. She remembered the unpleasant experience she had in a similar discussion a year ago. Henry's performance since that discussion had been tolerable, but mediocre at best. While there were many aspects of the job where Henry's performance could be improved, she planned to focus on only two or three areas where improvement was especially needed.

Last year in her first appraisal discussion with Henry, he reacted very defensively to any suggestions she made for improving performance. He was especially annoyed by the fact that the overall rating she had assigned was only "Very Satisfactory." In fact, he appealed the rating, but fortunately Jane's boss supported her judgment. Customarily, most professionals in the company were rated as either "Outstanding" or "Excellent." While distributions weren't published, it was generally known that only a small percentage received ratings below "Excellent" on the scale. Yet, Jane couldn't in good conscience rate Henry above "Very Satisfactory," which was the midpoint on the scale.

Jane hated to conduct these annual review discussions, especially with those for whom she couldn't justify an "Outstanding" overall rating. The discussions often seemed to do more harm than good. Her relationships with Henry, for example, had been strained since their annual review discussion last year.

Is Jane's experience with the annual performance review discussion unusual? Do her reactions indicate that she is a poor manager? The answer to both questions is no.

Experience with appraisal programs shows that unless administrative pressures are applied to ensure that people are appraised and feedback given, the programs invariably die out very rapidly. Managers just do not carry out the process, even though departmental policy may call for it. Most organizations have found that a subordinate sign-off procedure must be used to guarantee that appraisals are completed and feedback is given.

IS APPRAISAL FEEDBACK USEFUL?

Starting about 30 years ago at G.E., we carried out an intensive series of studies on the performance appraisal and feedback process. Followup surveys showed that the majority of employees expressed more uncertainty about the status of their performance in their managers'

opinions after a performance appraisal interview than before. Evidently, in many cases the manager's formal feedback was discrepant with the informal signals they had been receiving about his or her view of their job performance. As Dave DeVries observed in a newsletter published by the Center for Creative Leadership a few years ago, most people get the feedback they consider to be really reliable in indirect, obscure ways. They judge the boss's mood, talk with the boss's secretary, note whether or not they are invited to important meetings, whether or not their opinion is sought on important matters, and so on.

A great deal of evidence, from our General Electric research and that reported in the literature, has shown that there is a strong tendency to distort appraisals toward favorable reviews when feedback must be given. For example, the federal government introduced a merit pay plan for mid-level employees about ten years ago. A rating of "fully successful" or better is needed to qualify for a merit increase. A recent study showed that 99.5 percent were eligible.

Managers learn through unpleasant experience that negative feedback not only results in the employee having negative feelings, but it also too often results in deteriorated rather than improved performance. Consequently, because of this positive distortion, subordinates may get misleading information which is often inconsistent with administrative decisions such as salary actions, promotion, and demotions. Such distorted ratings sometimes cause trouble when the manager wants to fire a poor performer. The manager may decide that a certain employee who has consistently performed inadequately should be demoted or fired. Yet, the record may show that this employee's performance has been consistently rated as "very satisfactory."

FEW "GOOD" PROGRAMS

Surveys of companies with appraisal programs have repeatedly revealed that few are satisfied with its performance appraisal program. A survey of 200 large companies conducted by Psychological Associates showed that 70 percent of employees said they were more confused than enlightened by the performance appraisal feedback they received. Similarly, an American Society of Personnel Administrators survey concluded that less than ten percent of companies have reasonably successful performance appraisal programs.

A recent nationwide survey of 3,500 companies showed that the most frequently mentioned human resource concern was the organization's performance appraisal system. Based

on another survey reported in *Industry Week*, the author summarized that, "The handling of performance reviews is little short of disastrous—a periodic agony thrust on both bosses and subordinates."

In a recent article in *Personnel Management*, after an exhaustive study of appraisal programs in the public sector the author observed, "The chances of failure in operating appraisal schemes far outweigh the chances of success. Many organizations have failed. Many others have systems which have degenerated into sterile paper chases, satisfying personnel departments' thirst for forms and justifying their existence but contributing little to the quality of organizational performance. Appraisal in practice tends to become a grand annual convulsion, more of a bureaucratic colossus than a means of insuring continuing development of people."

R. E. Kopelman, in his book *Managing Productivity in Organizations* noted that most managers regard the performance appraisal interview as a fundamentally unpleasant situation—one to be avoided, postponed, or handled hurriedly. A similar conclusion was reached by Napier and Latham based on their survey of appraisal programs in practice. They found that most appraisers saw little or no practical value in conducting performance appraisal interviews. No potential positive or negative consequences were generally foreseen, unless negative information was fed back and in those cases, the appraiser usually experienced aversive consequences.

WHY ARE PROGRAMS RETAINED?

If the results of appraisal and feedback programs have been so negative, why have they persisted? Why do we keep butting our heads against the wall and continue the search for a solution when the quest for this utopia seems so hopeless? I am sure we persist because the idea seems so logical, so common-sensible. Appraisal and feedback should serve important administrative and developmental objectives.

Feedback regarding job performance seems necessary to justify administrative decisions, such as whether a salary increase is awarded and the size of the increase, or whether an employee should be transferred to another job or scheduled for promotion. Feedback should contribute to improved performance. The positive effect of feedback on performance has always been an accepted psychological principal.

It is also well established that feedback designed to reinforce or alter behavior is most effective if provided when the behavior occurs. Daily coaching is more valuable for this purpose than a once-a-year discussion. However, most personnel managers insist that their managers schedule an annual, formally documented review to ensure that every employee gets at least

some feedback about his or her job performance. This annual feedback interview is intended to provide a clear message to employees about their performance and to motivate them to improve.

SPLIT ROLES

In some organizations, administrative feedback, such as communicating planned salary action, is separated from motivational and developmental feedback. Norman Maier, a noted industrial psychologist, recommended this more than thirty years ago. He ascertained that when the supervisor appraises a subordinate for administrative purposes, he or she is serving as a judge. If the supervisor is to effectively motivate a subordinate and provide guidance for development, he or she must serve as a counselor. Maier maintained that being both judge and counselor is incompatible. A person being judged is likely to be defensive. For counseling to be effective, the employee must be receptive to advice and suggestion, not defensive.

One of our G.E. studies in which almost 100 actual appraisal interviews were observed, supported Norm Maier's contention.⁸ Managers were required to communicate a salary decision and suggestions for performance improvement in the same interview. We observed that subordinate's defensive reactions were so common, and the ego involvement in the salary decision so powerful, that attempts to counsel the employee about needed performance improvement were mostly futile.

Our recommendation that salary action appraisal and motivational and developmental appraisal be accomplished in separate programs has not been widely accepted—at least not in the United States. Surveys show that in most organizations, both types of appraisals are covered in the same interview. Evidently this is not true in Great Britain where a recent survey of appraisal practices in large companies revealed that appraisals for the two different purposes were separated in 85 percent of the responding companies.

Based on my experience, I still maintain very strongly that appraisal for the two different purposes should be separated. I will focus here principally on motivational and developmental appraisal discussions. How can the process be more effective? I think the answer is to change our approach to the process.

CONTROL VERSUS INVOLVEMENT- ORIENTED MANAGEMENT

The traditional workforce management approach is to achieve efficiency by imposing management control over workers' behavior. However, it is becoming clear that a control-oriented approach to management is less effective. Our culture has changed. To remain

competitive, organizations must elicit the commitment of employees at all levels. Commitment is not likely to be engendered in today's employees by interacting with them in a control-oriented manner. Employees want to be respected, to be in the know, involved, and to be treated as important individuals rather than as "hands."

The conventional approach to performance appraisal and feedback is certainly consistent with the control-oriented approach to management. It fits perfectly in a bureaucratically run organization. It is incompatible with an involvement-oriented management style.

A CHANGED APPROACH

The traditional approach to appraisal—where the manager completes an evaluation form and meets with the employee to communicate the appraisal—is becoming anachronistic in our culture. Performance appraisal conducted in the traditional manner is highly authoritarian. When a manager sits down with an employee for an appraisal, there is no doubt about who is the "boss" and who is in the subordinate or dependent role. It is a parent-child type of exchange.

Our culture has been moving away from authoritarianism for at least the last fifty years. Few people like a dictatorial boss and no one wants to have his or her dependence accentuated. People want to be involved, respected, treated as equals and for this reason, involvement-oriented management has become popular. Most performance appraisal programs are inconsistent with this management style.

THE USE OF SELF APPRAISAL

The conventional approach to performance appraisal is sometimes appropriate when the subordinate is dependent on the supervisor—for new employees, trainees, or perhaps for people in highly structured jobs. It is not appropriate, however, for most employees. It is certainly inappropriate for professionals and administrators. For employees who are not in an obviously dependent role, an appraisal discussion designed to serve communication, motivation, and development purposes should be based on the subordinate's self appraisal.

About twenty years ago, Glenn Bassett and I conducted another study at G.E. which demonstrated that appraisal discussions between manager and subordinate based on the subordinate's self-review, were significantly more constructive and satisfying to both parties than those based on the manager's appraisal. It also resulted in significant improvement in job performance. Even though these discussions also communicated a salary decision, focusing on the subordinate's self-review was definitely more favorable.

ADVANTAGES OF SELF-REVIEW

Self-review has several advantages. First, it enhances the subordinate's dignity and self respect. The employee is not forced into a dependent role. Second, it places the manager into the role of counselor, not judge. Third, it is more likely to elicit employee commitment to any development plans or goals formulated in the discussion. That is, the subordinate is more likely to develop a feeling of ownership in plans and goals which he or she helped to create.

A fourth and major advantage of the self-review approach to the appraisal discussion was mentioned previously. That is, discussion based on the subordinate's review of his or her own performance is likely to be more satisfying to both parties and more productive than is the more traditional manager-to-subordinate review. Indeed, a number of studies seem to support that satisfaction with appraisal discussion results is strongly related to subordinate contribution and participation in the discussion.

The biggest problem with this approach is that it violates traditional mores regarding the proper relationship between boss and subordinate. This is probably why the results of our experiment on self appraisals have not been widely applied. Certainly, supervisors participating in appraisal discussions based on subordinates' self-review have to some extent lost the value of their acquired credentials as the "superior."

Another disadvantage of self-review is the self-serving bias expected to inflate the self-appraisal. However, research has shown that this "leniency error" can be minimized by orienting the self analysis toward self development rather than appraisal for administrative purposes. In fact, self reviews have proved to be superior to supervisory reviews in identifying individual strengths and shortcomings.

ELIMINATE THE "GRADING"

To improve the value of a feedback discussion based on self-review, the "grading" aspect should be eliminated. Assigning a numerical or adjectival grade, such as "satisfactory," "excellent," "adequate," "outstanding," or "poor" to overall performance or specific performance tends to obstruct rather than facilitate constructive discussion.

In addition, I recommend eliminating the formal grading aspect of a performance appraisal program used for administrative purposes. Most people in business find grading somewhat demeaning. It treats a mature person like a school child. The administrative action taken, such as the amount of salary increase or a promotion will communicate an overall

appraisal better than will a grade. Recognition can certainly be given and improvement needs discussed without necessarily assigning grades to performance.

CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSION

Usually, formal performance appraisal discussions are scheduled annually. The major purpose is to provide a periodic summary of job performance and future possibilities. This discussion, if based on self-review, will provide the supervisor with the subordinate's perspective of the job, goals, problems, and responsibilities. Specifically, this annual discussion might cover:

1. Overall progress—an analysis of accomplishments and shortcomings.
2. Problems encountered in meeting job requirements.
3. Opportunities to improve performance.
4. Long range plans, opportunities—for the job and for the individual's career.
5. General discussion of possible plans and goals for the coming year.

If a goal setting program is being used, such as Management by Objectives, this annual review discussion is not the best place to establish detailed job goals for the year. To be effective, a goal-setting program must be a continuous process. Several meetings may be needed to propose, negotiate, and agree on goals. Review discussions should be held more than once a year. In many jobs, quarterly reviews may be appropriate, while in other jobs progress review discussions may be needed monthly or weekly.

THE SUPERVISOR'S ROLE

Even though the subordinate has the lead role in the annual review discussion, the supervisor is not passive. The supervisor should prepare by noting the points he or she would like to make and how to present them. Actually, the supervisor is in a better position to give the employee recognition and suggest changes in activities or behavior when reacting to instead of initiating all input. The supervisor's role becomes that of "counselor" rather than judge or "the boss."

NEED FOR TRAINING

If self-review is adopted as the medium for an annual review, it will not obviate the need for training. Training supervisors to handle this type of discussion could be valuable. It need not be any more extensive than the training given for conventional appraisal programs. I can envision, for example, a behavior modeling training program which covers such topics as how to deal with

an overly favorable self appraisal, an unrealistically self-deprecating review, an important problem or development need not brought up by the subordinate, and so on.

In addition, employees will need guidance on how to prepare for and conduct a self-review discussion. As a minimum, instructional materials, perhaps in the form of a brief manual, should be provided.

HOW WILL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS BE MADE?

Performance appraisal programs are often used as the basis for compensation and promotion decisions. If the type of performance review discussion proposed here is directed only to communication and development objectives, how should those administrative decisions be made and communicated?

As indicated earlier, I strongly believe that appraisal for development should be separated from appraisal for compensation or promotion. The annual discussion based on a self-review is designed to stimulate self development and to open communication channels to improve the working relationship between supervisor and subordinate. A performance appraisal discussion in which salary and/or promotion decisions are communicated does not provide a desirable climate for achieving communication and development objectives.

Administrative decisions pertaining to merit raises or promotions are too important to the organization to be made by supervisors alone. Few supervisors are all-seeing, all-knowing persons. They have their own idiosyncrasies, failings, biases. In some cases, a supervisor may hide an especially effective employee to ensure continued achievement of his or her unit's objectives. Sometimes a supervisor is threatened by an unusually effective subordinate.

An administrative decision, such as on merit pay or promotion, almost always constitutes a zero-sum game. If differentiations are made, for each winner there must be one or more losers. Identifying the winners is extremely important to the organization as a whole, and therefore these should be organizational decisions, not decisions made by individual supervisors.

A growing trend in large organizations is to use an "annual human resources review" procedure to appraise the performance and potential of all employees. Peer-level managers in each division meet as a team with their manager to discuss the performance and potential of all employees who report to them. Using a team of people to evaluate individual performance

provides a broader perspective in appraising employees than individual assessment. It not only provides a more comprehensive and objective evaluation of each employee's performance, potential, and development needs, but it also minimizes the effects of individual biases based on distorted emphases, prejudicial viewpoints, and limited perspectives.

Even though some of the managers in this process may have minimal exposure to some of the employees, they can contribute by insisting that judgments are backed by objective and behavioral evidence. After all, each participating manager has an important stake in the process. If another manager's employee is identified as a winner, one or more of his or her "winners" might become losers.

Appraisals resulting from a team meeting of this kind are more likely to be accepted by employees. It is more difficult to challenge an appraisal formulated by group consensus. Moreover, when a supervisor communicates a merit pay decision to a subordinate, it is less likely that their working relationship will deteriorate. This is not the case when a merit pay decision is made by the supervisor acting alone.

The annual human resources review process has additional benefits that more than justify the investment of time. Each participating manager will become thoroughly familiar with the responsibilities and performance characteristics of each employee in the department. It may clarify expectations regarding responsibilities of specific individuals or positions. It often defines and solves departmental workflow problems. The participating managers may formulate strategy and action plans for more effectively using human resources to achieve department objectives.

SUMMARY

I think the administrative and developmental objectives of the performance appraisal process should be addressed in separate programs. To achieve communication, counseling, and development objectives, I believe very strongly that our traditional top-down approach to performance appraisal is anachronistic, *passee*, and obsolete. It is a parent-child type of exchange that is inconsistent with cultural values that have evolved in modern organizations. It often proves to be an embarrassing experience for both parties involved and it accentuates the dependent role of the subordinate. This relationship is appropriate only in a control-oriented management environment. Effective organizations are moving away from the control-oriented approach toward an involvement-oriented climate designed to elicit commitment on the part of employees at all levels. Even the term "subordinate" is eschewed in modern organizations.

In most organizations, if supervisors are constrained to use the traditional supervisor rating and feedback approach to the annual review discussion, it would be better to abandon the program altogether. Conversely, if one concedes that it is desirable for supervisors to have some sort of annual review discussion with each of their direct reports, a discussion based on self-review can be valuable and constructive.

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READING 4

LOOKING FAIR VS. BEING FAIR

Managing Impressions of Organizational Justice

Jerald Greenberg

Abstract

This paper conceives of organizational justice as an impression management process. Evidence is presented arguing that fairness is a desired social identity and that people seek to present themselves as fair to themselves and others. Tactics used to cultivate an image of fairness are presented as they may be used in organizations. These include behaviors designed to mend a spoiled identity—"defensive tactics," such as accounts (including excuses and justifications) and apologies, and those intended to establish a particular identity—"assertive tactics," such as entitlements and enhancements. A discussion of the implications of this analysis focuses on the sincerity of fair impressions, organizational influences on fair identities, the benefits and liabilities of fair impressions, and provides cases of the management and mismanagement of impressions of fairness in and by organizations. In concluding, a plea is made for re-directing future research and theoretical efforts toward an impression management perspective of organizational justice.

In conjunction with a training exercise on developing managerial skills, I recently asked a group of managers, "What should your subordinates think about you in order for you to function effectively as a supervisor?" As evidenced by the following sample of responses, one of the most commonly expressed themes centered around the importance of being perceived as fair.

To close a sale I have to get both the salesman and the customer to think they're being treated fairly.

Used-car sales manager

Almost anything I decide about office policy can be accepted if the staff thinks I've treated them fairly.

Office manager at an insurance company

If my crew doesn't think I'm fair, it's all over, I can't get anything done.

Crew chief for a rural electric cooperative

My teachers and students can think whatever they want about me, so long as they think I'm fair.

Assistant principal of a high school

Even those who would prefer to dismiss these self-reports as unscientific data would have to admit that the sentiments expressed reflect a concern about the importance of fairness that is commonly espoused. Indeed, if news headlines of the late 1980s linking certain political and religious figures to morally unethical behaviors have taught us anything, it is that the mere appearance of an impropriety may be sufficient to erode a powerful figure's base of support, precipitating a fall from grace. What the managers in my training class seem to be saying is very similar—appearing to be fair helps get the job done.

Although the importance of looking fair on the job was expressed prominently by my managerial sample, the theme of impression management has been given little attention by the prevailing "reactive content" theories of organizational justice (Greenberg, 1987a), such as equity theory (Adams, 1965) or relative deprivation theory (e.g., Crosby, 1984), which traditionally have focused on the reactions of workers paid more than or less than comparably qualified others (e.g., for reviews, see Greenberg, 1982, 1987a; Mowday, 1987). This is not to say that purely anecdotal evidence provides the only inspiration for studying the appearance of fairness in organizations. On the contrary, a shift has been noted in recent social science theorizing away from intrapsychic theories (such as equity theory) toward more interpersonal approaches—both in reports of social psychological processes (e.g., Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985) and organizational phenomena (e.g., Chatman, Bell, & Staw, 1986; Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987, 1990). As theorists (e.g., Bies, 1987a; Reis, 1981) begin to explore justice from an impression management perspective (Schlenker, 1980), it would appear that the study of organizational justice is beginning its journey along this tide.

The present paper advances an impression management orientation toward organizational justice. Such an approach is offered in the interest of promoting "theoretical pluralism" (Feyerabend, 1970), encouraging the study of organizational justice from more than one point of view. As such, it is not intended to completely supplant more traditional approaches, but rather, to provide an alternative that accounts for a broader array of organizational justice concerns. Toward this end, the paper will examine research and theory relevant to three core issues within the impression management literature (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). Specifically,

the paper will consider: (a) the extent to which fairness is a desired social identity, (b) the possible targets of fair impressions, and (c) the tactics used to achieve a fair identity. Following this, the implications of these analyses for future research and theory development will be considered. Before turning to this, however, I will begin by reviewing some germane background issues.

BACKGROUND: JUSTICE AS AN IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT ISSUE

To set the stage for the presentation to follow, three background issues will be discussed. First, I will review the intrapsychic tradition of studying organizational justice and point out some of its limitations. Then, the alternatives offered by an impression management approach will be outlined. Finally, earlier conceptualizations of justice showing an appreciation for impression management processes will be reviewed.

The Intrapsychic Tradition of Equity Theory and its Limitations

According to Greenberg's (1987a) taxonomy of organizational justice theories, the predominant approach to studying justice in organizations has been Adams's (1965) equity theory. Rooted in the tradition of psychological balance theories (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958), equity theory offers an intrapsychic explanation of behavior that focuses on the cognitive and motivational processes of the individual. Specifically, the theory proposes that workers will experience a state of inequity whenever they perceive that the ratios of their own job rewards (termed "outcomes") to job contributions (termed "inputs") are unequal to the corresponding ratios of some comparison others. The person favored by any imbalance is expected to feel guilty from the resulting "overpayment inequity," whereas the under-benefited worker is expected to feel angry from the resulting "underpayment inequity." These negative states are theorized to cause tension, motivating attempts to restore a more desirable, balanced condition—equity (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Such efforts may be behavioral (such as, by raising or lowering one's work contributions; e.g., Pritchard, Dunnette, & Jorgenson, 1972) and/or psychological (such as by re-assessing the perceived value of one's work outcomes; e.g., Greenberg, 1989)—both of which have been studied in organizations (for reviews, see Greenberg, 1982; Mowday, 1987).

The research inspired by equity theory has left a formidable legacy in the archives of organizational behavior (e.g., see Adams & Freedman, 1976; Greenberg, 1982). However, in recent years, interest in equity theory has waned (Greenberg, 1987a; Reis, 1986), with one

observer relegating it to the ranks of the "not so useful" theories of organizational behavior (Miner, 1984). One likely reason for equity theory's decline in popularity may be the acceptance of accumulated criticisms regarding its internal validity (e.g., Furby, 1986; Greenberg, 1984; Schwab, 1980). For example, the theory has been criticized on the grounds that: (a) the conceptual status of many job elements as outcomes or inputs (e.g., decision-making power, status) is ambiguous (e.g., Goodman & Friedman, 1971; Tornow, 1971); (b) the experimental procedures commonly used to manipulate states of inequity are confounded and subject to alternative explanations (e.g., Pritchard, 1969); (c) the hypothesized mediational role of the affective state, "inequity distress," is unsupported (e.g., Greenberg, 1984); and (d) the interrelationship between modes of inequity resolution are conceptually ambiguous (e.g., Adams & Freedman, 1976; Greenberg, 1989). Such criticisms have resulted in some proposed structural re-formulations of equity theory (e.g., Cosier & Dalton, 1983; Harris, 1976) and the introduction of derivative approaches (e.g., Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, & Cohen, 1972; Folger, 1986).

A more frequently expressed reason for disenchantment with equity theory (e.g., Bies, 1987a; Greenberg, 1987a)—and one more relevant to the present paper—is its limited capacity to explain the broad array of factors that define justice as a concern in organizations (Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg, 1987a). One particular criticism is that equity theory fails to consider how perceptions of justice are influenced by the procedures through which outcomes are determined (Leventhal, 1980). This limitation has resulted in many attempts to broaden the domain of organizational justice (Greenberg, 1987a) to include procedural justice variables focusing on how outcomes are determined (for reviews, see Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg & Tyler, 1987; Lind & Tyler, 1988). For example, recent research has shown that the procedures used to appraise employees (Greenberg, 1986a, 1986b, 1987b), supervise them (Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987), and resolve conflicts between them (Sheppard, 1984, 1985) are at least as important as determinants of perceived fairness and job satisfaction as the outcomes resulting from these procedures (see also, Alexander & Ruderman, 1987).

Equity theory also has been cited for ignoring the social contexts in which assessments of fairness are made. For example, although research derived from equity theory has focused on reactions to payment inequities (Greenberg, 1982) and on allocations of organizational resources (Freedman & Montanari, 1980), more recent research has revealed that people think of fairness in terms of behaviors that go far beyond these limited responses, and focus on interpersonal considerations, such as the things people say to one another (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985). In this regard, Bies (1987a) has characterized people making fairness judgments as "intuitive jurists" (Hamilton, 1980; Fincham & Jaspars, 1980), seeking to

understand why certain events occurred, instead of dispassionate, "intuitive scientists" (Kelley, 1967), or "intuitive accountants" (Bies, 1987a), analytically balancing their mental ledgers of outcomes and inputs. This approach is used to introduce the notion of interactional justice—the fairness of the interpersonal treatment people receive (Bies & Moag, 1986)—as the basis for studying the role of information presentation of perceived justice. To date, research inspired by the *interactional justice* approach has found that the explanations given for why outcome decisions are reached may influence workers' reactions to the perceived fairness of layoffs (Brockner & Greenberg, 1989), hiring decisions (Bies, 1986a; Shapiro & Buttner, 1988), performance ratings (Greenberg, 1988a), and the acceptance or rejection of proposals (Bies & Shapiro, 1987, 1988; Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988).

It may be concluded from this brief review that whereas equity theory, with its emphasis on intrapsychic processes, has fallen into disfavor among organizational scholars, interest in the topic of organizational justice remains very much alive, and has seen a resurgence, stimulated largely by the social context-sensitive procedural and interactional approaches (for a review, see Greenberg, 1987a). The present paper proposes a thematic focus to the study of organizational justice based on the concept of impression management.

An Impression Management Alternative

Schlenker (1980) has defined impression management as, "the conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions" (p. 6). We will argue in this paper that workers are concerned about projecting an image of themselves as fair, and that they engage in many tactics to do so. In so doing, impression management will be presented as an explanatory concept that helps integrate disparate issues and approaches to organizational justice at the same time it broadens the core knowledge of research on impression management (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985).

The idea that people say and do things to create desired identities in the eyes of others has a rich tradition in the social sciences (e.g., Cooley, 1902; James, 1890; see also, the historical review by Scheibe, 1985). The theme of impression management has evolved in contemporary times from the observational research of the sociologist (e.g., Austin, 1961; Goffman, 1959) to the laboratory of the experimental social psychologist (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981), most recently to the field studies of the organizational psychologist (Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987). Basic to the impression management approach is Tetlock's idea that people operate as "intuitive politicians" (Bell & Tetlock, 1990; Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock &

Manstead, 1985) who seek to convince themselves and others that they possess desired characteristics. As Moberg (1977) put it:

politicians must avoid having their behavior attributed by others to a particular intent (illegitimate or self-serving motives). They may do so first by "creating the impression" that they have legitimate motives (p.1).

Such political astuteness may be keenly important in organizations. Indeed, the importance of cultivating a proper image has been associated with organizational phenomena as widespread as leadership (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984), performance appraisal (Longenecker, Sims & Gioia, 1987), goal setting (Huber, Latham, & Locke, 1990), and career development (Chatman et al., 1986). With the present work, the field of organizational justice may be added to those in which an impression management perspective has been introduced.

The impression management approach to organizational justice explicitly recognizes that fairness is in the eye of the beholder. In hierarchical organizations the different interests, goals, and access to information of individuals at different levels are likely to lead to different beliefs about what constitutes fair procedures and outcomes (Greenberg, 1987a). Accordingly, a manager who does what he or she believes to be fair—whatever that may be—may learn that others are not necessarily likewise convinced. To some extent, organizational justice may require impressing others with one's fairness. If different organizational perspectives offer different views of morally, ethically, and socially appropriate behaviors (Cavanagh, Moberg, & Velasquez, 1981), it may be in the best interests of effective management to sensitize oneself to others' perspectives on fairness. As I noted elsewhere, "even the best-intentioned, most "fair-minded" manager may fail to win the approval of subordinates who are not convinced of his or her fairness" (Greenberg, 1988a, p. 155). Thus, the impression management view of organizational justice conceives of fairness as a label for a set of attributions regarding adherence to appropriate standards of conduct that enhances one's self-image and/or one's projected social image. How these images operate, and their value as a managerial tool will be discussed in this paper.

Earlier Applications of Impression Management to Justice

Impression management interpretations of justice behavior are not completely new (e.g., see Bies, 1987a; Reis, 1981). The theme of impression management has been introduced indirectly to the justice literature on several earlier occasions—once as an alternative interpretation of

equity theory findings, and once as the result of a movement to study justice as a normative value.

The Self-esteem Challenge to Equity Theory. Ironically, although not always characterized as such, some of the earliest and most persistent critiques of equity theory research were predicated on an impression management interpretation. Specifically, the prototypical early experimental tests of equity theory (e.g., Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962) manipulated overpayment by leading subjects to believe that they were unqualified for the job they were about to do, but that they would be hired anyway and paid at the advertised rate (which, of course, was inappropriately high). This manipulation has been criticized on the grounds that it may have threatened workers' self-esteem (Lawler, 1968; Pritchard, 1969). Accordingly, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the high levels of performance that followed this manipulation were the result of workers' attempts to demonstrate to themselves and their employers that they were actually quite capable despite their apparent under-qualifications. In other words, subjects' reactions to the inequity may have been caused by attempts to manage impressions of themselves (to both themselves and their superiors), rather than attempts to minimize distress resulting from the inequity.

Support for the self-esteem explanation is provided in a role-playing investigation by Andrews and Valenzi (1970). Participants in this study were asked to report how they would feel if they were involved in a qualifications-challenging situation like that in the Adams and Rosenbaum study. It was found that while none of the subjects expressed awareness of a wage inequity, approximately 44% noted that their self-esteem would be threatened. Although further debate on the construct validity of inequity manipulations has continued (for reviews, see Greenberg, 1982; Schwab, 1980), the self-esteem criticism was an important one. It represents the earliest efforts to propose an impression management explanation for what was initially theorized as an intrapsychic process.

Normative and Instrumental "Uses" of Justice. An analogous appreciation for impression management influences on justice behavior followed in the 1970s as theorists began to conceive of justice as a social norm. Spearheading this movement, Sampson (1975) argued that, "By nature, man is not an equity theorist" (p. 49). Specifically, eschewing the intrapsychic perspective, he contended that "equity is not as much a psychological law about human nature as it is a psychological outcome of the culture's economic socialization practices" (p. 58). This theorizing ushered in the beginning of a series of conceptualizations about justice norms guiding the allocation of resources—social rules specifying "criteria that define certain distributions of rewards and resources as fair and just" (Leventhal, 1976, p. 94). Initially, to the norm of equity,

Sampson (1975) added a second justice norm—equality. Later theorists added a third norm—need (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976), and the list of justice norms proliferated to 6 (Lerner, 1977), 9 (Lerner, 1980), and 17 (Reis, 1984,1986).

Such efforts were, in part, directed toward answering the question, "which norm, when?" Such research has shown that the selection of a justice norm often depends on the goal of the allocator (for a review, see Greenberg & Cohen, 1982). At the risk of oversimplifying the conclusions of this line of research, it has been found that a preference for *equitable* allocations (to each according to his merits) predominates when an allocator's goal is to foster economic productivity, *equal* allocations (to each the same) are made when the preservation of harmony is the desired goal, and need-based allocations (to each according to his legitimate need) result when the allocator's goal is to foster personal welfare and development (see Deutsch, 1975,1985; Leventhal, 1976). This line of investigation helps underscore the point that prevailing social rules help define actions made in the name of justice.

Implicit within the normative approach to justice is the idea that adherence to normative standards is dictated by prevailing social forces. The person who follows a normative prescription may be motivated reactively, out of recognition of the pressures to conform to justice norms (Allen, 1982). It also has been postulated that such behavior is motivated proactively—by the belief that behaving in a certain manner provides a path toward attaining other goals. Writing on this topic, Ronald Cohen and I (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982) have argued that many acts performed in the name of fairness actually may be motivated by the desire to attain other goals—what we called *instrumental* acts.

Drawing a parallel to prosocial behaviors, which are not necessarily motivated by an underlying concern for altruism (Schwartz, 1977), we posited that ostensibly fair behaviors may not necessarily be motivated by an ultimate concern for justice. Justice may be a penultimate state on the way to an ultimate goal (Green-berg, 1986c). Leventhal (1976) articulated this point clearly when he asserted:

it is likely that an allocator who distributes rewards equitably does so more because he desires to maximize long-term productivity than because he desires to comply with an abstract standard of justice. His decisions are based on an expectancy that equitable distributions of reward will elicit and sustain high levels of motivation and performance (p. 96).

As such, he distinguishes between acts motivated out of a concern for justice per se, "fair behavior," and those derived from other motives, "quasi-fair behavior" (Leventhal, 1980). The possibility that the justice-restoring effects of an action may be epiphenomenal, motivated apart from moral or ethical considerations, is basic to our argument that people may internalize

expectations about the effects of behaving fairly, and do so in order to meet these expectations. In other words, justice may be "used" as the mechanism for attaining other goals. Although it is difficult to prove the existence of a specific motive underlying behavior, there is evidence to suggest that people sometimes engage in ostensibly "fair" actions for expressed reasons that do not reflect any concern for fairness at all. For example, Greenberg (1978) found that equitable divisions of reward were made by persons claiming to be trying to be maximizing their own gain or the gain of others. Thus, people may be implicitly aware that their adherence to a justice norm may reflect "an attempt to gain the unique pattern of instrumental benefits that is associated with following that norm" (Leventhal, 1976, p. 95).

The underlying point is that many acts are performed behind a "veneer of justice." If so, then one may ask how norms of justice are sustained. It may be argued that justice norms remain intact because of their instrumental value. Norms of justice facilitate social system goals (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982). Justice norms may be "used" to promote the social welfare of individuals and society by providing an orderly way for resources to be distributed. As Cohen and I noted elsewhere, "justice works" (p. 457); norms create explanations that guide behaviors in directions that are reinforced by society. Moreover, justice is socially rewarding; people are rewarded for treating others fairly (Walster et al., 1978). Indeed, research has shown that people often closely adhere to justice standards whenever they believe that others can reward them socially for doing so (e.g., Morse, Gruen & Reis, 1976; Reis & Gruen, 1976; Rivera & Tedeschi, 1976). Such conformity to justice norms is not only individually rewarding (Allen, 1982), but also facilitates social interaction in general by making interaction more predictable (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

Given this background, the stage is now set for analyzing the role of justice in some of the core questions of the impression management literature.

FAIRNESS AS A DESIRED SOCIAL IDENTITY

Probably the most basic core question asked among impression management theorists is: what types of identities do people seek (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985)? Although it may be tempting to answer this question by positing that people seek "socially desirable" identities, such a response fails to consider the broad cultural and historical differences that may exist in definitions of desirability (Schlenker, 1980). Moreover, it is overly simplistic in that people sometimes seek identities that are not positive. Even identities emphasizing toughness, dangerousness, helplessness, weakness, and dependency, Jones and Pittman (1982) claim, may be effective as means of gaining social approval and power.

There can be little doubt that the characteristic of fairness is recognized as desirable. Probably the most basic evidence in support of this idea is provided by Anderson's (1968) study in which students rated 555 personality traits on scales ranging from 0 ("least favorable or desirable") to 6 ("most favorable or desirable"). Although the trait "fair" was not among those rated, it was found that related traits received very high ratings of favorability (e.g., "honest," $M = 5.55$; "honorable," $M = 5.07$; "ethical," $M = 4.76$). Moreover, the trait, "unfair," was rated as extremely undesirable ($M = 1.07$). Such evidence clearly reflects the abstract positive connotations of fairness and the negative connotations of unfairness as personal characteristics.

Beyond such abstractions, a case can be made for fairness as a social identity. As Reis (1981) has noted, the desire to be seen as virtuous and fair is implicit within Jones and Pittman's (1982) class of self-presentational strategies known as exemplification. An exemplifier is one who "seeks to project integrity and moral worthiness" (Jones & Pittman, 1982, p. 245). Because of the conceptual overlap between fairness and exemplification as identities, it has been claimed that perceiving oneself as an exemplifier may be understood as an attempt to project an image of fairness (Reis, 1981).

More direct evidence of a widespread motive to shape dispositional beliefs about fairness is provided by survey research highlighting the central position of fairness as a work value. For example, recent survey research has shown that a concern about fairness on the job is one of the most prevalent life values noted among a wide variety of workers (e.g., Cornelius, Ullman, Meglino, Czajka & McNeely, 1985; Ravlin & Meglino, 1987). Although more recent investigations reveal individual differences in the specific structure of fairness values (e.g., Rasinski, 1987), it appears safe to claim that fairness is a desired value. Identities that are valued on the job may well be those that stimulate the greatest efforts to be attained.

Another line of evidence that fairness is a social identity comes from the finding that people perceive themselves as fairer than others. In six studies conducted in the United States and the Netherlands, Messick and his associates (Liebrand, Messick, & Wolters, 1986; Messick et al., 1985) found that subjects reported behaviors thought to be fair as more characteristic of themselves than of others, believing that they more often did fair things and less often did unfair things. Given the general tendency for people to attribute desirable characteristics to themselves (Miller & Ross, 1975), such self-serving perceptions of one's own fairness may be taken as evidence of the social desirability of fair identities.

The most direct evidence of fairness as a desired identity in organizations is provided by Greenberg's (1988b) survey of 815 managers. Participants were asked two sets of questions: one set inquiring how concerned they were about actually being fair on the job, and another set asking how concerned they were about appearing to be fair on the job. It was found that the

managers expressed greater concern about appearing to be fair than actually being fair. Moreover, the two sets of questions were not significantly correlated with each other, suggesting that managers distinguished between "looking fair" and "being fair".

These findings provide a useful adjunct to the present analysis by directly revealing that the desire to cultivate an impression of fairness is of great concern to managers. Moreover, the findings suggest that this concern operates at the level of conscious awareness. This is not to say, however, that such self-consciousness is a necessary precondition for fair impression management to occur (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). Indeed, theorists have contended that impressions management efforts may be the result of well-learned scripts (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 1980), and that ostensible reactions to inequities may be the result of enacting such scripts (Greenberg, 1984). Furthermore, it may be argued that questionnaire responses regarding the importance of fairness may themselves represent attempts on the part of participants to present themselves favorably to an authority figure (Alexander & Rudd, 1981). Notwithstanding these limitations, it appears safe to assume that the attribution of fairness is a desired individual identity in organizational settings.

TARGETS OF FAIR IDENTITIES

Accepting that fairness is a desired social identity, I continue my analysis by asking: To whom are identities of fairness presented? At the risk of over-simplification, it may be answered: oneself, and others. Although external audiences (such as bosses, teachers, and judges) are usually emphasized in the study of impression management (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Jones & Pittman, 1982), there is also widespread acceptance of the idea that people seek to cultivate certain impressions of themselves for themselves (e.g., Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Schlenker, 1986). As I will review here, the justice literature has recognized the importance of both internal and external targets of an image of fairness.

In keeping with the distinction that justice norms may be either normative or instrumental (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982), Tetlock (1985) has drawn a parallel distinction between impression management efforts that are principled (i.e., intended to satisfy internalized standards) and those that are pragmatic (i.e., concerned with establishing good relationships with others). As I will review here, many of the same situational variables (e.g., degree of public scrutiny) and dispositional variables (e.g., self-consciousness) identified as mediating the choice of principled vs. pragmatic goals (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Tetlock, 1985) also have been identified as moderators of both reactions to inequity and the choice of a justice standard (Reis, 1981).

Others as Targets: Pragmatic Identities

One such situational variable concerns the public scrutiny of one's behavior. A commonly used experimental technique to distinguish intrapsychic explanations from impression management explanations of behavior involves manipulating the degree to which subjects believe their behavior is under public scrutiny (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). The underlying rationale is that behaviors designed to impress others would occur only when people believe that others can observe their behavior.

Several studies of reactions to inequity have relied on this manipulation (for a review, see Reis, 1981). For example, Rivera and Tedeschi (1976) compared subjects' reactions to overpayment inequity using a simple paper-and-pencil measure and an elaborate lie detector (the "bogus pipeline"; Jones & Sigall, 1971). It was found that overpaid subjects reported feeling more guilt than equitably paid subjects when they believed their true feelings could not be detected (in the paper-and-pencil condition) than when the lie detector encouraged them to express their true feelings. Had the overpayment inequity induction actually led to feelings of guilt, there would have been no reason to suspect that differences in the face validity of the instrument used to measure such guilt would have made any difference. Yet, because the socially desirable guilt response (one should feel guilty for being overpaid) was more prevalent when subjects believed they could misrepresent their true feelings with impunity, it appears that the reactions expressed may be more the result of the desire to appear socially acceptable to the experimenter than the desire to express their true feelings. Such findings have been taken as support for the idea that responses to equitable treatment may be based on people's impression management concerns, "contrary to the postulated intrapsychic processes that have been proposed as mediating post-allocation responses" (Rivera & Tedeschi, 1976, p. 899).

A similar tendency for verbal reactions to overpayment to reflect impression management interests has been found by Morse, Gruzen, and Reis (1976). Subjects in this experiment justified overpayment conditions by exaggerating claims of task difficulty to a greater degree when they expected their self-reports to be shared in the experimenter than when they expected them to remain anonymous. Several additional studies (reviewed by Reis, 1981) likewise show that publicly visible reactions to overpayment take the socially desirable form of ostensibly demonstrating dissatisfaction with overpayment more than responses made in private.

Analogous evidence using the public-private distinction is found in the literature on the allocation of reward. By comparing the responses of subjects made publicly and privately, this literature has repeatedly found that "subjects incorporate the perceived standards of significant

others who are aware of their behavior" (Reis, 1981, p. 276). For example, Lane and Messe (1971) found that dyad members who expected to be introduced to each other were less likely to take advantage of each other by taking self-interested shares of reward than those who were not identified. Related research has found that allocators attempt to present themselves favorably to recipients by dividing reward equally among them (Leventhal, Michaels & Sanford, 1972), especially when they expect recipients to be aware of their decisions (Reis & Gruzen, 1976). Expecting to meet the recipient of an allocation decision also leads people to favor equal allocations, even when an equity-based allocation may be justified by their higher inputs (Austin & McGinn, 1977; Shapiro, 1975). Equal divisions of reward also tend to be made whenever allocators expected to be evaluated by another whose impressions are valued, such as one's spouse (Schoeninger & Wood, 1969), coworkers (Friedman & Goodman, 1974) or friends (Austin, 1980). Presumably, making a more self-serving response would be antagonistic to an interest in making a favorable self-presentation. Summarizing, studies of reward allocation behaviors suggest that equal divisions of reward are made in the interest of promoting favorable impressions of oneself.

It is important to point out that such favorable impressions may not necessarily be impressions of fairness. By not taking advantage of others, and not wishing to confront those they have harmed, subjects are at least demonstrating an interest in avoiding conflicts likely to arise from discriminatory behavior (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976). That they are trying to impress others with their fairness is less apparent. For this to be the case, subjects would have had to internalize the normative appropriateness of equal allocations. To the extent that their behaviors may have been motivated by an interest in avoiding conflict, their impression management interests, although considerable, may have focused on identities other than fairness. However, accepting the inherent ambiguities regarding exactly what behaviors may be fair in any situation (e.g., Reis, 1986), it is possible that subjects in these studies just may be seeking to minimize their costs in the experimental situation, to "get out of it" as inexpensively as possible. Given the low value of the stakes involved, it is not surprising to find experimental subjects willing to forego financial reward in favor of social reward—especially when they can do so by following a justice norm, such as equality (Greenberg, 1978).

Despite this caveat, there is evidence that certain justice behaviors may be the result of specific attempts to cultivate impressions of fairness. Rather than dealing with the impressions created in the minds of others, the investigations examining explicit attempts at cultivating impressions of fairness have focused on the self as a target of fair impressions.

Oneself as Target: Principled Identities

Experimental research making the self salient as a target of impression management typically follows the practice of making subjects "objectively self-aware" (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975) by having them confront their reflections in a mirror. According to the theory of objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975), the self-focused attention created by this manipulation heightens self-critical judgments; people become more aware of the discrepancies between their own behavior and ideal standards, thereby making them more sensitive to normative values (Vallacher & Solodky, 1979).

Evidence that self-awareness moderates reactions to inequity has been found by Reis and Burns (1982). These investigators found that overpaid subjects were more productive when they performed a task in the presence of a mirror than in the absence of a mirror. Related findings were also obtained by Gibbons and Wicklund (1982, Experiment 4). Given that equity theory predicts increased outputs in response to overpayment inequity, the higher level of inputs following overpayment by self-aware subjects than by not self-aware subjects suggests that reactions to overpayment inequity are heightened by states of self-awareness. Being self-aware heightened subjects' sensitivity to the state of inequity they experienced. Although these findings show that self-awareness increases responsiveness to states of inequity, they do not reveal anything about subjects' proactive concerns about adhering to justice standards.

Such a connection has been established, however, in several studies investigating the role of self-awareness on adherence to justice standards. In one study, Greenberg (1980) found that subjects who were made self-aware while dividing earned rewards between themselves and a competitor showed greater concern for making equitable allocations (i.e., divisions proportional to inputs) than subjects who were not self-aware. The mirror-induced self-awareness led higher-input subjects to keep more reward for themselves and lower-input subjects to keep less reward for themselves than those not self-aware. Moreover, self-aware subjects expressed greater concern over having made the appropriate allocation response than those who were not self-aware. In another study by Greenberg (1983a), subjects rated making fair payments as being more important when they were self-aware than when they were not self-aware. Self-aware subjects in this study were more prone than those who were not self-aware to reject as unfair all inequitable allocation decisions, even those that benefited themselves.

Thus far, it has been established that states of self-awareness enhance adherence to personal standards of justice. In the previous section of this chapter, it was reported that people are also concerned with creating a favorable impression on others. As a result, it is possible that the two interests may conflict. Indeed, the inherent ambiguity associated with the fairness of any

given response may make different reward allocation norms (e.g., equity, equality, need; Deutsch, 1975) justifiable as normatively appropriate (Leventhal, 1976). As a result, a potentially fair response may not necessarily be one that is best accepted. For example, although conditions may be such that the prevailing standard of justice is the equity norm (such as when competitive, profit-oriented conditions exist; Deutsch, 1975), it cannot be assumed that the most favorable impressions may be created by adhering to this norm. This would be the case when a reward allocator expects to have future interaction with a poor-performing co-recipient. Impressing such individuals, research has shown (Austin & McGinn, 1977; Reis & Gruen, 1976; Shapiro, 1975), dictates the use of equal allocations—responses that promote interpersonal harmony (Leventhal, Michaels, & Sanford, 1972). As a result, the normative behaviors required to satisfy one's internal standards of justice may be inconsistent with those needed to cultivate a favorable self-image. The resolution of such conflicts appears to be based on the relative strength of the various forces.

Testing this notion, Greenberg (1983b, Experiment 1) studied how subjects respond to such conflicts by manipulating self-awareness (mirror presence or absence) in conjunction with impression management concerns (expectation of meeting a lower-input person). In keeping with the Greenberg (1980) study, subjects who were self-aware tended to make equitable allocations and to report that behaving fairly was more important to them than those who were not self-aware. Also as predicted, those who expected to meet their low-input competitors tended to make equal allocations (Shapiro, 1975). However, when self-aware subjects expected to meet their low-input competitors, a conflict occurred between making a favorable impression on oneself (by allocating the reward equitably—that is, in proportion to relative contributions) and on the other person (by allocating the reward equally). Subjects tended to resolve this conflict by favoring either one norm or the other; they were almost equally divided in their preference for equity and equality, making very few compromise solutions. Apparently, subjects were divided as to the relative strength of their impression management targets—some adhered to self-standards by allocating rewards equitably; others presented themselves favorably to recipients by allocating rewards equally.

The possibility of an individual difference variable moderating the choice of competing allocation rules is suggested by the attention given to the distinction between public and private self-consciousness in the impression management literature (e.g., Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). The self-consciousness scale developed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) distinguishes between public self-consciousness—a concern for oneself as a social object (high scorers are concerned about the impressions they make on others), and private self-

consciousness—awareness of the covert, personal aspects of oneself (high scorers are attuned to their internal standards) (for a review, see Carver & Scheier, 1981).

Reasoning that differences in public vs. private self-consciousness may have moderate reactions to the self-image vs. impression management conflict in Experiment 1, a follow-up study was conducted (Greenberg, 1983b, Experiment 2). This investigation recreated the conflict conditions for subjects who were highly public self-conscious (scored high on public self-consciousness and low on private self-consciousness) and those who were highly private self-conscious (scored high on private self-consciousness and low on public self-consciousness). It was reasoned that persons in these extreme groups would resolve the conflict between internal standards of justice and the pressure to present oneself favorably to others in ways commensurate with their predispositions. As expected, it was found that subjects followed the equity norm most closely when they were made highly self aware (by the presence of a mirror) and were dispositionally predisposed to follow their internal standards (the high private self-conscious group). Analogously, the strongest adherence to the equality norm occurred when highly public self-conscious subjects were not made self-aware. Interestingly, subjects in this condition expressed less concern over doing what seemed fair to themselves than subjects in any of the other conditions. Accordingly, it appears that concerns for fairness and adherence to justice norms are influenced by *both* personal and situational factors operating additively to dictate the salience of justice norms.

What is interesting about these findings is that they have been conceptually replicated in a study obtaining opposite behavioral results. Creating a situation in which equality was normatively appropriate instead of equity (joint cooperation was emphasized; Deutsch, 1975), Kernis and Reis (1984) had subjects allocate rewards after performing a task on which they were led to believe they were more productive. They found that the equality norm was followed by subjects who were highly private self-conscious, but that the equity norm was followed by subjects who were highly public self-conscious. Although these findings are behaviorally opposite Greenberg's (1983b, Experiment 2), they are conceptually identical.

The reason has to do with the fact that manipulations used in the two studies dictated the appropriateness of different norms of justice to fulfill internal and external standards. Specifically, to make salient internal standards. Greenberg (1983b) used a competitive context that made the equity norm appropriate, whereas Kernis and Reis (1984) used a cooperative context that made the equality norm appropriate (for a discussion of the situational factors dictating the appropriateness of various justice norms, see Deutsch, 1975; Greenberg & Cohen, 1982; Lerner, 1977; Leventhal, 1976). Furthermore, to make salient external standards, Greenberg (1983b) led subjects to believe that they would get to meet a low-input co-recipient,

thereby encouraging the use of equal allocations in order to avoid conflict and cultivate that person's favor (Reis & Gruen, 1976; Shapiro, 1975). By contrast, Kernis and Reis (1984) explicitly encouraged subjects to consider each person's relative contributions when allocating the money between them; that is, equity was encouraged to please the experimenter. Despite these different sets of internal and external standards, both studies yielded conceptually identical patterns of results. To wit, both studies show that private self-consciousness enhanced adherence to internal standards and that public self-consciousness enhanced adherence to external standards. The fact that these findings were obtained in two separate studies in which situational factors defined different justice standards as normatively appropriate provides the kind of experimental convergence that enhances confidence in the underlying theoretical interpretation (for further discussion, see also, Carver & Scheier, 1985).

To summarize, the research reviewed here makes a clear case for the importance of the self as a target of identities of fairness. People like to think of themselves as fair, particularly those who are predisposed to think about their personal standards and/or when discrepancies from those standards are made salient situationally. Taken together with the evidence showing people's sensitivity toward impressing others with fairness, it appears safe to conclude that concerns about fair impression management are directed both inward, toward one's self-image and outward, toward one's social image.

TACTICS OF PROMOTING FAIR IDENTITIES

Having established that people are interested in impressing both themselves and others with their fairness, a question arises as to how they go about creating such impressions. Although, "Almost all behaviors and appearances potentially convey information about the self and may be used as a self-presentational strategy" (Schneider, 1981, p. 26), theorists have concentrated on studying the influence of verbal claims about the self. Particularly in organizations, language is recognized as the tool through which managers explain and rationalize their actions (Pfeffer, 1981), and has been studied as such (e.g., Garner & Martinko, 1988). The potential influence of statements about oneself has been noted explicitly by Schlenker (1980) in his treatise on impression management: "Through public descriptions of the traits they possess, the things they are accountable for, and the ways they view the world, people can secure identities that maximize the public esteem in which they are held and the outcomes they receive" (p. 91). Similarly, survey research on the tactics of organizational politics likewise has noted that managerial personnel explicitly identify things said to cultivate and maintain a favorable image in organizations—such as sensitivity to organizational norms—as a popular tactic of gaining

organizational influence (Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick, & Mayes, 1979). Apparently, people seek to "explain themselves" to others by presenting themselves in ways that create, promote, and maintain desired social identities (Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981a).

What I am alluding to here is known as self-presentation, "a set of behaviors designed by an actor to establish particular identities in the eyes of various audiences" (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985, p. 293). Following Tedeschi's lead (e.g., Tedeschi & Norman, 1985; Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984), the present discussion of impression management tactics will distinguish between self-presentations that are defensive (i.e., designed to mend a spoiled identity) and assertive (i.e., initiated to establish a particular identity). The next two sections will discuss the defensive and assertive tactics used to manage impressions of fairness.

Defensive Tactics: Identity-Threatening Predicaments

Theorists have conceived social situations as involving challenges to people's self-images, raising questions about the legitimacy of one's claim to an image. For example, as Schlenker (1980) put it, "Life is a constant series of tests in which we are called on to substantiate our claims through personal performance or some other means" (p. 99). When an event occurs that casts unwanted aspersions on someone's character, that person is said to be in a predicament. Specifically, predicaments have been defined as "situations in which events have undesirable implications for the identity-relevant images actors have claimed or desire to claim in front of real or imagined audiences" (Schlenker, 1980, p. 125). In keeping with the recent work of Bies (1987a), situations in which an injustice is perceived to have occurred may be characterized as "predicaments of injustice" for those associated with it. The severity of a predicament depends not only on the undesirability of the event, but also the actor's responsibility for the event (Bell & Tetlock, 1990; Tetlock, 1985). Schlenker expressed this clearly when he characterized responsibility as "the adhesive that links an actor to an event and attaches appropriate sanctions to the actor that deserves it" (p. 126). Given this, it is not surprising that the major tactics for extricating oneself from social predicaments are attributional in nature (Synder, 1985).

Building on the pioneering sociological work of Austin (1961) and Scott and Lyman (1968), Schlenker (1980) identified two broad classes of remedial tactics used to reduce the negative repercussions of a predicament—accounts and apologies. Although Tedeschi and his associates (e.g., Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981a) have expanded this list, accounts and apologies remain the most commonly researched tactics for defending against social predicaments. Accordingly, I will now consider how accounts and apologies may be used to help minimize threats to one's self-identity as a fair person.

Accounts. Accounts are explanations designed to remove an actor from a predicament. They provide information about an event that either lessens one's responsibility for it, and/or lessens the apparent severity of the consequences (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981b). Two types of accounts have been identified—excuses and justifications. An excuse allows actors to deny or minimize responsibility for a predicament; a justification attempts to reduce the negative consequences of a predicament (Austin, 1961; Scott & Lyman, 1968).

More precisely, excuses are "explanations in which individuals acknowledge that their conduct was somehow bad, wrong, or inappropriate, but attempted to minimize their personal responsibility or culpability for it" (Tetlock, 1985, p. 215). Several theorists (e.g., Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Snyder, 1985; Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky, 1983) have claimed that excuses will lessen one's apparent responsibility for an event if it can be demonstrated that the causes of the event were external and/or unintentional. Both internality and intentionality have been studied as general attributional categories (e.g., Weiner, 1974), and they have been shown to influence justice behavior (Greenberg, 1984; Kidd & Utne, 1978; Utne & Kidd, 1980).

Explanations suggesting that an actor's behavior was not volitional, but the result of externally-imposed demands (e.g., "my hands were tied by economic pressures") tend to minimize one's perceived responsibility for the effects of that behavior (Heider, 1958). Moreover, events believed to be externally caused (such as competitive events won as a result of luck as opposed to skill) tend not to be rewarded in a manner that credits people differentially for their inputs—that is, equitably (Cohen, 1974; Greenberg, 1980; Witting, Marks, & Jones, 1981). Furthermore, reward distributions following from externally-caused outcomes are perceived to be less fair than those resulting from conditions in which people are responsible for having caused their outcomes (Greenberg, 1980). Similarly, research has found that people are more responsive to inequities that others have intentionally created than those that are unintentional (e.g., Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; Leventhal, Weiss, & Long, 1969). For example, it has been reported that subjects are more likely to re-allocate rewards so as to redress overpayment or underpayment inequities if these were believed to be intentionally rather than unintentionally created (Garrett & Libby, 1973). Taken together, these findings suggest that attributions of internal and intentional causality heighten people's sensitivity to injustices.

In keeping with this, a stream of research by Bies and his associates has examined the influence of claims of mitigating circumstances on feelings of injustice (for a review, see Bies, 1987a). A mitigating circumstance lessens one's responsibility for an event, often by imposing explanations of external and unintentional causality (Weiner, 1974), thereby excusing an actor for any resulting injustice. Research by Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings (1988) content analyzed

the retrospective accounts workers gave of their bosses' reasons for denying their requests, revealing six distinct types of mitigating circumstances. The most frequently cited mitigating circumstance was the worker's own behavior (e.g., incompetence), followed by claims of budgetary constraints, controls imposed by higher levels of management, limitations of a political nature, restrictions due to formal company policy, and inconsistencies with company norms. The mitigating circumstance judged most adequate had to do with company norms (e.g., "traditionally, our company has never allowed this"). Judged least adequate were explanations based on the current political environment (e.g., "it would be politically incorrect to do this now")—in fact, claims of mitigating circumstances based on such political considerations were judged no more adequate than reports of no mitigating circumstances at all.

In several laboratory studies Bies and Shapiro (1987, Studies 1 and 2; 1988, Study 1) studied the effects of claims of mitigating circumstances (e.g., an economic depression) on reactions to unfavorable organizational events (e.g., budget cutbacks). Such accounts were found to reduce people's feelings of having been unfairly treated relative to others receiving the same outcomes but who were not given accounts of mitigating circumstances. Follow-up research in field settings also has found that accounts of mitigating conditions enhanced perceptions of fairness of naturally-occurring negative outcomes, such as the rejection of a proposal of organizational funding (Bies & Shapiro, 1987, Study 3; 1988, Study 2; Bies et al., 1988), rejection of an application for employment (Bies & Moag, 1986), poor performance ratings (Greenberg, 1988a), and layoffs (Brockner & Greenberg, 1989). It is the point of these studies that accounts of mitigating circumstances discourage persons disappointed by managerial decisions from attributing malevolent motives to the decision-maker (i.e., eliminating a worst-case reading of the situation), thereby facilitating acceptance of the outcomes (Bies, 1989).

Further research has shown that excuses may most effectively facilitate outcome acceptance when they are perceived to be adequate. For example, Bies and Shapiro (1987, Studies 2 and 3) found that the perceived adequacy of the reasons for claiming mitigating circumstances was significantly more important as a determinant of perceived fair treatment than the claim itself (e.g., an explanation couched in terms of adverse economic conditions). Similarly, Folger and his associates (e.g., Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983; Folger & Martin, 1986) found that the feelings of discontent resulting from procedural changes creating unfavorable outcomes were reduced only when an adequate explanation was given for the changes. Recent evidence also suggests that "good" excuses (e.g., claims of mitigating circumstances) were more effective than "bad" excuses (e.g., no mitigating circumstances) or no excuses at all in alleviating the anger of victims of another's harm doing (Weiner, Amirkhan, Foies, & Varette, 1987). These findings are consistent with evidence from the impression

management literature showing that the acceptance of excuses requires them to be perceived as genuine (Jones, 1964) and not habitual (Snyder et al., 1983).

What constitutes an adequate excuse? Several recent studies shed light on this question. For example, Shapiro and Buttner (1988) found that explanations for rejected loan requests that were logical (i.e., based on relevant financial information) were perceived as adequate, and that such explanations enhanced perceptions of procedural justice. Several additional studies have found that the apparent sincerity of an excuse is another determinant of its perceived adequacy. For example, Bies (1987b; Bies et al., 1988) found that the greater the perceived sincerity of a supervisor's reasons for rejecting workers' requests, the more liked the supervisor was, and the more fair those supervisors' actions were perceived to be. Additional research has shown that sincere explanations were found to facilitate social exchange in another way—by discouraging the use of disruptive conflict (Baron, 1988). Indeed, organizational explanations perceived to be ungenue and manipulative in intent have been found to be associated with disliking for the person offering the explanations, and the unfairness of the resulting actions (Greenberg & OrNSTEIN, 1983). As such, explanations that are based on logical information, and which show sincerity appear to be the most effective in enhancing the perceived fairness of outcomes and the procedures that led to them. Although several additional factors may moderate these effects (Bies, 1987a), the recent studies reported here suggest some promising candidates for refining our conceptualizations of adequate excuses.

To summarize, evidence supports the idea that excuses can influence the perceived fairness of events. People are most likely to redress inequities that are believed to be under internal control and the result of intentional acts. Additionally, the perceived fairness of undesirable outcomes has been found to be enhanced by claims of mitigating circumstances. Verbal excuses—specifically, those perceived to be adequate—enhance perceptions of fairness. Adequate excuses are ones that are logical and which are believed to be sincere.

Another category of accounts is justifications. In contrast to excuses, in which one dissociates oneself from a predicament, justifications are "explanations in which the actor takes responsibility for the action, but denies that it has the negative quality that others might attribute to it" (Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981a, p. 281). Predicaments can be resolved if the actor's blameworthy behavior has been explained away in an acceptable manner. Hence, justifications also have been referred to as "techniques of neutralization" (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Schlenker (1980) describes several ways of reducing the severity of a predicament. Among these are: (a) changing the focus of social comparisons, and (b) appealing to superordinate goals. The justice-related implications of each of these tactics will be discussed.

People often justify identity-threatening actions by claiming that "everyone else does it." Individuals making such a claim seem to be implying that their actions are normatively acceptable, and that singling them out for their behavior would be unfair. Although reference standards are emphasized in many theories of organizational justice (e.g., Adams, 1965; Crosby, 1976; for a review, see Greenberg, 1987a), Bies (1987a) reminds us that only a few studies have examined the effects of justifications based on social comparisons—what he terms "referential accounts" (p. 301).

Two studies focused on social comparisons that were temporally-based (Albert, 1977). For example, Bies (1986b) found that people who had proposals rejected by their bosses were more likely to accept this outcome as fair if they believed the boss might approve their proposal subsequently. Future comparisons apparently facilitated workers' acceptance of the fairness of negative outcomes. Similarly, Greenberg (1988a) found that references to future outcomes (e.g., "I hope you will do better next time") were made by managers in 16.22% of the narratives they gave to explain their subordinates' performance ratings. Compared to subordinates receiving no such messages, those who received messages making reference to future outcomes rated their performance evaluations as being more fair. Apparently, communications raising the prospect of future positive outcomes were effective in enhancing the perceived fairness of current negative outcomes.

An alternative source of temporal comparisons is information regarding what *could* have happened (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). For example, some of the managers in Greenberg's (1988a) study informed subordinates that their outcomes could have been worse (e.g., "I could have given you a lower rating"). Research by Folger and his associates (e.g., Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger et al., 1983) has found that people's reactions to injustices are influenced by their beliefs about outcomes that could have occurred (for a review, see Folger, 1986). Specifically, when subjects were told that a change in procedures could have led to lower outcomes than they currently received, they reported less discontent than when more desirable outcomes could have resulted. Apparently, believing that "things could have been worse" was accepted as justification for the procedural changes that adversely affected their outcomes.

Another technique of justification calls for presenting the incident in the context of attempts to achieve superordinate goals. A father who claims to punish his children "for their own good," for example, may be seen as justifying his actions by embedding them with a more desirable or acceptable context. Likewise, organizations faced with having to layoff employees may justify the decision on the grounds of economic necessity and ostensibly display their good intentions by promoting their re-training or outplacement services. Such "reframing" in terms of "ideological accounts" (Bies, 1987a, p. 300) helps redefine questionable actions or outcomes as

morally acceptable (Lofland, 1969). Tedeschi and Reiss (1981a) note that events may be justified by appealing to: higher authorities (e.g., organizational policies), loyalties (e.g., group norms), humanistic values (e.g., peace), ideology (e.g., nationalism), and—of current interest—norms of justice (e.g., equity).

How are appeals to norms of justice used to justify one's actions? Tedeschi and Reiss (1981a) explain that someone's failure to work as contracted or failure to pay for work done may be justified on the grounds that such acts could exacerbate unfair conditions. For example, workers who believe they have been underpaid may seek to restore an equitable state by lowering their performance or going on strike (Greenberg, 1982). Indeed, evidence that such labor actions are justified by recourse to superordinate goals of justice is readily provided by the words often seen on the picket signs carried by striking workers: "Justice on the job," "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work," or most simply, "unfair!"

In a recent study, Greenberg (1988a) found that managers gave ideologically-based explanations of performance to 11.22% of the subordinates whose work they evaluated. An explanation such as, "This rating is good for you; it'll show you there's room for improvement" fits into this category. Such explanations were given primarily to subordinates whose work was rated as average or good, and less frequently to those rated either higher or lower than this. It was found that such ideological justifications enhanced workers' perceptions of the fairness of the evaluations they received relative to those who received no descriptive explanation for their performance ratings. Similarly, Bies (1986b) found that workers' willingness to work harder for bosses who rejected their proposals was facilitated by the use of ideological-based accounts. To recapitulate, people attempt to justify unacceptable actions by getting others to believe that the future holds more favorable outcomes and that these outcomes are required to attain superordinate goals. Such beliefs facilitate the perceived fairness of unacceptable outcomes.

Apologies. In addition to accounts (excuses and justifications), apologies are also used to extricate oneself from an impression management predicament. Following from Goffman (1971), Tedeschi and Norman (1985) define apologies as "confessions of responsibility for negative events which include some expression of remorse" (p. 299). Apologies are designed to convince an audience that although the actor accepts blame for the undesirable event, any attributions made on the basis of it would not be accurate. According to Schlenker (1980), successful apologies convince others that the harmdoer's actions "should not be considered a fair representation of what the actor is 'really like' as a person" (p. 154) and permit them to "leave the undesirable event behind and present a reformed identity to the audience" (p. 157). The mechanisms of apology can range from a perfunctory saying "pardon me," typically for very

minor harmful acts, to complex statements adding expressions of remorse, offers of help, requests for forgiveness, and the use of self-castigation, usually reserved for acts with more serious consequences (Schlenker & Darby, 1981).

One mechanism for gaining the acceptance of one's apologies is to perform penance and offer to compensate one's victims (Goffman, 1971). In a series of studies, O'Malley and Greenberg (1983) found that persons who admitted their wrongdoing and voluntarily offered to compensate their victims were believed by female subjects to require smaller payments as fair restitution than those who did not offer any such penance. The act of voluntarily admitting responsibility was apparently accepted as a "down payment" toward undoing wrongdoing, thereby necessitating smaller amounts of additional compensation. In other words, lower amounts of compensation were believed to be fair costs to be borne by those who already partially compensated their victims by voluntarily admitting their wrongdoing. The tendency for other acts of remorse to induce leniency has been shown in several additional studies (e.g., Austin, Walster & Utne, 1976; Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, & Tedeschi, 1978).

How accepting others are of one's apologies depends, no doubt, on the severity of the deviation from acceptable standards. Kelman (1973) has distinguished between deviations from standards of morality (e.g., harming others or society in general), likely to elicit feelings of guilt and remorse, and deviations from standards of propriety (e.g., failing to behave in accord with one's particular position or role identity), likely to elicit embarrassment and shame. Evidence from simulated legal settings suggests that harsher fines may be administered to deter moral violations than to deter violations of standards of propriety (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Similarly, post hoc analyses of sporting events suggests that more serious penalties (e.g., suspensions) are reserved for unfair acts (i.e., procedural justice violations) that threaten the moral character of the game (e.g., recruitment violations and serious fights), whereas more lenient penalties (e.g., foul shots in basketball) are used to regulate the orderly progress of the game (Brickman, 1977; Greenberg, Mark, & Lehman, 1985; Mark & Greenberg, 1987). Such sanctions may be understood as society's mechanisms for institutionalizing restitution from those who do not voluntarily yield to more subtle social pressures.

In organizations, apologies (also referred to as "penitential accounts" by Bies, 1987a) have been studied by Greenberg (1988a) in his investigation of the explanations given for performance evaluations. Apologies (e.g., "I am sorry to have to give you such a low rating") were given as the prevalent explanation of performance ratings in 13.41% of the cases studied. These represented the most popular category of explanation given to workers in the lowest performance categories ("poor" and "needs improvement"). Although workers receiving such low ratings tended to be dissatisfied with their evaluations, it was found that an apologetic

explanation for the rating enhanced workers' feelings that their ratings were fair, relative to those who were not offered any such apology.

To summarize, both accounts (including excuses and justifications) and apologies have been shown to be effective mechanisms for defending against the threat of an identity of unfairness. Verbal behaviors offered to excuse, justify, or apologize for one's actions can enhance the perceived fairness of those actions and the social acceptance of the actor.

Assertive Tactics: Identity-Enhancing Situations

As noted earlier, self-presentational efforts are not only directed toward defending against identity-threatening predicaments, but also promoting identity-enhancing situations. Various referred to as assertive tactics (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985), offensive attributions (Tetlock, 1985), and acclaiming tactics (Schlenker, 1980), impression management theorists have recognized the existence of proactive efforts directed toward seeking approval for behavior in a meritorious way. Following the lead of D'Arcy (1963), theorists have distinguished between entitlings—attempts to gain responsibility for positive events and their consequences, and enhancements—attempts to augment the positive implications of one's actions (e.g., Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981b; Tetlock, 1985). As will be argued in the following sections, both entitling actions and enhancements are used as tactics to enhance one's image of fairness.

Entitlings. Imagine a supervisor who believes she behaved responsibly by appraising her subordinates' performance following all the procedural rules (e.g., giving worker input into the decision) and distributive practices (e.g., rating commensurate with work performed) recognized as prerequisites for fair performance appraisals (Greenberg, 1986a, 1986b). However, she feels her praiseworthy actions are not being recognized by her subordinates or her superiors. This situation may be said to create a "predicament of image projection" (Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981b, p. 8) for the supervisor, who will desire to gain credit for her actions by getting others to attribute the characteristic of fairness to her. The behaviors directed at prompting these attributions are referred to as entitlings (D'Arcy, 1963). As such, entitlings are the opposite of excuses: the former actions attempt to maximize one's responsibility for positive events, whereas the latter attempt to minimize one's responsibility for negative events (Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981b).

What do managers do to enhance their perceived responsibility for fair outcomes? What fairness-entitling actions do they engage in? Some answers are provided by Greenberg (1988a), who asked a sample of 815 managers to describe one thing they thought they could do to make

their subordinates think they treated them fairly. The responses fell into four categories derived by crosscutting things done to look fair (behavioral acts) and things said to look fair (social account) with the means by which things are done (process) and the end results themselves (outcomes). Specifically, 81% of the respondents reported that they could enhance their image of fairness by "publicly announcing all pay raises and promotions"— a behavioral act focusing on outcomes. "Allowing workers to participate in decision-making," a response reported by 55% of the sample, exemplifies a behavioral act focusing on organizational processes. Social accounts also focused on outcomes, such as "explanations of why certain work assignments must be made" (43% frequency), and processes, such as, "how pay raises are determined" (76% frequency). Managers were apparently aware of several tactics they could use to promote fair self-attributions. Although it remains to be determined how often managers actually use these tactics, and how effective these tactics ultimately may be in cultivating fair impressions, it is instructive to note the range of potentially entitling actions managers believed were possible.

Whereas earlier research has focused on various organizational outcomes and processes perceived as fair (for a review, see Folger & Greenberg, 1985), the Greenberg (1988a) findings extend this work by showing that managers are aware of the things they can do to promote the impression of fairness. In other words, managers appear to be aware of what they have to do or say to look fair. Entitlements may be understood as representing tactics for promoting one's image of fairness—*intuitive self-marketing plans*, if you will.

Astute managers who plan to reap the benefits of fair dispositional characteristics may carefully select behaviors that help cultivate desired impressions in the minds of relevant others. Allen et al. (1979) implicitly make this point in reporting their findings regarding the popularity of various techniques of organizational politics (which they conceive of as tactics for gaining organizational influence). Among the most frequently-obtained responses were "attempts to create and maintain a favorable self-image." These included responses such as developing a reputation for being thoughtful and honest—attributions similar to those in Jones and Pittman's (1982) exemplification category, as well as less cognitive acts, such as good grooming.

The organizational politician was also noted for drawing attention to successes, including ones for which the individual was not directly responsible (Allen et al., 1979). Schlenker (1980) refers to this as the "association principle," the tendency to associate oneself with desirable images. Managers claimed this was done sometimes by taking credit for another's accomplishments, often by making misleading statements or not crediting the appropriate source of one's ideas. It is indeed a curious (and, to my knowledge, untested) possibility that one may use a practice of such a dubious ethical nature to foster an image of oneself as a "fair" individual. However, given the importance of justice as a tool of organizational politics (Cavanagh et al.,

1981), it would not be surprising to find people attempting to solicit at least partial credit for implementing well-received organizational plans. In fact, anticipating this, team leaders may well wish to gain their team members' support by allowing them to share the credit for their group's accomplishments—thereby giving them an opportunity to "bask in the reflected glory" of their joint accomplishments (Richardson & Cialdini, 1981).

Enhancements. In addition to attempting to credit oneself with positive events, people also attempt to persuade others that an ambiguous event was positive, or that an ostensibly positive event really was very positive. Such efforts at augmenting the positive implications of one's actions are known as enhancements, and represent a second category of assertive impression management tactics (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985). Just as entitling actions are the opposite of excuses, enhancements may be understood to be the opposite of justifications (Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981b).

The key to enhancing self-presentations is information. It is therefore not surprising that in their study of managers' use of organizational politics, Allen et al. (1979) found that "information presentation" was one of the most popularly reported techniques. Managers claimed to selectively withhold and distort information in order to influence others. In the case of influence through fair self-promotion, managers may be likely to take advantage of inherently ambiguous consensual definitions of fairness by presenting information that enhances the perceived fairness of their actions (Backman, 1985). By selectively presenting information about an ambiguous event, managers may be helping consensually define the "truth" about it for those who are involved with interpreting it. In other words, managers may attempt to "negotiate" an impression of themselves as fair (Backman, 1985; Schlenker, 1980). This possibility is in keeping with the idea that social constructions help define moral conduct—including a sense of fairness (Backman, 1985). Similarly, the concept of leadership also has been presented as a "negotiated identity," that is socially constructed (Tedeschi & Mel-burg, 1984). The underlying idea is that many salient realities confronting people in organizations are socially constructed (Weick, 1979). People respond to what they believe, and information is the key to manipulating beliefs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the selective presentation of information—enhancement behavior—is such a useful tool of organizational politics.

There appear to be many ways organizational agents can enhance the ostensible fairness of their intentions—thereby helping others define their perceived reality as fair. For example, public pronouncements (such as through press releases, policy statements, and advertising campaigns) or internal memoranda (such as announcements made in writing or at meetings, and statements in company newsletters) may be recognized as tools used to promote fairness at the

organizational level. Similarly, annual reports have been interpreted as tools to influence interested parties in an organization's image (e.g., Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983). At the individual level, managers may behave analogously—by selectively detailing their decisions, and by feeding leaks of fair actions through opinion leaders and informal channels of communication (Katz, 1957). The organizational performance appraisal interview may be understood as another vehicle through which the fairness of a manager's actions may be communicated (Greenberg, 1986b).

It is, in fact, quite likely that an organization that institutes an ostensibly fair, nurturant policy (e.g., a non-layoff agreement) may seek to enhance the intended benefits by promoting it—both internally, to employees, and externally, via institutional advertising. Advertising also may be used by organizations to promote their good-will gestures toward their customers. For example, one large word processing software firm has reproduced in print ads its monthly telephone bills totaling \$169,848.22 for toll-free customer support lines ("What's So Special," 1988). Juxtaposing the bill with a check for the amount signed by the company president, the ad may be understood as an attempt to enhance the company's image of concern for its customers. The benefits to be derived from the "we're fair, we care" image may well rival, if not exceed, those directly associated with the administration of the policy itself (Greenberg, 1988b). The possibility that such efforts represent intentional attempts at impression management is inherent in Thompson's (1967) notion of prospective rationality: "organizations act rationally to increase their evaluations or ratings by others on whom they are dependent" (p. 65.).

Impression Management Strategies: Reputation-Building

Before concluding this part of the chapter, a final point needs to be made. All the impression management tactics described here are designed to have an immediate, short-term effect on one's perceived identity. Tedeschi and his associates (e.g., Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985) distinguish between these short-term "tactics," and strategies—behaviors designed to have long-term consequences on impressions.

Strategic impression management "typically involves a variety of tactical behaviors cumulatively directed toward establishing a particular identity in the eyes of others" (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985, p. 296). As such, impression management strategies have the effect of reputation-building. One who repeatedly convinces others of his or her fairness eventually may develop a reputation as a fair person. Relative to the person-specific and transitory identities resulting from the tactics described to this point, reputations are "typically functional for multiple audiences (or targets), [and] are effective across various situations" (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985, p. 297). They

are, therefore, much more powerful tools, opening up a wider world of influence. For this reason, a person's acquisition of a good reputation may be seen as an investment that yields long-term gains in social influence (Schlenker, 1980). Accordingly, the benefits of behaving fairly may not only be derived from the immediate impact of the actions themselves, but the cumulative impact of the impression that the actor is himself or herself "a fair person." To my knowledge, there are, unfortunately, no direct empirical tests of this process as it applies to the development of reputations of fairness. Given the likely impact of reputations of fairness, such research would appear to be quite useful.

IMPLICATIONS OF AN IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE

The issues discussed thus far have some interesting implications and raise some important questions for the study of organizational justice. Implications and questions focusing on four issues will be raised here: (a) the sincerity of fair impressions, (b) organizational influences on fair identities, (c) the benefits and liabilities of fair impression, and (d) the management of impressions of organizational justice.

On the Sincerity of Looking Fair: Hollow Justice?

If the research and conceptual ideas introduced in this chapter combine to make any single point, it is surely that looking fair is a distinct concern from being fair. Certainly, people may behave fairly because they are motivated out of an interest in doing the right thing, believing that the cumulative effect of fair behavior benefits everyone in the long run (Lerner, 1977; Walster et al., 1978). Indeed, the value of justice and morality at the organizational level has been expressed eloquently by the philosopher, John Rawls (1971), who referred to justice as, "the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of political thought" (p. 3), and equally powerfully by the sociologist Charles Perrow (1972):

The common purpose of an organization must always be a moral purpose, and to inculcate this moral purpose into the very fiber of the organization and into the members of it is the only meaningful task of the executive (p. 77).

I do not challenge this position. Rather, I seek to expand the point by noting that people may facilitate the process of fostering morality by promoting their own fairness. Such a sentiment is not completely new to management thinking, as Chester Barnard, the former president of AT&T argued over a half-century ago, "wholesale general persuasion in the form of salesmanship and

advertising" (Barnard, 1938, p. 144) is needed to persuade employees of the moral character of executives' actions. The various assertive tactics described in the present chapter may be understood as mechanisms for ensuring agreement about the importance of one's fair actions.

It also should be added that people may strive to attain the benefits of being recognized as fair, but without actually behaving fairly. Such self-promotions of fairness lacking in substance may be referred to as hollow justice. Any mere "veneer of fairness" may function as effectively as any more deeply-rooted concern for moral righteousness as long as it is not perceived to be manipulative. A perceived intentional "using" of fairness as a tool of manipulation is likely to backfire when such insincerity is suspected (as indicated by research on the ingratiation's dilemma; e.g., Jones, 1964; Liden & Mitchell, 1988; Ralston, 1985). Demonstrating this effect, subjects in two experiments by Greenberg and Ornstein (1983) reported feeling equitably paid when they were compensated for added job responsibilities by being given a high-status job title. However, when they suspected that their supervisor may have given them the title to trick them into thinking they were fairly compensated, they rebelled—attributing malicious motives to the supervisor, perceiving they were underpaid, and dramatically lowering their job performance.

Although some may seek to further their selfish interests by wrapping their malevolent motives around the mantle of justice—particularly political leaders (DiQuattro, 1986)—it is not necessary to assume deceptive motives in order to embrace an impression management view of justice. In this regard, I should not be represented as echoing the sentiments of his honor, Philip Stanhope, the Earl of Chesterfield, who in 1749 said, "Without some dissimulation, no business can be carried out at all" (cited in Rheingold, 1988, p. 88). Impression management theorists are quick to point out, and I would agree, that people's tactical efforts at presenting themselves favorably to others should not be confused with lying (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Rosenfeld, 1981). The image one puts forth may be sincere, in that it accurately reflects the actor's self-image, or it may represent dissembling. However, not all inaccurate self-presentations may be consciously duplicitous; some may represent identities actors believe they have, if only through wishful thinking (Baumeister, 1982). Generally speaking, "people need to believe attributions designed to protect their sense of self-worth (otherwise the attributions do not serve their 'intended' motivational function), but people do not need to believe attributions designed to protect their public or social identities (we can offer explanations for conduct that impresses others favorably, but that we do not really believe to be true)" (Tetlock, 1985, p. 222).

A key determinant of the sincerity of one's projected image is the degree of clarity surrounding the appropriateness of the behavior in question (Baron, 1988; Snyder, 1985). The inherent ambiguity regarding what constitutes fairness makes it possible for many actions to be presented as fair. The very ambiguous nature of fairness has been established in several open-

ended questionnaires focusing specifically on organizational behaviors (e.g., Greenberg, 1986a; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987) and general social interaction (Liebrand et al., 1986; Messick et al., 1985). This condition makes it possible for people to couch their behaviors (including their verbal remarks) in terms of justice without intentional dishonesty. People may well believe that certain acts are fair that others cannot accept as such (Baumeister, 1982). In other words, fairness may be a socially constructed reality (Bies, 1987a; Weick, 1979). The idea that fairness is a desired label that people seek to attach to their behaviors is one of the most important implications of an impression management interpretation of justice (Bies, 1987a). Understanding the processes through which labels of fairness are attached and removed (an approach that has been recommended for the study of leadership by Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984) opens up an entirely new direction for research on organizational justice. Such an approach clearly identifies a host of different research questions than an approach assuming that the underlying motive behind an act of justice is the desire to relieve the negative emotions brought on by an inequitable payment (Greenberg, 1987a).

As one example of the kind of new questions likely to emerge, we might see a shift in research on individual differences in justice behavior. Traditionally, researchers have studied how differences in such variables as sex, personality, and nationality relate to intolerance for inequities and the preference for various normative standards of justice (for a review, see Major & Deaux, 1982). An impression management perspective would suggest the introduction of variables based on self-presentational styles (Arkin, 1981), such as: determinants of sensitivity toward engendering disapproval for unfairness relative to garnering approval for fairness, and preferences for various defensive and assertive techniques of fair impression management. Knowing about such variables would further our understanding of the mechanisms by which impressions of fairness are cultivated.

Organizational Influences on Fair Identities

It has been shown that people seek to present themselves as fair to others and to themselves. Superimposing these findings on organizational contexts identifies some interesting and important unanswered questions.

For one, it would be instructive to know if certain organizational figures are more salient than others as sources of self-presentational concerns. Typically, higher-status persons are more inclined to be targets of impression management efforts (Gardner & Martinko, 1988). In organizations, this phenomenon is complicated by the fact that one's actions are likely to have impact on—or, at least, be known by—multiple constituencies (Ralston, 1985). In many cases,

what may be done to impress one party with one's own fairness may be antagonistic to cultivating another's impressions of fairness. For example, in keeping with the research reviewed here, a manager may seek to divide available monies for pay raises equally among his subordinates in order to minimize the interpersonal strain merit-based, equitable divisions may create (Leventhal, 1976). However, in so doing, managers run the risk of displeasing other workers, particularly high-input workers who would have benefited from equitable divisions of reward. To impress such an individual with one's fairness may require making a different response. Further complicating the example, supervisors also may face pressure from their own superiors to follow other rules of fairness. In cases of conflicting expectations among multiple constituencies, it may be expected that the target selected for impression management purposes will be the target whose impressions are most highly valued (Schlenker, 1980). In organizations, this may well be that person believed to control the most valued resources.

This situation is complicated by the possibility that different organizational constituencies may be sensitive to qualitatively different manifestations of fairness. In other words, the aspect of one's behavior needed to cultivate an image of fairness may be different for different target persons. For example, a middle manager may seek to convince subordinates that he behaved fairly by giving them a voice in the decisions regarding the manning of office telephones during lunch hours (e.g., "Someone has to monitor the phones during lunch, and rather than assign one of you to do so, I'll let you decide among yourselves who should do it."). This same manager may have to convince his superiors that he behaved fairly by presenting his personnel-assignment decision in a manner consistent with other organizational units (e.g., "As done elsewhere in our company, I delegated this decision to the workers themselves."). Thus, managers may be able to satisfy the fairness demands of multiple constituencies by simply focusing their explanations on different aspects of the same behavior. In this example, the manager would emphasize to the subordinates the fact that he allowed them to make the decision themselves (i.e., emphasizing the procedural fairness criterion of voice in decision making; Greenberg & Folger, 1983), whereas to the superior, the manager would emphasize the fact in performing the same behavior he conformed to organizational policy (i.e., emphasizing the distributional equality of the outcome). By selectively reporting one's behavior, it may be possible to convince several targets of one's fairness. (Of course, to the extent that an actor's image of fairness is reputational, persons interacting with that actor are likely to attribute his or her actions to fair motives simply because of that person's reputation. He or she would receive "the benefit of the doubt" about being fair.)

Finally, it is interesting to consider how social pressures in organizations impose subtle limitations on efforts at positive self-presentation. In particular, the tendency to play up one's

organizational fairness may be limited by fears of presenting oneself immodestly. The practice of immodestly attempting to manipulate desired impressions may sometimes backfire (such as when the actions are perceived as exaggerated and ethically inappropriate), resulting in an undesirable image—a self-promotor's paradox (Ashforth & Gibbs, in press). As a result, the risks of being caught in the act of ostensibly manipulating impressions may be especially likely to be accepted by those who believe their potentially positive impression-forming actions would otherwise go unnoticed. Persons who believe that others will come to know of their desirable actions tend to be less self-aggrandizing than those who do not (Baumeister & Jones, 1978). To the extent that existing mechanisms of organizational communication (e.g., the announcement of one's actions in a company newsletter) ensure the transmittal of a manager's fair actions, managers may be reluctant to engage in further self-promotional efforts. Instead, managers convinced of public acceptance of their actions may reinforce their subordinates' attributions of their fairness through their humility. In so doing, they may be benefiting from the "secondary impression" of modesty as well as the "calculated impression" of fairness (Schneider, 1981). As Schlenker (1980) put it, "successful people can afford to be modest and thus acquire images of success and humility" (p. 193).

Benefits and Liabilities of Fair Impressions

Impression management theorists (e.g., Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981b; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985) have pointed out several benefits of favorable self-presentations that apply quite well to self-presentations of fairness (Greenberg, 1988b). There are also several possible liabilities and limitations associated with attempting to cultivate an image of fairness.

Benefits. One benefit of a fair identity is that it may reinforce a person's self-identity and sense of self-esteem (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). People sometimes do things to convince themselves of their fairness (Greenberg, 1983a), particularly those individuals who strongly endorse the Protestant work ethic (Greenberg, 1979). An internalized belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980) is likely to be reinforced by actions that help define oneself as fair. Indeed, research has shown that self-image maintenance is a very potent determinant of fair behavior (Greenberg, 1980, 1983a, 1983b).

In addition to these intrapsychic benefits, fair identities also may help individual organizational functioning by enhancing a manager's power base. In fact, Tedeschi and Norman (1985) explicitly contend that self-presentations may be interpreted as influence attempts. Managers perceived as fair may gain power advantages through several mechanisms. To the

extent that fair behaviors are admired (Messick et al., 1985), and liking encourages compliance with managers so as to gain their approbation (French & Raven, 1959), attributions of fairness may strengthen a manager's power base. Similarly, managers' power may be enhanced by their subordinates' beliefs in their fairness because of widely held associations between fairness and credibility (Liebrand et al., 1986; Messick et al., 1985). Just as the power of a fair judge is derived from his or her perceived lack of ulterior motives and consistent application of the law, so too may a manager's reputation for credibility and trustworthiness facilitate his or her power to supervise (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981b).

An indirect power advantage also may be gained by managers believed to be fair. As has been noted earlier in this chapter, the fairness of many managerial decisions is ambiguous to subordinates because they are made on the basis of unknown information. Managers with reputations for fairness (or, at least, those who have temporarily impressed others with their fairness) may meet fewer challenges to their authority than others who lack the reputational power of fairness. In ambiguous situations, managers may rely on their reputations for fairness to convince subordinates of the fairness of their actions. Managers who have demonstrated themselves to be fair in the past may well derive power from the acceptance of their admonitions to "trust me, I'll be fair." In other words, a reputation for fairness may help give managers the benefit of the doubt in situations in which judgments of fairness may not be easily made—a process similar to the issuance of "idiosyncrasy credit" (Hollander, 1964) noted in the study of leadership emergence in small groups.

Finally, I should note that fair social identities also may facilitate functioning at the organizational-level. As Greenberg (1988b) discusses, an organizational-level image of fairness—that is, a corporate culture of fairness—may help attract and retain the best qualified job candidates, as well as customers who are attracted by the company's positive image. Indeed, it has been argued that the public will recognize and support "socially responsive firms"; that is, those that fulfill society's moral and ethical expectations (Murray & Montanari, 1986). To the extent that this is true, then benefits of identities of corporate fairness may also be realized in terms of marketing indicators (e.g., percent of market share) as well as management indicators (e.g., degree of job satisfaction). Promotional efforts that position corporations as fair-minded to their employees, the surrounding economic community, and the ecology may be the result of efforts to cultivate a corporate image of fairness (Greenberg, 1988b). (As an example, one may note the frequent advertisements by large oil companies promoting their efforts at eliminating, rather than contributing to, environmental pollution.) Recent research by Schwoerer and Rosen (1989) has found that job applicants' impressions of prospective employers were enhanced by brochures promoting the organizations as being committed to a doctrine encouraging "fair

treatment to all employees." Corporate values, including those emphasizing justice and morality, have been recognized as core elements of organizational culture (Deal & Kennedy, 1982).

In addition to individuals seeking to convince themselves (the private self) or specific external audiences (the public self) of their fairness, organizations provide an opportunity for people to seek adherence to superordinate goals, norms of justice accepted collectively by reference groups. Greenwald and Breckler (1985) use the term collective self to refer to an individual's internalization of the goals of a group with whom he or she is identified, the "we-aspect" of one's identity. Although it is often assumed that internalization of reference groups' standards account for public self-presentations (a "situated identity" position; Alexander & Rudd, 1981), the possibility that workers directly may seek to impress the collective self with their fairness remains untested. Some relevant research has shown that people may frame accounts of their behavior in highly ideological terms (e.g., "this is the right thing to do because it helps us—the company"), making reference to loftier collective goals in order to meet more immediate needs (see Bies, 1987a).

Sensitivity to the collective self might not be equal at all organizational levels. Specifically, it may be speculated that higher-level organizational officials, presidents and CEOs, would tend to be held most responsible for achieving collective standards of fairness. The perspective afforded by their positions may empower them to consider justice from a collective viewpoint more than others whose lower levels in the hierarchy encourage them to focus on more individual-level concerns. Position power, in fact, may well reflect one's level of interest in collective concerns about justice (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985).

Liabilities. In addition to the benefits associated with an image of fairness, there also may be some liabilities that are not immediately obvious to those who strive to attain that image. For one, the "responsibilities" of one's image sometimes may jeopardize one's social standing (Schlenker, 1980). Consider, for example, the plight of certain political and religious figures (former President Nixon and TV evangelists Bakker and Swaggart come to mind) whose alleged indiscretions have publicly disgraced them. Because these individuals' identities were defined primarily in terms of their lofty moral standing, it would not be surprising to find them more disgraced for their actions than others who never sought, by virtue of their position or their actions, a reputation for moral purity.

A challenged identity is, perhaps, most threatened when it forms the core of one's public image. A parallel to the concept of "status liability" (Wiggins, Dill, & Schwartz, 1965) is apparent. Just as a high status person may receive the most credit for positive outcomes and take the most blame for negative outcomes, a similar process may be operating with respect to self-

presentations. That is, persons whose primary social identities are invested in a certain image may not only receive the most approval for events affirming that identity, but also may receive the most disapproval for events challenging that identity (Schlenker, 1980). Thus, although images of fairness may be quite valuable organizational tools, there also may be some costs associated with maintaining them.

Just as individuals may bear costs associated with having a fair identity, so too may institutions bear similar costs—and in an analogous manner. For example, because the American news media is expected to fairly and dispassionately report stories to the public, it is sometimes found that press accounts of news events that are biased, or which proactively create rather than reactively report stories instigate public outcries of injustice. Such was the case, for example, when press reports surfaced prior to the 1988 U.S. presidential election that questioned Republican Vice Presidential candidate Dan Quayle's motives for joining the National Guard (allegedly, to avoid being drafted and serving in a military unit in Vietnam). One poll taken at that time found that 55% of those surveyed believed the press coverage was unfair ("Poll," 1988). Such assessments may well be partly responsible for growing public disenchantment with the mass media (Roberts & Maccoby, 1985). Given that the American press is an institution historically associated with safeguarding justice and democracy, public sensitivity to potentially unfair actions on its part (e.g., claims of overzealously "hounding" a political candidate) may be readily understood as an instance of an institution's liability for its reputation. In other words, just as the "holier than thou" individual might be held to a higher moral standard than mere mortal souls, so too may institutions sanctioned with responsibility for assuring public well-being be expected to face harsh disapproval when they appear to have violated the very rights they are empowered to protect.

Another personal liability associated with having a reputation for being fair may be the burden of having to justify one's actions in terms of fairness rather than any other criteria, such as one's own preferences (B. R. Schlenker, personal communication, June 26, 1988). If a "fair person" is who you are in the eyes of others, your projected identity, then it may be seen as insufficient for you to account for your actions in terms that do not assert this identity. Others will be looking for and expect to find an explanation couched in terms of fairness and may be dissatisfied by any other type of explanation. In fact, it is an intriguing possibility that failure to assert the identity regularly may actually weaken the identity itself. Such obligations to justify one's actions as fair (i.e., pressures to live up to one's reputation) may be burdensome in that they force the actor to couch his or her actions in the language of justice (e.g., "I did it this way because it took everyone's relative contributions into account."), and may restrict the use of other explanatory mechanisms (such as personal choice; e.g., "I did it this way because I wanted to.").

In other words, to reap the benefits of a fair identity, one may have to pay for it in terms of the restricted behavioral (or at least, rhetorical) options required to maintain that identity. (This process is analogous to the press agent's efforts to put his client into situations that help reassert his or her public image— such as getting the playboy millionaire to be seen in the presence of a beautiful starlet at a chic night spot. To maintain his appeal as a box office draw, the playboy is expected to present himself in a manner consistent with the image created for him—whether he wants to or not!)

Managing—and Mismanaging—Impressions of Organizational Fairness: Case Studies

Given the fact that scientists and practitioners have only recently begun to recognize and appreciate the full range of organizational behaviors associated with organizational justice, it is not too surprising to find very few published cases in which issues of fair impression management are explicitly analyzed. Yet, with increased frequency, recent treatises on corporate morality are beginning to pay attention to the matter of impressions of fairness, if only in passing (e.g., Jackall, 1988; Walton, 1988). In addition, two recent cases may be identified as explicitly focusing on concerns about fair impressions created in organizations. One highlights the successful management of fair impressions, and the other, unsuccessful management.

Successful Impression Management: Introducing a New Performance Appraisal System at Cyanamid. In 1986 the American Cyanamid Company introduced a new performance appraisal system company-wide following a successful experiment in the company's Medical Research Division during the previous three years (Gellerman & Hodgson, 1988). After reducing an unworkable 10-point scale to an easier 3-point scale and eliminating forced-distribution expectations, claims that the scale was unfair were greatly reduced. In fact, during the last year of the study (1986), 63% of the workers using the new system reported that it fairly assessed their performance, compared to only 24% in a control group using the old system. On the basis of such findings, the new system was adopted in 1986 for all of the company's 11,500 U.S. employees.

Interestingly, although the company planned on introducing the new system company-wide regardless of the study's findings, the positive reaction of workers in the company's Medical Research Division was cited as justification for introducing the system. These findings were then widely disseminated throughout the company in an attempt at publicizing the new system's fairness—and the company's fairness in basing the system's introduction on such successful trial outcomes. Such an ostensible effort at showing the company's concern for

introducing an established perceived-fair practice was seen as consistent with CEO George J. Sella Jr.'s commitment toward humanizing the corporate culture and improving the quality of life for the company's employees. These actions also have been credited for fostering workers' acceptance of the new system. (Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which acceptance of the new system is based on employees' genuine regard for the system's own characteristics uncontaminated by the company's ballyhoo regarding its greatness.) Cyanamid's efforts at impressing its workforce with the company's interest in introducing proven- fair procedures provides an excellent example of the concern for cultivating fair impressions described in this chapter.

Unsuccessful Impression Management: The Firing of the Ohio State University's Football Coach. By contrast to the Cyanamid case, not all organizational changes are managed in a manner perceived as fair. An excellent example is provided by Lewicki's (1988) analysis of claims of unfairness resulting from the firing of the Ohio State University's head football coach, Earle Bruce, in November, 1987.

The case begins when the University's President, Edward Jennings, fired Coach Bruce in the middle of Bruce's contract, one week before the 1987 season's final game (against its arch rival, the University of Michigan). Claiming that such personnel matters required secrecy, President Jennings gave little or no information to the public regarding his reasons for Coach Bruce's surprise dismissal (the coach had repeatedly led his team to 9-3 seasons—a good, but not impressive record). The firing subsequently led the University's Athletic Director to resign in protest, Coach Bruce to bring suit against the University (resulting in a \$471,000 settlement), the University President to lose a great deal of good will for his actions (publicly decried as unfair), and Coach Bruce to emerge as a sympathetic, victimized hero.

In analyzing this incident, Lewicki (1988) noted that public organizations with highly visible performance and large public constituencies (such as in this case) need to be sensitive to the perceived fairness of their actions. Clearly, in this case the University President was not sensitive enough to issues of perceived fairness. Specifically, by failing to disclose adequate reasons behind the Coach's firing, the university may be seen as violating the public's consensually perceived "rights" of full disclosure, and its "right" to question undesirable actions. Although there are no actual legal rights to such information in this case, the disclosure of such information would have been useful in facilitating the public's acceptance of the decision as a fair one. Lewicki (1988) claimed that by not providing such information, the University violated the public's "right to know," thereby providing an incident of ineffective management of social accounts resulting in perceptions of unfairness. Certainly, the effects of such actions on alumni

donations, fan support, and the recruitment of future players and coaches—although unknown at the present time—may be taken as useful indicators of the long-term impact of such mismanagement.

Synthesis. Despite their many differences, the Cyanamid case and the Ohio State University case clearly underscore the importance of impressions of fairness in organizations. It was the promoted appearance of fairness that facilitated acceptance of Cyanamid's new performance appraisal system, and the ostensible unfairness of the manner of Coach Bruce's firing that led to public disapproval of the University President Jennings. Just because Cyanamid's new performance appraisal system does a better job of evaluating workers, or even if President Jennings actually had just cause for firing Coach Bruce, it was the way in which the information was presented in both cases that appears to have been so responsible for the reactions that resulted. Thus, as I have been saying throughout this chapter: it is the management of an impression of fairness that is so greatly responsible for the reactions that result from one's behavior.

CONCLUSION

Can it be said that concerns about impressing others with one's fairness are preeminent in organizations, or that fairness is the most important attributional goal sought by subordinates, managers, or organizations? Although any claims to these effects may represent overstatements, the salience of concerns about fairness cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, organizational scientists have largely overlooked impression management issues as they pertain to organizational fairness. Long limited by the domination of a narrow perspective about justice, they have not been able to capture the richness of this topic. With these remarks, it is hoped that the field of organizational behavior will expand its views of organizational justice and re-direct at least some of its efforts away from "being fair" and toward "looking fair."

As in the case of earlier efforts at applying an impression management perspective to social phenomena traditionally studied by intrapsychic theories (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985), my interest has been in encouraging the study of organizational justice from an alternative point of view. I believe the departure from the historically prevalent reactive content frameworks (e.g., equity theory and relative deprivation theory) for studying organizational justice (Greenberg, 1987a) outlined here provides a more insightful approach into a broader range of issues of organizational justice than heretofore may have been considered. As such, the time appears to have come for equity theory, the reigning theory of organizational justice to release its hegemony

over the field. Such a shift in paradigms would be in keeping with a reorientation that took place in social psychology from the 1960s to the 1970s, "a shift from motivational/drive models of cognitions, behaviors, and internal states to information processing, attribution models of such phenomena" (Bern, 1972, p. 43). This shift that Bern referred to is also in evidence in the field of organizational behavior (e.g., Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). However, the field of organizational justice has been slow to catch up with this movement (Greenberg, 1987a). Hopefully, the impression management orientation advanced in this chapter will encourage some new directions in organizational justice research and theory development that embrace the intrapsychic orientation.

Before concluding, I must caution readers against the temptation toward interpreting an element of irony in this paper—namely, that one would act manipulatively in the name of fairness. To be sure, there is nothing inherently Machiavellian about wanting to appear fair. Concerns about the perceived fairness of one's own actions reflect a social sensitivity that may be no more deceitful than any other self-presentational efforts (such as dressing to impress others, or treating people in a kind manner to win their friendship). Of course, whereas any calculated impression may be motivated by unethical interests (e.g., the slick con job of the snake oil salesman), there is no reason to suspect that fairness as a desired identity is any more likely to be associated with the deceitful intentions of those who pursue it than any other identity. To the hopefully many readers to whom this caveat may seem unnecessary and overly defensive, my reply is that it is not aimed at you. Rather, it is intended to reassure those inclined to treat justice as a cherished virtue that risks tarnishing by tampering with it (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985) that any concern for nurturing justice fails to render it less pure.

I opened this chapter by arguing that practicing managers may have greater awareness of the importance of fair social identities than most organizational scientists who study fairness. In closing, it is hoped that the impression management perspective advanced on these pages will stimulate the efforts of those who study organizational behavior to catch up with the consensual beliefs of those who practice it.

READING 5

BEST PRACTICES IN WHITE-COLLAR DOWNSIZING

Managing Contradictions

Kim S. Cameron

Sarah j. Freeman

Aneil K. Mishra

Executive Overview

It is no secret that U.S. industry, once the most productive in the world, is now lagging behind its global competitors. What is not well known is that blue-collar productivity is not necessarily the problem. Between 1978 and 1986, for example, the number of production workers declined by six percent while real output rose 15 percent. White-collar productivity decreased six percent while the number of workers increased by twenty-one percent.

Downsizing, which involves reducing the workforce, but also eliminates functions and redesigns systems and policies to contain costs, is becoming more common in U.S. companies. Despite its pervasiveness, however, downsizing has rarely been investigated by organization and management researchers.

This article seeks to identify the processes used in effective downsizing as well as the consequences that result. The authors studied organizational downsizing and redesign for four years in thirty organizations in the automobile industry. Six general strategies are presented that highlight the best practices of these firms that are downsizing effectively.

Once the most productive nation in the world, the U.S. now lags most of its global competitors in productivity growth. For example, private sector productivity growth slowed from 3.3 percent per year between 1948 and 1965 to 0.1 percent today for the entire economy. Worse still, productivity for nonfarm businesses declined 0.3 percent. A good share of the blame for this decline rests squarely on white-collar employees and management. To illustrate, consider that between 1978 and 1986 the number of production workers in the U.S. declined by six percent

while real output rose fifteen percent. That represents a 21 percent gain in blue-collar productivity, or a 2.4 percent annual growth rate. During the same period, however, U.S. manufacturing firms expanded the number of white-collar, non-production workers by twenty-one percent, representing a six percent decrease in productivity.

The trend toward a disproportionate expansion in the number of white-collar workers is also illustrated by the fact that in 1950, twenty-three percent of U.S. manufacturing industry employees were non-production workers. By 1988 that figure had risen to forty-seven percent. At the same time that production worker employment was decreasing in the 1980s, non-production worker employment was increasing dramatically in the manufacturing sector. The good news is that approximately seventy percent of the increase in America's GNP in the 1980s was accounted for by an expansion in the number of jobs. The bad news is that this growth of our major global competitors was accounted for by increases in employee productivity, not merely job growth.

DOWNSIZING AS A RESPONSE

Declining white collar productivity is reflected as a cost disadvantage. Overhead rates reflecting excess white-collar employees have created a cost structure in many U.S. companies that limits global price competitiveness and, consequently marketshare growth. It is not surprising, then, that organizational downsizing has become a common cost reduction strategy in U.S. companies. *More than eighty-five percent of the Fortune 1000 firms, for example, downsized their white-collar workforce between 1987 and 1991, affecting more than five million jobs. More than fifty percent downsized in 1990 alone. Major reductions occurred in firms such as ITT (more than forty percent of the company's workforce), K-Mart (more than 20 percent), Peat Marwick (more than 20 percent), IBM (more than 10 percent), AT&T (more than 10 percent), Eastman Kodak (more than 10 percent), and Sears (more than 10 percent). Almost a million American managers with salaries exceeding \$40,000 lost their jobs last year, and between one and two million pink-slips have been handed out each year for the past three years. (More than half of those employees took pay cuts of thirty to fifty percent to obtain new jobs.)*

Yet, even with the extensive downsizing implemented in U.S. firms, white-collar productivity has not improved significantly. Overhead rates and costs remain significantly above the best global competitors in many industries. One explanation is that downsizing has not been managed effectively in many firms and, therefore, the intended cost reductions and efficiencies

have not materialized. Another is that downsizing has created resentment and resistance in firms, thus hindering rather than helping U.S. competitiveness. Unfortunately, not enough is known about the implementation processes associated with downsizing to identify best practices. Despite its pervasiveness, downsizing has rarely been investigated by organization and management researchers. Few systematic studies have been published of the precursors, effects, and strategies associated with organizational downsizing.

One reason is that downsizing has often been confused with two other organizational phenomena: layoffs and decline. Organizational downsizing involves many alternatives beyond just laying off personnel. Organizations may get smaller, for example, through headcount reduction strategies such as attrition, early retirements, or outplacements. Downsizing may occur by reducing work, not just personnel, by eliminating functions, hierarchical levels, or units. And it may also occur by implementing cost containment strategies that simplify processes such as paperwork, information systems, or sign-off policies.

Organizational decline is also different than downsizing. Decline refers to the involuntary loss of resources, generally revenues or marketshare. Downsizing refers to intended reductions of personnel. Organizational decline often leads to what Cameron, Kim, and Whetten called "the dirty dozen"—that is, twelve dysfunctional effects in organizations. These include decreasing levels of morale, trust, communication, and innovation as well as increasing levels of conflict, scapegoating, threat-rigidity reactions, and conservatism. Whether these same phenomena occur when organizations are downsizing was an important question in the study reported here. Because downsizing may be implemented when the organization is growing as well as when it is declining, downsizing and decline are not the same phenomena.

ISSUES FOR INVESTIGATION

This article reports some of the findings from a four-year longitudinal study of organizational downsizing and redesign in thirty organizations in the U.S. automobile industry. Some organizations were plants within parent corporations (for example, assembly plants or stamping plants); some were independent firms (supplier businesses). The study focused on white-collar downsizing (as opposed to hourly employee reductions) because productivity declines and non-competitiveness are attributed mainly to excess white-collar positions. Moreover, these positions are often the most attractive positions in organizations. Their attractiveness makes them difficult to eliminate, although they may be the most redundant.

One primary intent of the study was to identify the processes used in effective downsizing as well as the consequences that resulted from downsizing. More precisely, this

article reports "best practices"—the downsizing strategies that were associated with the most effective organizational outcomes. In brief, the major question being addressed is: When organizations engage in downsizing, what strategies are most likely to be associated with organizational effectiveness?

METHODOLOGY

Firms in the auto industry were selected because of the extensive downsizing that is occurring in that industry and because of its size and importance in the American economy. For example, more than forty percent of this nation's current merchandise trade deficit is related to the automotive industry. Well over a million people work for the Big Three Auto companies alone (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler), not to mention the myriad related organizations and industries that serve as suppliers to and customers of the automobile companies. Moreover, since 1981 nearly half a million jobs have been affected by downsizing activities in the Big Three firms.

Each of the thirty organizations in the study had engaged in downsizing activities. Some downsized in years prior to the study (pre-1987), almost all downsized during the years of the study, and many were planning to downsize in the immediate future as well. Reductions in the workforce in these firms ranged from +14 percent to -69 percent of white-collar employees and from +69 percent to -49 percent of blue-collar employees. (That is, some organizations increased the white-collar workforce while decreasing the blue-collar workforce, or vice versa.) The smallest of these organizations employed approximately 100 employees; the largest employed over 6000. Interviews were conducted every six to nine months with the head of each organization between 1987 and 1990. This top manager was treated as the key informant to provide ongoing information regarding how downsizing and organizational redesign activities were being implemented. Each manager was interviewed five times over the four-year period, with each interview lasting about two hours. Two separate researchers, one involved in conducting the interviews and one not involved, read the transcripts of the interviews and independently identified the themes, issues, and strategies that characterized each organization. Relationships between organizational effectiveness and implementation processes were especially noted. Agreement between the interview coders for these themes, issues, and strategies was very high.

In addition to the interviews, approximately 2500 questionnaires were collected from white-collar employees in these 30 organizations, asking for perceptions of strategies, corporate culture, leadership, and outcomes of downsizing. Measures of effectiveness were obtained by

asking respondents to compare their organization's current performance with its performance in the previous two years, with the performance of its best domestic and global competitors, with stated goals for the current year, and with perceived customer expectations. Table 1 reports the range of organizational effectiveness scores for firms in the study. Statistical analyses of the questionnaire responses uncovered the factors that are most closely associated with organizational effectiveness. These analyses are not reported in detail here, but the findings related to implementation processes are discussed below. It was discovered that the way in which downsizing occurred was more important in accounting for effectiveness than the size of the work force reduction or the cost savings that accrued. The following discussion explains these effective implementation processes.

BEST PRACTICES IN DOWNSIZING ORGANIZATIONS

Analyses of the set of interviews together with the questionnaires revealed that very few of the organizations in the study implemented downsizing in a way that improved their effectiveness. Most deteriorated instead of improving in terms of pre-downsizing levels of quality, productivity, effectiveness, and the "dirty dozen" (e.g., conflict, low morale, loss of trust, rigidity, scapegoating). However, in a few of the firms especially noteworthy practices were associated with improvement in organizational effectiveness over time. Specifically, six general strategies highlight the best practices typical of the firms in the U.S. auto industry that are downsizing effectively. Other less effective firms may have been characterized by some of the processes, but only in the most effective firms were all six present.

Table I

AVERAGE ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS SCORES IN 30 FIRMS IN THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY

<i>Highly Effective</i>	<i>Moderately Effective</i>	<i>Ineffective</i>
<i>Effectiveness Scores</i>	<i>(on a 5.0 point scale)</i>	
Above 4.0	Between 3.0 and 4.0	Below 3.0
<i>Presence of the Six Strategies</i>		

All six present

Some of the six present

Few of the six present

Number of Organizations

N=4 firms

N=22 firms

N=4 firms

1. The most successful downsizing was implemented by command from the top-down, but it was also initiated from the bottom-up.

In effective organizations, leaders initiated downsizing. They exhibited aggressive, strong leadership, and they remained visible and interactive with their employees. They had clearly articulated visions of where they wanted the organization to go. Effective downsizing was managed and monitored by top managers; it required hands-on involvement and momentum that originated at the top of the organization.

On the other hand, the best downsizing strategies were, at the same time, recommended and designed by employees, not top managers. Employees analyzed the operations of the organization job-by-job and task-by-task. This sometimes happened in cross-functional teams, sometimes in blue-ribbon committees, sometimes in self-managed task forces. Members identified redundant jobs and partial tasks, determined how employees were spending their time, found ways to eliminate organizational fat and improve efficiency, and planned ways in which the changes could be implemented. External organizations that had previously downsized were studied by these teams and task forces. When employees (1) understood the reasons for downsizing, (2) were assured that their personal employment was guaranteed with the firm for a certain period of time, even if they recommended the elimination of their own jobs, and (3) trusted managers to listen and be fair, downsizing strategies were implemented smoothly and effectively from the bottom-up.

One CEO's process took this form:

We held a meeting for all the salaried people . . . we gave them an overview of the [downsizing] plan. And we spent time talking about that, and then different staff heads talked about their strategy and where they're headed . . .

We do that on a quarterly basis now. Once you start doing that you can drive the plan down into the organization. People understand it, they embrace it, they figure out, "Here's what I've got to do at the departmental level and at the group level and at the individual level. Here's how everything ties together. . . You can almost pick out the date on the calendar when this stuff started happening because you see the significant improvement.

In one organization, employees were told that if their jobs were eliminated, they would still receive full pay for a year, but in the meantime would be required to create another value-

added job inside the firm or find another position outside. Retraining would be paid for, but employees had to justify the expenditure in a proposal. Employees were encouraged to look more broadly than just joining an existing unit; instead, they were urged to find ways to innovate, to initiate new products or services, or to improve current products and processes. Some employees used the time to find jobs outside the firm; others found ways to try out new projects that improved both bottom-line (cost control) and top-line (revenues) results.

Downsizing from the top down provided consistency, vision, and clear direction as well as visible commitment and hands-on involvement. Downsizing from the bottom-up helped foster innovation and improvements that would not have been possible had top management simply mandated headcount reductions. In one firm, for example, an employee analysis resulted in new tooling that reduced 37 different tool sets to just one, in turn, reducing the number of set-up operators significantly along with other costs. Better union-management relations eliminated the need for several "watch-dog" positions. Improvement in paperwork processing and standardized forms (e.g., insurance claims, reporting forms) eliminated a variety of non-value-added positions and \$2 million from bottom-line costs. A suggestion system contributed to the elimination of more than \$1 million in costs in another firm. The redesign of a door panel in one company, from seven pieces to three pieces, allowed each product to be manufactured with fewer employees and at lower cost. In each case, it took bottom-up analysis to identify the potential for these improvements coupled with top-down motivation, mandate, and monitoring to implement them.

2. The most successful downsizing was short-term and across-the-board, but it was also long-term and selective in emphasis.

In firms that downsized effectively, implementing across-the-board cutbacks was an effective means of capturing employees' attention, mobilizing the energy of all the organization's members, and overcoming resistance to change. It highlighted the seriousness of conditions faced by the firm and woke up the organization to the need for new approaches to day-to-day work. Cutbacks made it clear that the status quo was no longer acceptable. Generalized downsizing also helped avoid charges of favoritism and potential legal or contract issues. Especially, it helped achieve headcount and cost-savings goals quickly and visibly.

Nonprioritized downsizing, on the other hand, was similar to tossing a grenade into a crowded room. There could be little prediction of who would be eliminated, how many would be gone, or which talents and skills would be lost. Companies were continually taken aback, for example, by how many or how few employees accepted early retirement offers. The harm caused

by these approaches, therefore, frequently off-set the positive effects of "unfreezing" the organization. One dramatic example occurred in an organization where a 30-year employee in the purchasing department was the primary agent for ordering steel. Over the years, modifications had been made in the types of steel and alloys ordered, but changes in the written specifications had not kept pace. Shortly after this purchasing agent accepted an early retirement option, an order was placed unknowingly for the wrong kind of steel. This produced a \$2 million loss for the organization in downtime, rework, and repair. The organizational memory, as well as the expertise needed to do the work, left with the purchasing agent without any chance of replacement or retraining because of the expedient and nonprioritized method used in downsizing. Simply put, when implemented in the absence of other strategies, "grenade" approaches to downsizing were rarely positive and frequently negative in their consequences.

Three types of downsizing strategies characterized the methods used in these organizations. They are summarized in Table 2: workforce reduction strategies, organization redesign strategies, and systemic strategies. Workforce reduction strategies were actions that eliminated individual jobs by, for example, layoffs, attrition, or buyouts and retirement incentives. They were usually implemented on a short-run, across-the-board basis, and they produced immediate decreases in headcount (grenade approaches). These strategies were by far the most commonly used by downsizing firms; in fact, they were used by all the firms in our study. But the most effective firms didn't stop there.

Table II

THREE TYPES OF DOWNSIZING STRATEGIES

Type of Strategy	Characteristics	Examples
Workforce Reduction	Aimed at headcount reduction	Attrition
	Short-term implementation	Transfer & Outplacement
	Fosters a transition	Retirement Incentives
		Buyout packages
		Layoffs
Organization Redesign	Aimed at organization change	Eliminate functions
	Moderate-term	Merge units

	implementation	
	Fosters transition and, potentially, transformation	Eliminate layers Eliminate products Redesign tasks
Systemic	Aimed at culture change	Change responsibility
	Long-term implementation	Involve all constituents
	Fosters transformation	Foster continuous improvement and innovation Simplification
		Downsizing : a way of life

Organization redesign strategies were difficult to implement quickly because some redesign of the organization was required (e.g., eliminating a function, merging two subunits). They were, by and large, medium-term strategies used by firms to eliminate or re-position subunits within the organization or to eliminate work. Sometimes eliminations of a hierarchical level, for example, were accomplished without a redesign of the work, but generally some kind of work redesign accompanied these strategies.

Systemic strategies were aimed at changing the mind-set or culture of the organization. Instead of a single action or program, they involved a change in the way employees interpreted and approached their work. Minds as well as actions became the target of change. These strategies could not be implemented quickly but were part of a long-term change process. Downsizing was redefined as a continuous, never-ending set of opportunities. No size or savings level was set as a target because whatever that level was, it could be improved. The main advantage of systemic strategies was in helping the firm avoid the need for more short-term

workforce reductions in the future when another economic downturn or crisis occurred. Relatively few firms adopted systemic strategies in their downsizing efforts.

The most successful firms implemented all three types of strategies: workforce reduction, organization redesign, and systemic strategies. That is, they implemented both short-term (workforce reduction) and long-term (redesign and systemic change) strategies as they downsized. They used both across-the-board and targeted downsizing. They focused on the immediate measurable changes that were required as well as immeasurable changes in the way work was defined and approached.

One firm accomplished this by conducting a "value analysis" of all tasks in the organization before beginning any downsizing. The question addressed was, "What value does this task have to the final product or service for which we are in business?" Conducted by the employees themselves, this analysis resulted in prioritizing the most valuable individuals, tasks, and jobs, which were not only protected but strengthened. Investment increased in some areas at the same time that individuals and jobs in areas adding less value were reassigned, redesigned, or removed. For example,

We sent out a survey to every employee and asked them ... to describe exactly what you do, whether your boss knows about it or doesn't. What is it that you do? We took all 743 of those and we charted those suckers. And it filled up most of the hotel down there in Ann Arbor ... And then we started sorting out the duplicates . . . and the things that don't fit, that lead to dead ends . . .
From where I sit at the top, I couldn't give you four job descriptions, so how would I know about what 743 are doing?

Together with an across-the-board early retirement program, for example, one firm offered certain employees incentives to remain in their jobs while others were given incentives to retire early. At the same time, work was redesigned when the quality control and maintenance functions were eliminated. Those tasks were reassigned so that the remaining employees became responsible for incorporating them into their own jobs. This necessitated a non-trivial investment in the training of all employees. Training focused on implementing a new culture of continuous downsizing and preparing employees for organizational changes that were to occur. Costs increased in the short run, therefore, due to the investment in training. To offset this increase, one employee in this firm proposed changing the work week from five eight-hour days to four ten-hour days to generate savings in maintenance, security, and energy costs.

3. The most successful downsizing involved paying special attention to those employees who lost their jobs. It also involved paying special attention to those who didn't.

Effective firms provided outplacement services, personal and family counseling, relocation expenses, and active sponsoring of employees whose positions were eliminated. Several top managers proudly announced that none of their white-collar employees was without a position someplace else. A wide variety of options was generated for these employees including severance pay, benefit packages, retraining, and employment opportunities. Temporary consulting arrangements were even made available to some terminated employees. In short, the best firms took responsibility for the transitions created by loss of employment.

On the other hand, white-collar employees who remained with the firm were likely to experience what Brockner and his colleagues labelled "survivor guilt." Psychological reactions among survivors of layoffs commonly include increased anxiety about job loss, decreased loyalty to the firm, and guilt feelings regarding displaced co-workers. Survivor guilt occurs when the remaining employees feel guilty about working overtime, for example, or receiving paychecks when their friends and former co-workers may not be working at all. In addition, survivors may feel that the attributes traditionally valued in good employees—loyalty, hard work, and personal competence—no longer count in the firm. Individuals who displayed those traits still lost their jobs. Evidence of survivor guilt was prevalent in the firms in this study.

In addition to this deterioration in morale, practical work problems were even more noteworthy. As a result of downsizing, for example, fewer numbers of employees were left in the firm to do more work and, frequently, to do a more complex set of tasks than before.

A common complaint among top managers was that downsizing created job demands that most remaining managers were not qualified or experienced enough to fulfill. Management survivors were required to manage a larger number of employees, maintain accountability for multiple (often new) functions, and to coordinate among more subunits than before. Many were simply not equipped to handle the increased work demands or the additional knowledge required. Management burn-out was a common complaint.

While outplacement support and attractive incentive packages were provided to those leaving the organization, survivors in most organizations received disincentives such as increased workloads, smaller or no raises, loss of cost-of-living-allowances (COLA), the same or a reduced title, demands to learn new tasks and take on broader responsibilities, and sometimes, an escalation in the "dirty dozen" dynamics. "Survivor envy" as well as survivor guilt was a common outcome.

In firms that downsized successfully, however, special attention was paid to the transition experienced by employees who remained with the organization as well as those who exited. One

way this transition was managed was by increasing the amount and frequency of information communicated to these employees. For example, some top managers reported going the extra mile to make certain that all employees knew the rationale and circumstances underlying the downsizing effort. Openness in sharing information with employees at all levels was a priority. One company held regular "forums" where data was shared on both the company's and its major competitors' costs and performance. These included question and answer periods with blue- and white-collar workers. Data that might have been confidential before was posted in several locations throughout the company, so that organization members were included in downsizing planning and implementation. Other firms held special events to signal the end of the degeneration phase and the beginning of the regeneration phase for the company (e.g., "launch lunches," a new company logo, new signs, fresh paint, colors in the production area).

The point was to communicate a different message to employees than had been communicated before. Whereas downsizing has usually created loss of loyalty, morale, and trust, some companies made special efforts to convey a sense of excitement and opportunity in a new phase of the firm's lifecycle. In particular, top managers passed messages that the survivors were survivors because they were highly valued and respected. The need to downsize was not due to their mistakes, but they were the ones who would make (or keep) the firm competitive. Managers often targeted an outside scapegoat as the culprit in unpleasant downsizing actions (e.g., the economy, the Japanese transplants, the rising quality expectations of the public). One highly effective CEO, in a speech to his recently downsized top management group, stated it this way: "Despite all the problems created for us, despite all the obstacles placed in our way, I'm confident that this team has the guts, and the ability, and the talent to see this program through to the end and bring us back to profitability."

But increases in communication went both ways. Survivors were encouraged to put forth their ideas at the front-end of the change process. They were encouraged to pass information upward as well as provide feedback on information passed downward. The point is that increasing information exchange was an important way to give special notice to surviving employees.

Changes in the human resource system were a second way the transition faced by survivors was managed effectively. Training and development opportunities were provided for survivors, and they received incentives for learning new tasks and expanding personal competencies. For example, one manager noted:

We don't delegate training. We're trying to get every department to say training is our responsibility ... In other words, we have a person who's in a level 6 job, but he can grow to a level 7 or 8 if he becomes the trainer for three

or four locations within the section, in addition to his regular job . . . responsibility for training new people as well as existing people. So the curriculum and materials are really developed by the people, up-dated by the people, and administered by the people.

In organizations that downsized most effectively, changes in the HRM system (i.e., selection, appraisal, reward, development) preceded as well as followed the implementation of downsizing strategies. For example, in one organization training and development activities began a year before the downsizing was implemented, so that white-collar employees were prepared for changes that would occur in the structures and management processes. In another firm every employee, salaried and hourly, attended a forty-hour training workshop on the implementation and implications of downsizing. The appraisal system was also redesigned in advance of downsizing. Managers were held accountable for the extent to which they developed and trained their own subordinates in new jobs and functions. In sum, incentives were put in place to motivate survivors who faced new demands in a downsized organization. Both casualties and survivors were made to feel valued, and both groups had opportunities to make contributions and fulfill their potential.

4. The most successful downsizing was surgical and targeted inside the firm, but it was also generalized and included the firm's external network.

Inefficiencies and redundancies are not always easy to identify in an organization, so it is often difficult to know where to target downsizing activities. One manager highlighted this problem in his organization:

As long as you've got as many people as we've got buying stuff, you're going to have lots of suppliers. As long as I've got as many people as I do designing and engineering, I'm going to have as many models as I have. I'm going to have all the variation I have. That's job security. If I'm not generating ideas and I'm not designing new widgets, I don't have a job. So, I'm going to drive changes on parts that customers never see, and I'm going to change them every year because I'm a good engineer, or designer, and that's what I'm supposed to do. And we throw away all kinds of money in that regard.

The most effective firms, however, engaged in surgical procedures. That is, they identified precisely where redundancy, excess cost, and inefficiencies existed, and they attacked those areas specifically. Internal data gathering and data monitoring became systematic and precise, so that employees had access to performance and cost data almost instantaneously. For example,

We have cathode ray tubes . . . about 300 of them, in the plant. And they have all of our performance categories on it, everything from cost of cars to grievances to absenteeism to daily quality to corporate quality. Any one of the 900 pages on this is easily accessible to any hourly-rate employee by just hitting numbers on a keyboard. Not only is it regularly updated, but it's constantly changing to get more and more information out to the hourly people.

Employees of this firm logged several thousand sign-ons daily just checking on performance statistics. Aspects of the work such as container sizes, distance indexes, number of line stations, number of parts per work station, batch sizes, inventory sizes, and so forth, were examined carefully to find areas in which costs could be reduced. The "tight ship" or "lean and mean" metaphors were typical of managers' descriptions.

At the same time, firms that downsized effectively also applied downsizing universally to the entire system of suppliers, customers, and distributors. In planning and implementing downsizing, they reduced the number of outside agents dealt with directly. These outside agents were treated as involved partners as well as potential targets of the downsizing efforts. For example, several firms reduced multiple, redundant single-item suppliers to a single-source supplier of systems of parts. Instead of twenty-eight separate suppliers for an electrical component system, for example, one organization reduced that number to one supplier who provided the entire system. This, in turn, reduced the number of staff coordinators needed to administer supplier relations, including purchasing, inspection, negotiation, and so on. Redundancy in suppliers had been considered necessary to assure that a labor action or a disruption in one supplier organization did not disrupt production in the customer organization. But this firm selected its single source supplier on the basis of reliability and dependability of service as well as cost and quality of the product. It also involved that supplier in many aspects of design, production, marketing, and service of the final product. (Many former suppliers became "second-tier" suppliers to the single-source, system supplier.)

Similarly, reducing distribution points helped several firms improve on- time delivery and eliminate much of the overhead necessary to schedule, transport, and warehouse products for customers when multiple outlets were being maintained. Identifying targeted customer groups helped pare down marketing and sales activities so that efficiencies could be gained in advertising, sales, and customer follow-up. The successful firms were both systemic and surgical in approach, encouraging generalized system change and implementing specific targeted cutbacks simultaneously. The strategic intent was to consolidate around the company's core competency. To accomplish this, every element within the firm and in its external environment was considered in downsizing planning, analysis, and execution.

5. The most successful downsizing resulted in small, semi-autonomous organizations, but it also resulted in large integrated organizations.

Theoretically, small organizations run more efficiently than large organizations. They are unencumbered by multiple management layers and staff functions, fostering rapid, efficient decision making and innovativeness. Face-to-face communications cuts down on sign-offs and implementation time. On the other hand, large organizations can call upon economies of scale and integration to reap efficiencies not available to small organizations. The availability of abundant resources provides flexibility and responsiveness under conditions of uncertainty. Cross-functional and multi-layered teams bring to issues broadened insight and perspective that are not available in small organizations. In this study, the best downsizing was aimed at producing specialized, flexible, loosely coupled units, while at the same time producing generalized, coordinated, centralized units.

Some analysts have suggested that decentralized organizations (composed of small, autonomous units) are more effective than centralized organizations (composed of large, coordinated units). Yet centralization always engenders decentralization, and vice versa. What appears to be decentralization from the perspective of corporate headquarters (e.g., forming semi-autonomous units and powerful unit heads), is viewed as centralization from the perspective of the unit itself. For example, some firms removed from corporate headquarters functions such as purchasing, accounting, marketing, customer relations, or engineering. These functions were dispersed to separate operating units. From the corporate perspective this was decentralization. From the unit perspective, which now had the resources and authority to operate autonomously, it was centralization. On the other hand, the unit may also decentralize its resources and authority to teams. The teams are provided with discretion and control over the resources required to do their work (e.g., staffing, purchasing, scheduling, appraising). The team, therefore, is centralized but the unit is decentralized. Depending on where one looks, therefore, centralization is really decentralization, and vice versa.

The most effective downsizing strategies produced autonomous or semi-autonomous units within the larger organization as well as strong, centralized functions. Unit leaders were given the responsibility to manage functions previously centralized at headquarters, or they were given profit-center responsibility and could decide for themselves which functions to eliminate, which to purchase from corporate headquarters, and which to contract out.

For example, one large organization divided itself into three semi-autonomous units, each producing a different product. Within each of these units, area heads and team leaders were given control over the resources they needed to manufacture products in the most efficient way. Some decided that certain functions were not needed at the sub-unit level and could be purchased from a central staff unit at the parent company's headquarters (for example, finance and personnel). They were not required to match headquarters staff functions at the subunit level as they had been previously. Other firms in the study had staff functions at the unit level simply because corporate staff heads wanted a counterpart in the subunits. In those cases, decentralization created inefficiencies. Effective decentralization, on the other hand, created unit managers who had the necessary flexibility, discretion, and control to improve their own efficiencies and contain their own costs.

At the same time, the effective organizations produced efficiencies by centralizing functions and creating large organizations. The information processing function was removed from geographically dispersed subunits in one organization to form a large centralized system. Previously diverse data entry and software systems were standardized and consolidated into a single network. The elimination of duplication and coordination costs resulted in substantial savings. The merger of several related subunits into a single large entity with combined staff functions made it possible for another organization to eliminate two management layers and reassign about half the staff employees. Geographic or product reorganizations often produced larger, more centralized units within (decentralized) parent companies.

The use of a "clan" control system was a key to the successful formation of simultaneous small and large organizations during downsizing. Of the three types of control systems Ouchi identified, the bureaucratic (relying on rules, audits, and hierarchical relationships) and the market (relying on competition, goals, and exchange relationships) control mechanisms characterized all the firms in the study. But in a few, those with the highest levels of effectiveness, a clan control system was also fostered. The clan relies on common values, shared vision, and a collective perspective. Its advantage, of course, is that employees can be self-regulating because they hold a common set of values and assumptions. Fewer resources are required to monitor and manage their work. Some managers engendered a clan control system through the use of symbolic events and involvement activities.

For example, one organization instituted a "Build With Pride Week" in the initial phases of downsizing. Family members were invited to the firm on one day, customers on another, suppliers on another, local government officials on another. Special events, special refreshments, and special decorations were used throughout the week to signal the beginning of a new era in the firm, particularly of a team-oriented approach to work. Non-management employees served

as hosts and guides, and outsiders were permitted to question and observe workers as they performed their jobs. Dramatic improvements in productivity and product quality, and a sense of collective pride and teamwork followed from this event.

Another organization developed a sense of teamwork through employee-designed and administered rewards.

The latest gimmick is alligator hats . . . they have the plant quality logo sewn into the top of them. People give each other hats for doing something good for quality. The important issue is that it is an on-going process. People are involved. They make the decisions. It's not something that is tightly managed by a staff group or something. And it's always kind of nice to have your peers trying to find something good about you instead of bad.

Some firms simply made label changes, such as renaming the quality control department "the customer satisfaction department," or generating names and slogans for sub-unit teams (e.g., one product design team became Delta Force— "seek and destroy errors before customers catch them"). The intent was not just to be cute, but to help create a different mindset among employees about the downsizing and redesign efforts. Other firms offered both advance and follow-up employee training, emphasized constant and consistent articulation of a vision by top managers, implemented a congruent reward system, and emphasized cross functional teamwork. As a result, the decentralized, semi-autonomous units operated harmoniously with the centralized, large units and did not require extra management resources to assure consistency.

6. The most successful organizations emphasized downsizing as a means to an end, but they also emphasized downsizing as the targeted end.

Downsizing was interpreted in some firms as an admission of failure or weakness. More commonly it was considered a temporary, protective mechanism that would help the firm weather-the-storm until a normal growth orientation could be resumed. For example, a number of substitutes for the term downsizing were used in these firms to avoid negative connotations: resizing, right-sizing, rationalizing, rebuilding, rebalancing, reassigning, reorganizing, reallocating, redeploying, streamlining, slimming, slivering, functionalizing, demassing, downshifting, consolidating, contracting, compressing, ratcheting-down, and even leaning-up. This negative interpretation generally resulted from downsizing being defined as a reactive strategy rather than a proactive strategy.

All the firms in the study implemented downsizing primarily as a reaction to loss of market share or profitability, entrance of a lower-cost competitor, or a parent company mandate. In most of

these cases, downsizing took a defensive form. It was associated with exclusive use of workforce reduction strategies (as opposed to redesign and systemic strategies) and mechanistic shifts in organization structure (e.g., rigidity, restricted communication flows, lower levels of employee involvement).

On the other hand, some firms interpreted downsizing as an opportunity for improvement or as part of an aggressive strategy leading to enhanced competitiveness. To illustrate, one of the effective top managers commented:

"We're not getting smaller, we're getting better. This change is necessary for continuous improvement. It just happens that fewer employees is a way to accomplish it." In these firms downsizing was associated with a combination of workforce reduction and redesign downsizing strategies, and, in a few cases, with systemic strategies as well. Higher levels of employee involvement, participation, and flexibility were also typical.

In this study, the most effective firms did both. That is, in the face of an unequivocal need to retrench, the most effective downsizing firms targeted downsizing as a central, critical outcome. "Taking out headcount" and "trimming the fat" were clear and consensual objectives. But these firms also treated downsizing as just one in a cluster of strategies designed to achieve organizational improvement. "Improving productivity" and "enhancing competitiveness" were labels that helped position downsizing as just one strategy to improve firm performance.

In one firm, for example, downsizing was framed in terms of continuous improvement focused on the core mission of the company:

They've got a crystal clear corporate focus that involves everybody in regard to continuous improvement in meeting the challenges that are upon them. Consistent day in and day out. Everybody knows the score. It's not herky-jerky reorganization, jump to this, jump to that. They have a very clear focus in each piece of their business. They go after it. Everybody just functions that way. Building cars and trucks is absolute uno-priority.

The relationship between effective downsizing and the approach to quality employed in these firms was especially notable. Cost savings associated with improved quality have been publicized recently in the literature, but a particular quality culture emerged here.

Cameron described three approaches to quality that characterize organizations. No organization is characterized by only one approach to quality, but most have a dominant emphasis. For example, when a firm focuses on error detection, it emphasizes inspecting and detecting errors after the product or service has been produced. The goal is to reduce waste and to find and fix mistakes. The approach to customers seeks to avoid making them unhappy, meet expectations, and be responsive to their needs and complaints.

An *error prevention* approach emphasizes avoiding errors in the first place. The goal is to produce zero defects by doing work right the first time. This is done by finding root causes of problems (rather than just product defects) and monitoring and adjusting the work processes to eliminate them. The approach to customers involves actively satisfying their preferences (not just needs) and occasionally exceeding expectations.

The third approach, *creative quality coupled with continuous improvement*, emphasizes surprising and delighting customers by delivering products and services that not only exceed but actually create new preferences and expectations. The standard is improvement in the quality of products, not just meeting a goal or target. Small, incremental, continuous improvements are coupled with innovation (large, visible changes) to achieve new levels of quality. To illustrate, when new equipment or technologies were introduced into most firms an assumption was made that this was the best condition the new material would ever be in (i.e., no repair and little maintenance needed). In the firms with a continuous improvement culture, on the other hand, it was assumed that this was the worst condition the new material would ever be in (i.e., it had not yet been improved).

Most organizations in this study were dominated by an emphasis on the first approach to quality-error detection. This approach, with its reliance on quality control departments and inspection, was associated with higher costs, more floor space dedicated to rework and touch-up, and higher numbers of personnel than the other two approaches. The most effective firms coupled downsizing with the latter two approaches to quality—error prevention and creative quality. When downsizing was coupled with a focus on process improvement (error prevention), not just produce improvement (error detection), and when a continuous improvement culture operated in the organization (creative quality), downsizing was associated with higher levels of organizational effectiveness as well as lower costs.

In the few organizations where the approach to quality emphasized prevention and creativity more than detection, a subtle shift had occurred from thinking of customers as end-users or recipients of a product or service to defining customers as anyone with whom an employee interacted, inside or outside the firm. Customer expectations were continuously measured and monitored in the effective firms.

For example,

We've got a great push to work on a more caring attitude toward the customer which is being spread throughout our organization . . . It's really dealing with how do you get out and get the voice of the customer, and then how do you respond to that voice in a manner that makes the customer believe and understand that we are caring about their attitude and their feelings.... ?

Several of the most effective top managers indicated that, in their firms, it was assumed that employees would exceed, not just meet, expectations for both inside and outside customers, and for past, present, and future customers. It was especially noteworthy in these firms that improvements in quality were linked to continuous downsizing—employees were encouraged to constantly look for ways to reduce resource requirements and increase response time and efficiency. Questions such as the following were part of job expectations: Can this task be eliminated? Can it be completed in less time? Can it be completed at less cost? Can someone else do it better? Can it be simplified or reduced? The relationship between quality and downsizing—i.e., that each should enhance the achievement of the other—was made explicit. Cost savings attributable to process improvements and increases in quality were highlighted in company newsletters, mini-ceremonies, and one-time bonuses.

In sum, whereas downsizing was clearly the central target of these firms—e.g., reduce headcount, cut costs, and/or consolidate units—the means they used to define and achieve quality facilitated the achievement of that goal. Developing a mature approach to quality helped reduce current costs and created a continuous improvement mentality for future downsizing.

CONCLUSION

Almost daily, press accounts announce layoffs or plant closings by firms suffering the effects of an economic recession or foreign competition. Published case histories of layoffs, closings, and bankruptcies are common, yet few accounts have analyzed the most effective ways to implement a downsizing strategy. Almost no studies have been done across multiple organizations to identify "best practices" for managers to follow as they face the need to downsize.

In this study of white-collar downsizing in the U.S. automobile industry, six critical strategies characterized the firms that were downsizing most effectively. These six strategies have at least two important implications for practicing managers. One implication relates to common assumptions about organizational dynamics; the other to strategic contradictions.

Assumptions about Organizations

At the beginning of the 1990s several fundamental assumptions dominated thinking about organization and management. Most managers, as well as most scholars, assumed: (1) that bigger means better; that is, having more employees, more products, more plants, or more money is better than having fewer or less; (2) that *unending growth is a natural and desirable process in organizational life cycle development*; that is, forms of nongrowth such as decline or stagnation

are undesirable aberrations from a normal life cycle pattern; (3) that adaptability and flexibility are associated with slack resources, loose coupling, and redundancy; that is, uncommitted resources facilitate experimentation and the ability to take advantage of new opportunities; and (4) that consistency and congruence are hallmarks of effective organizations; that is, strategy, structure, culture, and systems should all fit together synchronously to achieve effectiveness.

However, the characteristics found to typify the most effective downsizing organizations challenge those assumptions. These characteristics highlight a dual set of assumptions that require an expansion of past assumptions about common organizational dynamics. These six characteristics point out that, contrary to the way we thought in the past, smaller organizations (not just bigger organizations) may also be better organizations. Downsizing not only can improve productivity and competitiveness in organizations, but it can lead to a more humane and enjoyable working environment. Fewer hierarchical levels and smaller units usually mean better communication, more participation, and stronger feelings of belonging.

Similarly, unending organizational growth, as proposed in most organizational life cycle models, is fiction. Decline and, most certainly, downsizing are likely to be a recurring part of many organizations' life cycle stages in the future. In fact, this study's results suggest that downsizing should become a permanent and on-going activity in organizations. Like fine-tuned athletes who constantly try to improve their performance, firms should be constantly looking for ways to improve efficiency through downsizing.

The third assumption, that looseness and redundancy produce flexibility and adaptability, is also dispelled by these findings. The presence of nonredundancy and tight coupling in effective downsizers provide an alternative viewpoint. Firms were effective when their downsizing activities eliminated the slack and duplication that produced longer response times, less flexibility, and an inability to adapt to environmental changes.

Finally, the congruence-produces-effectiveness assumption is also challenged by these results. The presence of dualities and contradiction in organizational downsizing implies inconsistency and incongruence, and it is precisely this lack of consistency and congruence that is most closely associated with organizational effectiveness in the process of downsizing. While most firms were congruent in their approaches to downsizing, the best organizations (albeit only a few of them) engaged in seemingly contradictory processes. This theme of contradictions, in fact, highlights the second important implication that emerged from the findings.

Apparent Contradictions in Strategy

An analysis of the firms that were downsizing effectively supports the conclusion that most organizations were inclined to downsize in inappropriate or ineffective ways. They engaged in

downsizing activities that fostered dysfunctional outcomes (e.g., decreasing morale and commitment, increasing conflict and criticism) rather than improved performance. This is partly because they tried to be consistent in their downsizing approach, and effective downsizing was found to involve contradiction. That is, effectiveness was typified by processes that are often thought to be opposite or incompatible.

This existence of apparent contradiction was the best overall explanation of the difference between effective and ineffective downsizing firms. As explained earlier, top managers in the few effective firms were actively pursuing strategies that included a duality. The top managers in the ineffective firms, on the other hand, attempted to maintain consistency, harmony, and fit. They pursued one side of the strategy alone—for example, a short-term, internal approach without its accompanying long-term, external approach. Managers in effective firms adopted a "both/and" approach to downsizing instead of an "either/or" approach. For most managers in the study, this both/and approach was viewed as incompatible with effective management and inconsistent with traditional approaches to change.

Of course, the apparent contradictions in the downsizing strategies are not inherent. They are contradictions only because the presence of one strategy caused most of the managers interviewed in the study to deny the possibility that the opposite strategy could, and should, also occur in their organizations. In only a few of the most effectively downsizing firms were these processes not defined as contradictory. Thus, when managers were not open to adopting a bifurcated, both/and approach to downsizing, their firms actually deteriorated in performance instead of improved.

In sum, an important lesson emerging from this investigation is that the perspectives of both scholars and managers may need to be expanded. On one hand, the six effective downsizing strategies highlight the need to broaden assumptions of scholars and practitioners about the nature of organizational dynamics. Past assumptions bound too narrowly the research questions being investigated and the change strategies being pursued. On the other hand, effective downsizing processes help illustrate the desirability for managers of considering dualities, apparent contradictions, and a broader approach to managing organizational downsizing. In the foreseeable future, downsizing is likely to remain a major managerial challenge and contradictions will be a hallmark of effectiveness.

РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ ПО ПОДГОТОВКЕ ПРЕЗЕНТАЦИЙ

1. ОБЩИЕ СВЕДЕНИЯ

В западном мире подготовка устных выступлений в форме презентации существует достаточно давно, примерно с середины XX века, а в России такая форма подачи информации появилась чуть более десяти лет назад и связано это, прежде всего, с развитием бизнеса в нашей стране. Причина в данном случае очевидна – презентация продукта оказалась действенным инструментом для продвижения товара на рынке.

Наряду с бизнес-презентацией существует презентация для академических целей, построенная по тем же принципам, что и бизнес - презентация, но предназначенная для выступления на конференциях, форумах, семинарах с целью изложения результатов своей научной деятельности. Нас интересует, прежде всего, презентация, выполненная для академических целей, о которой и пойдет речь далее.

Итак, вы приступаете к работе над презентацией. Скорее всего, вы будете придерживаться следующей схемы:

- сформулируете тему
- напишете примерный план работы
- проведете исследование по теме
- структурируете материал и напишете черновик
- выделите основные мысли, чтобы перенести их на слайды программы Power Point
- отрепетируете речь выступления, учитывая допустимый лимит времени

Вы так и поступили? К сожалению, вы допустили ошибку. В приведенной схеме пропущены два пункта, которые обычно не учитывают начинающие презентеры:

- цель презентации
- целевая аудитория

Теперь схема подготовки презентации выглядит следующим образом:

- цель презентации
- целевая аудитория
- формулировка темы
- составление примерного плана

- проведение исследования по выбранной теме
- структурирование материала
- подготовка презентации в программе Power Point
- репетиция выступления

Остановимся подробнее на некоторых пунктах. Для начала вам необходимо ответить на вопрос, чего именно вы хотите достичь:

- а) предоставить информацию аудитории или
- б) убедить аудиторию в чем-либо, заставив ее принять вашу точку зрения

Выбранная цель определит характер вашей презентации. В первом случае следует построить выступление на статистических данных, фактах, описаниях, а во втором – на аргументации и примерах. Более того, цель презентации повлияет на выбор наиболее удачного начала для вашего выступления. Почему это важно? Дело в том, что неудачное начало приведет к тому, что вы не сможете завладеть вниманием аудитории. По мнению некоторых экспертов достаточно 2-3 минут, чтобы произвести впечатление на аудиторию и именно в эти минуты у присутствующих складывается впечатление о вас. С какой фразы вы начнете выступление? «Добрый день, уважаемые дамы и господа! Наш разговор сегодня пойдет о...», - это пример стандартного начала выступления, который больше подойдет для презентации первого типа. В том случае, когда вы ставите своей целью убедить в чем-то аудиторию, лучше, по мнению некоторых исследователей, начать с интересной истории, риторического вопроса или цитаты [4].

Нередко англоязычные пособия по подготовке презентации предлагают использовать шутку в качестве начала выступления. Однако, на наш взгляд это - наиболее рискованный из всех ранее предложенных способов. Если шутка окажется удачной, вы сможете расположить к себе всех присутствующих, но если нет – аудитория потеряет к вам интерес.

Стоит заметить, что вы можете проявить изобретательность и начать выступление каким-то другим образом, но на стадии подготовки презентации подумайте, насколько уместным окажется тот или иной вариант, учитывая цель вашего выступления, потребности аудитории и отведенное вам время.

Далее вам необходимо узнать, что представляет собой ваша аудитория. Более подробно об аудитории мы поговорим в одной из последующих разделов.

После того как определена цель презентации, предполагаемая аудитория и сформулирована тема, необходимо структурировать материал. Мы намеренно пропускаем

стадии составления плана и проведения исследования по теме, т. к. они являются основными компонентами исследовательской работы и выходят за рамки данного проекта.

Структура презентации

В этом разделе речь пойдет о структуре текста презентации, а также самого выступления. Постарайтесь ответить на следующие вопросы:

- 1) Знаете ли вы структуру презентации, даже если готовите презентацию впервые?
- 2) Зависит ли структура презентации от ее цели?

Если вы ответили «да» в первом случае и «нет» во втором, вы совершенно правы, т.к. вне зависимости от цели презентации ее структура вам знакома и выглядит она следующим образом:

- 1) Введение
- 2) Основная часть
- 3) Заключение

Во введении необходимо указать, почему вы делаете презентацию. Это означает, что, к примеру, сложилась ситуация, которую необходимо изменить, а именно, *обозначить, рассмотреть, улучшить* и т.д. Следовательно, в основной части вы предлагаете пути решения данной проблемы. Особое внимание следует уделить заключению, т.к. в зависимости от типа вашей презентации будет строиться и заключение.

Не менее важно знать структуру самого выступления. Как правило, выступление разделено на три части:

- Вводная часть
- Презентация
- Ответы на вопросы

Некоторые эксперты предлагают начинать вводную часть с выражения слов благодарности присутствующим, самопрезентации, обозначения плана своего выступления и т.д. Между тем, на наш взгляд наиболее эффективными оказываются способы начала выступления, описанные ранее.

Мы считаем необходимым привлечь ваше внимание к заключительной части вашего выступления, в которой вам следует:

- подвести итог сказанному
- при необходимости наметить план будущего исследования
- предоставить на слайде презентации список использованной литературы
- поблагодарить аудиторию за внимание
- сообщить о том, что вы готовы ответить на вопросы

Вопросы заслуживают особого внимания, потому что нередко представляют сложность для докладчика. Существует определенная тактика ответов на вопросы аудитории, которую необходимо использовать в зависимости от намерения того, кто задает вопрос. Следует иметь в виду, что вопросы задаются с определенной целью, например, для того, чтобы

- определить насколько хорошо вы разбираетесь в том, о чем говорите. Вы, конечно, **обязаны** превосходно владеть материалом, но бывают вопросы, на которые вы не знаете ответа. Не бойтесь сказать об этом.
- продемонстрировать свою осведомленность. Нередко тому, кто задает вопрос льстит, что он/она знают не меньше, чем вы по данной проблеме, и они с энтузиазмом сообщают об этом присутствующим. Дайте им возможность продемонстрировать себя. Ваш ответ может выглядеть примерно так: «Да, конечно, Вы совершенно правы, но я не касался этого вопроса/проблемы и т.д. по такой - то причине».

Существуют и другие варианты ответа на вопрос:

- можно обратиться с этим вопросом к вашему коллеге, с которым вы вместе делаете презентацию, при условии, что вы **уверены** в том, что он может знать ответ на вопрос, а также
- вернуть вопрос тому, кто его задал

Нельзя не обратить внимания на тот факт, что начинающие исследователи допускают типичную ошибку, пытаясь сделать свое исследование полным, масштабным и всеобъемлющим. Необходимо помнить, что вы ограничены во времени и, как правило, примерно за 20 минут можно рассмотреть только два основных пункта.

Не менее важным оказывается и способ подачи информации. Несмотря на тот факт, что ваша аудитория - взрослые люди, они хотят, чтобы им *рассказали историю*, а

выражаясь научным языком ваше выступление должно быть построено в форме нарратива. Сравните два варианта, какой из них вы бы предпочли услышать:

«Это устройство делает то-то и то-то и не делает того-то» или «В самом начале нам не удавалось найти...,но затем мы обнаружили, что... и в конечном итоге вы видите, как это работает».

В следующих разделах мы подробно рассмотрим, что такое устная публичная речь и что еще необходимо предпринять, чтобы ваше выступление имело успех.

Устная публичная речь

Вам удалось структурировать исследование согласно предложенным рекомендациям. Какое именно действие должно за этим последовать? Теперь необходимо перенести текст вашей научной работы на слайды программы Power Point, причем полностью, не пропуская ни одной фразы, и, используя обороты, присущие научному стилю. Результатом вышеперечисленных действий будут, по меньшей мере, удивленные взгляды ваших коллег и отсутствие интереса на лицах собравшихся. Имейте в виду, если вы полностью перенесете текст научной работы на слайды и сохраните научный стиль – вы потеряете аудиторию. Что же необходимо предпринять, чтобы избежать этого?

Обратите внимание на название этого раздела. Ваша презентация должна представлять собой *запись устной публичной речи*. Сравните лекцию одного из ваших преподавателей и статью из научного журнала. Вы видите, как разнится язык в том и другом случае?

В самом общем виде рекомендации относительно составления речи выступления можно свести к следующему:

- избегайте чрезмерного использования абстрактных существительных
- вместо страдательного залога используйте действительный
- **не** используйте очень сложные синтаксические конструкции
- избегайте терминов, если не уверены в том, что аудитория с ними знакома

Далее мы предлагаем информацию, которая касается логики построения выступления. Особого внимания заслуживают определенные фразы, которые помогают аудитории понять, о чем только что сказал докладчик, о чем пойдет речь далее, т.н. ориентиры. Мы считаем целесообразным предоставить эту информацию на английском языке:

Signposting

Section of presentation	Signpost language
Introducing the topic	<p>The subject/topic of my talk is ...</p> <p>I'm going to talk about ...</p> <p>My topic today is...</p> <p>My talk is concerned with ...</p>
Overview (outline of presentation)	<p>I'm going to divide this talk into four parts.</p> <p>There are a number of points I'd like to make.</p> <p>Basically/ Briefly, I have three things to say.</p> <p>I'd like to begin/start by ...</p> <p>Let's begin/start by ...</p> <p>First of all, I'll...</p> <p>... and then I'll go on to ...</p> <p>Then/ Next ...</p> <p>Finally/ Lastly ...</p>
Finishing a section	<p>That's all I have to say about...</p> <p>We've looked at...</p> <p>So much for...</p>
Starting a new section	<p>Moving on now to ...</p> <p>Turning to...</p> <p>Let's turn now to ...</p> <p>The next issue/topic/area I'd like to focus on ...</p> <p>I'd like to expand/elaborate on ...</p> <p>Now we'll move on to...</p> <p>I'd like now to discuss...</p> <p>Let's look now at...</p>
Analysing a point and giving recommendations	<p>Where does that lead us?</p> <p>Let's consider this in more detail...</p> <p>What does this mean for...?</p>

	<p>Translated into real terms...</p> <p>Why is this important?</p> <p>The significance of this is...</p>
Giving examples	<p>For example,...</p> <p>A good example of this is...</p> <p>As an illustration,...</p> <p>To give you an example,...</p> <p>To illustrate this point...</p>
Summarising and concluding	<p>To sum up ...</p> <p>To summarise...</p> <p>Right, let's sum up, shall we?</p> <p>Let's summarise briefly what we've looked at...</p> <p>If I can just sum up the main points...</p> <p>Finally, let me remind you of some of the issues we've covered...</p> <p>To conclude...</p> <p>In conclusion ...</p> <p>In short ...</p> <p>So, to remind you of what I've covered in this talk, ...</p> <p>Unfortunately, I seem to have run out of time, so I'll conclude very briefly by saying that</p> <p>I'd like now to recap...</p>
Paraphrasing and clarifying	<p>Simply put...</p> <p>In other words.....</p> <p>So what I'm saying is....</p> <p>To put it more simply....</p> <p>To put it another way....</p>
Invitation to discuss / ask questions	<p>I'm happy to answer any queries/ questions.</p> <p>Does anyone have any questions or comments?</p> <p>Please feel free to ask questions.</p> <p>If you would like me to elaborate on any point, please ask.</p> <p>Would you like to ask any questions?</p>

В следующем разделе мы рассмотрим очень важный вопрос, который затронули в самом начале данной главы – вашу аудиторию.

Аудитория

Определяющим фактором, влияющим на успех вашего выступления, в данном случае является количество присутствующих. Имейте в виду, что приемы, которые вы эффективно использовали во время выступления перед большой аудиторией, будут работать против вас, если вам предстоит выступать перед небольшим количеством людей.

Далее мы приводим краткий список навыков для работы с большой /небольшой аудиторией.

При работе с большой аудиторией вам необходимо:

- уметь привлечь и удерживать внимание аудитории в течение продолжительного времени
- обладать в какой-то степени актерскими способностями
- знать основы ораторского искусства
- иметь опыт выступления перед большим количеством людей

Небольшая аудитория предполагает:

- умение спонтанно изменить порядок и содержание выступления, если в этом есть необходимость
- умение создавать непринужденную атмосферу для беседы

Выступление перед аудиторией имеет одну особенность: тот факт, что один человек выступает, а остальные обязаны его слушать, дает чувство превосходства и, как следствие, вызывает высокомерие. Такой тон презентации абсолютно недопустим и будет расценен как показатель низкой внутренней культуры.

Нам хотелось бы затронуть еще один аспект, говоря об отношениях с аудиторией. Речь пойдет о самом выступлении. Вы испытываете сильное волнение перед

выступлением? Очень хорошо, если вы дали положительный ответ. Волнение, наличие эмоций, означает, что вам небезразлично то, что вы делаете, а значит, вы постараетесь выступить как можно лучше. Аудитория в зале увидит ваш эмоциональный подъем, энергию и не останется равнодушной.

Однако чрезмерное волнение и страх перед аудиторией могут сказаться негативно, оказать парализующее действие. В этом случае необходимо мысленно «собрать» всех присутствующих, представив их одним человеком. Если аудитория «рассыплется» на отдельных людей, их количество будет оказывать на вас эмоциональный прессинг, вы не сможете справиться с волнением, и вам сложно будет продолжать выступление.

Наконец, мы подошли к последнему разделу - выступлению. Поскольку об этом говорилось на протяжении всей главы, осталось дать лишь несколько полезных рекомендаций.

Выступление

В рамках проекта авторы подготовили обзор англоязычных сайтов, касающихся публичного выступления. Мы решили отобрать наиболее существенные, с нашей точки зрения, пункты:

1. Говорите убедительно. Придерживайтесь структуры научного исследования (введение, основная часть, заключение).
2. Не читайте текст выступления. Говорите громко и четко. Если ошиблись, исправьте ошибку и продолжайте.
3. Не садитесь, но и не стойте на одном месте в течение долгого времени.
4. Не теряйте зрительный контакт с аудиторией, общайтесь с аудиторией, а не с вашей презентацией в программе Power Point, которая проецируется на экран. Не поворачивайтесь к аудитории спиной.
5. Чтобы составить первое впечатление о человеке достаточно 2-3 минут. Используйте начало выступления, чтобы увлечь аудиторию.
6. Покажите свою презентацию кому-то, кто не является специалистом в вашей области. Удалось ли им понять, что именно вы хотите сказать?
7. Отрепетируйте свое выступление. По возможности запишите себя на видеокамеру и проанализируйте запись.

2. ПОДГОТОВКА ТЕКСТА ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЯ

Предлагаемые рекомендации являются продолжением вышеперечисленных рекомендаций по подготовке презентации и выступления. Тем не менее, напомним, что ранее речь шла о том, как грамотно начать свое выступление в зависимости от аудитории, для которой предназначается выступление, как выстроить выступление в логической последовательности с помощью определенных клише и грамотно ответить на вопросы, возникшие у аудитории после вашего выступления. Приведенные далее рекомендации помогут вам подготовить выступление (запись устной публичной речи), основываясь на тексте научной статьи.

Итак, напоминаем правила относительно подготовки выступления, сформулированные в предыдущей главе:

- избегайте чрезмерного использования абстрактных существительных
- вместо страдательного залога используйте действительный
- **не** используйте очень сложные синтаксические конструкции
- избегайте терминов, если не уверены в том, что аудитория с ними знакома

Далее рассмотрим два примера **одного и того же** выступления. В первом случае (Version 1) рекомендации не соблюдаются, что приводит к потере контакта с аудиторией, ослаблению интереса с ее стороны и, в итоге, препятствует пониманию.

Version 1

The significance of these figures incorporating data from multicentre studies cannot be underestimated. Next slide. In the American part of the survey it was found that success in business can be correlated directly with leadership style.

An individualistic style appears to be closely associated with rapid career path progression, whereas a group or participative style, despite its evident attractiveness to all members of staff, is correlated with a relatively slow career progression. Next slide. This is further illustrated in my next slide which shows the result of another survey into senior management attitudes.

Although lip service is paid to the concept of participative management, their real perceptions of leadership qualities completely contradict this view. It can be further seen that such surveys...

Текст первого выступления (Version 1) содержит следующие ошибки:

1) наличие большого числа абстрактных существительных – *significance, progression, attractiveness* и т.д.

2) использование страдательного залога вместо действительного - *cannot be underestimated, it was found, can be further seen*

3) использование сложной синтаксической конструкции в следующем предложении - *An individualistic style appears to be closely associated with rapid career path progression, whereas a group or participative style, despite its evident attractiveness to all members of staff, is correlated with a relatively slow career progression*

Кроме того, такие слова как, *whereas* (тогда как) свойственны письменной речи и не используются в устной.

Version 2

We can't really afford to ignore these results. The survey was one of the most extensive of its kind and covers a wide range of corporations... We can see in this next slide the results from the American part of the survey. The survey was based on interviews carried out with senior managers in 200 corporations. You can see here ... 35% of the group of managers classified as participative reached senior management positions. On the other hand, 74% of the more individualistic managers achieved senior management status. So, I think the conclusion is self-evident. If you want to reach the top of American companies, you have a much better chance if you adopt a fairly autocratic, top-down approach.

What is important here not to dismiss the last ten years. Ten years in which the value of participative management has been preached... No, what we must do is to better understand the motivation of senior management.

If we look at this next slide, we can see the results from another survey into senior management attitudes. This shows how managers firstly evaluate the qualities of a good manager ... and secondly, how they evaluate the qualities of a good leader. What is quite clear is that managers are supposed to be sensitive, adaptable, and cooperative while leaders need to be decisive, dynamic, and single-minded.

So, we find there is a massive contradiction. Good managers are supposed to be participative – to make sure they consult and discuss. Good leaders are supposed to be strong individuals – able to make decisions on their own.

Текст второго выступления (Version 2) следует правилам составления устного выступления, а именно:

- 1) длина предложений значительно короче, чем в 1 тексте, что облегчает восприятие речи на слух
- 2) предложения, в основном, содержат активный залог, а редкое использование пассивных конструкций оправдано - *The survey was based on interviews...* (исследование всегда на чем-либо основано, поэтому в данном случае возможен только страдательный залог)
- 3) выступление интерактивно - *We can see in this next slide, you can see here, If we look at this next slide*
- 4) в речи прослеживается логика, которая выражается с помощью следующих конструкций - *On the other hand, so, what is important here..., firstly, secondly*

Следует отметить, что логика выступления заслуживает особого внимания. Рассмотрим кратко схему построения выступления на отрывке из второго текста (Version 2).

We can see in this next slide **the results from the American part of the survey.**

|
новая информация

The survey was based on interviews carried out with **senior managers in 200 corporations.**

|
полученная ранее информация
|
новая информация

Как вы видите, текст строится на чередовании новой и уже известной информации и, таким образом, разворачивается с помощью постепенной подачи новой порции информации.

В заключение, необходимо отметить, что рекомендации, приведенные выше, можно считать универсальными и следовать им вне зависимости от того на каком языке вы готовите презентацию – иностранном или родном.

3. ОСОБЕННОСТИ СОЗДАНИЯ ВИЗУАЛЬНОГО СОПРОВОЖДЕНИЯ ПРЕЗЕНТАЦИЙ

Подготовка выступления/презентации иногда представляет определенные трудности, связанные, прежде всего, с оформлением визуальной поддержки презентации. При подготовке выступления, как правило, используются слайды программы PowerPoint, в связи с чем, появляется необходимость обратиться к частотным ошибкам, возникающим при оформлении слайдов.

Для этого нам необходим анализ нескольких компонентов: графических элементов текста, цветовой гаммы, а также формы и содержания образов. Рассмотрим кратко каждый из компонентов.

1) Элементы текста

Если посмотреть на текст безотносительно значения слов и задуматься только о типографском исполнении, то обнаруживается, что в самом шрифте заложены некоторые смыслы, шрифт обладает определенным уровнем регистра, своей «индивидуальностью» и способом воздействия. Обратимся, в качестве примера, к шрифту, стилизующему надписи по-латыни на средневековых манускриптах. Как правило, использование такого шрифта вызывает исторические ассоциации с образами средневековой Европы. Содержание текста необходимо отражать графически, т.е. шрифт стилизованных средневековых надписей лучше всего использовать для презентации с исторической тематикой. Если использовать такой шрифт для надписей, несущих другой подтекст, разрываются ассоциации, связанные со шрифтом и разрушается культурный код. Каждый шрифт, каким бы нейтральным он не выглядел, вызывает определенные эмоции и ассоциации и закреплен в сознании с тем или иным явлением.

2) Цветовая гамма

В общих чертах можно говорить о том, что относительно выбора цветовой гаммы существует то же правило, что и при выборе типографических приемов – необходимо учитывать символику цвета, закрепленную в различных культурах. Так, в европейской культуре фиолетовый цвет считается символом королевской власти. В презентации, использование спектра фиолетового цвета будет означать исключительность,

изысканность и символизироваться с роскошью. Такой прием используется и в области рекламы для обозначения элитарных товаров и услуг. Кроме того, выбор цвета не может быть случайным, т.к., согласно теории цветов, существуют цвета контрастные и смежные, предполагающие сочетания на основе различия и сходства.

3) Форма и содержание образов

Наиболее значимым оказывается тот факт, что образ на слайде и есть текст, поэтому наличие иррелевантных, случайных деталей разрушает целостность композиции. Для того чтобы избежать ненужных деталей в композиции, образ необходимо «прочитать», выявить все содержащиеся в нём смыслы и соотнести вербальное сообщение с визуальным. Важным оказывается и качество исполнение изображения, т.к. «размытое» и нечеткое изображение препятствует «прочтению», не способно вызвать эмоции (не случайно, большинство из нас отказываются от просмотра фильма с низким качеством воспроизведения), что, в конечном итоге, снижает ценность выступления в целом.

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