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ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНЫЙ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СТУДЕНТОВ  
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Рекомендовано к размещению в электронной библиотеке  
кафедрой английского языка  
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Предлагаемое учебное пособие по английскому языку предназначено для студентов философского факультета. Основной целью пособия является развитие навыков чтения литературы по специальности, навыков говорения и перевода иноязычной литературы. Подобранный текстовый материал дает возможность развивать навыки чтения с разной полнотой извлечения информации. Обучение говорению и переводу производится на базе представленных аутентичных текстов.

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## ВВЕДЕНИЕ

Предлагаемое учебное пособие «Профессиональный английский язык для студентов философского факультета. Часть II» направлено на развитие устных и письменных коммуникативных компетенций студентов, обучающихся по специальности «Философия». Оно содержит аутентичные тексты и состоит из 3 разделов по тематике специальности. Ссылки на источники содержатся в тексте пособия.

Цель настоящего пособия состоит в формировании у студентов следующих навыков:

- научиться читать и понимать оригинальные тексты по философии;
- уметь делать сообщения в рамках изучаемых тем;
- адекватно переводить оригинальные философские тексты среднего уровня сложности.

Необходимость решения поставленных задач предопределила структуру пособия.

В каждом разделе предлагается несколько текстов, охватывающих основные темы, предусмотренные рабочей программой по специальности «Философия». После каждого текста предлагается словарь сложных для перевода слов и терминов. Тексты сопровождаются вопросами, направленными на проверку общего понимания прочитанного, и заданиями для развития навыков перевода и реферирования. Работа с текстом также включает письменный перевод и краткое изложение информации, предложенной в тексте. Данное пособие может быть использовано как для аудиторной, так и для самостоятельной работы студентов.

## CONTENTS:

### Unit I. Philosophy in the Enlightenment Era

1.1 Introduction to Enlightenment Philosophy.....	5
1.2 Rationalism and the Enlightenment.....	7
1.3 Empiricism and the Enlightenment.....	11
1.4 Skepticism in the Enlightenment .....	14
1.5 Science of Man and Subjectivism in the Enlightenment.....	18
1.6 Aesthetics in the Enlightenment.....	22
1.7 French Classicism and German Rationalism.....	23
1.8 Empiricism and Subjectivism.....	24
1.9 Late Enlightenment Aesthetics.....	27

### Unit II. Philosophy of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

2.1 Introduction to 19 <sup>th</sup> century Philosophy.....	32
2.2 German Idealism.....	35
2.3 Utilitarianism.....	40
2.4 Marxism.....	43
2.5 Existentialism.....	45
2.6 Positivism.....	49
2.7 Pragmatism.....	51
2.8 British Idealism.....	53
2.9 Transcendentalism.....	55

### Unit III. Philosophy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century

3.1 Introduction to the 20 <sup>th</sup> century Philosophy.....	59
3.2 Analytic Philosophy.....	63
3.3 Continental Philosophy.....	65
3.4 The History of Continental Philosophy.....	68

## Unit I. PHILOSOPHY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT ERA.

Give the written translation of the text.

### 1.1 Introduction to Enlightenment Philosophy.

#### **Part I.**

The Enlightenment is the period in the history of western thought and culture, stretching roughly from the mid-decades of the 17th century through the 18th century, characterized by dramatic revolutions in science, philosophy, society and politics; these revolutions swept away the medieval world-view and **ushered** in our modern western world. Enlightenment thought culminates historically in the political **upheaval** of the French Revolution, in which the traditional hierarchical political and social orders (the French monarchy, the privileges of the French nobility, the political power and authority of the Catholic Church) were violently destroyed and replaced by a political and social order informed by the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality for all, founded, **ostensibly**, upon principles of human reason. The Enlightenment begins with the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries. The rise of the new science progressively undermines not only the ancient geocentric conception of the cosmos, but, with it, the entire set of presuppositions that had served to **constrain** and guide philosophical inquiry. The dramatic success of the new science in explaining the natural world, in accounting for a wide variety of phenomena by appeal to a relatively small number of elegant mathematical formulae, promotes philosophy (in the broad sense of the time, which includes natural science) from a **handmaiden** of theology, constrained by its purposes and methods, to an independent force with the power and authority to challenge the old and construct the new, in the realms both of theory and practice, on the basis of its own principles. **D'Alembert**, a leading figure of the French Enlightenment, characterizes his 18th century, in the midst of it, as “the century of philosophy *par excellence*”, because of the tremendous intellectual progress of the age, the advance of the sciences, and the enthusiasm for that progress, but also because of the characteristic expectation of the age that philosophy (in this broad sense) would dramatically improve human life<sup>1</sup>.

#### **Vocabulary**

to usher – вводить, сопровождать;  
upheaval – потрясение, переворот;

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<sup>1</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

ostensibly – как будто бы;  
to constrain – принуждать, ограничивать;  
handmaiden – служанка;  
D'Alembert – Жан Лерон Д'Аламбер.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

## **Part II.**

The task of characterizing philosophy of the Enlightenment confronts the **obstacle** of the wide diversity of Enlightenment thought. The Enlightenment is associated with the French thinkers of the mid-decades of the 18th century, the so-called “*philosophes*”, (Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, Montesquieu, et cetera). The *philosophes* constitute an informal society of **men of letters** who collaborate on a loosely defined project of Enlightenment centered around the project of the Encyclopedia. But the Enlightenment has broader boundaries, both geographical and temporal, than this suggests. In addition to the French, there was a very significant Scottish Enlightenment (key figures were **Francis Hutcheson**, David Hume, Adam Smith, and **Thomas Reid**) and a very significant German Enlightenment (*die Aufklärung*, key figures of which include Christian Wolff, **Moses Mendelssohn**, G.E. Lessing and Immanuel Kant). But all these Enlightenments were but particular nodes or centers in a **far-flung** and varied intellectual development. Given the variety, Enlightenment philosophy is characterized here in terms of general tendencies of thought, not in terms of specific doctrines or theories.

Only late in the development of the German Enlightenment, when the Enlightenment was near its end, does the movement become self-reflective; the question of “What is Enlightenment?” is debated in pamphlets and journals. In his famous definition of “enlightenment” in his essay “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” (1784), which is his contribution to this debate, Immanuel Kant expresses many of the tendencies shared among Enlightenment philosophies of **divergent** doctrines. Kant defines “enlightenment” as humankind's release from its **self-incurred immaturity**; “immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another”. Enlightenment is the process of undertaking to think for oneself, to employ and rely on one's own intellectual capacities in determining what to believe and how to act. Enlightenment philosophers from across the geographical and temporal **spectrum** tend to have a great deal of confidence in humanity's intellectual powers, both to achieve systematic knowledge of nature and to serve as an authoritative guide in practical life. This confidence is generally **paired** with suspicion or hostility toward other forms or carriers of authority (such as tradition, superstition, prejudice, myth and miracles), insofar as these are seen to compete with the authority of reason. Enlightenment philosophy tends to stand in tension with established religion, insofar as the release from self-incurred immaturity in this age, daring to think for

oneself, awakening one's intellectual powers, generally requires opposing the role of established religion in directing thought and action. The faith of the Enlightenment – if one may call it that – is that the process of enlightenment, of becoming progressively self-directed in thought and action through the awakening of one's intellectual powers, leads ultimately to a better, more fulfilled human existence<sup>2</sup>.

### Vocabulary

obstacle – преграда, проблема, препятствие;  
man of letters – ученый, писатель;  
Francis Hutcheson – Фрэнсис Хатчесон;  
Thomas Reid – Томас Рид;  
Moses Mendelssohn – Мозес (Моисей) Мендельсон;  
far-flung – обширный, разветвленный;  
divergent – противоположный;  
self-incurred – самодельный;  
immaturity – незрелость;  
spectrum – круг, область;  
to pair – соединяться.

### Questions:

1. What is the Enlightenment associated with?
2. Who were the representatives of Scottish and German Enlightenment?
3. How does Kant define “Enlightenment”?
4. What are the main ideas of the Enlightenment?
5. What were the main beliefs of the Enlightenment philosophers?
6. What is the attitude of the Enlightenment philosophers towards religion?
7. What is the faith of the Enlightenment?

**Read the text, answer the questions and give the summary of it.**

### 1.2 Rationalism and the Enlightenment.

#### Part I.

René Descartes' rationalist system of philosophy is foundational for the Enlightenment in this regard. Descartes (1596–1650) **undertakes** to establish the sciences upon a secure metaphysical foundation. The famous method of doubt Descartes employs for this purpose **exemplifies** (in part through exaggerating) an attitude characteristic of the Enlightenment. According to Descartes, the investigator in foundational philosophical research ought to doubt all propositions

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<sup>2</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

that can be doubted. The investigator determines whether a proposition is **dubitable** by attempting to construct a possible scenario under which it is false. In the **domain** of fundamental scientific (philosophical) research, no other authority but one's own conviction is to be trusted, and not one's own conviction either, until it is subjected to rigorous skeptical questioning. With his method, Descartes casts doubt upon the senses as authoritative source of knowledge. He finds that God and the immaterial soul are both better known, on the basis of innate ideas, than objects of the senses. Through his famous doctrine of the dualism of mind and body, that mind and body are two distinct substances, each with its own essence, the material world (**allegedly**) known through the senses becomes denominated as an “external” world, insofar as it is external to the ideas with which one immediately **communes** in one's consciousness. Descartes' investigation thus establishes one of the central epistemological problems, not only of the Enlightenment, but also of modernity: the problem of objectivity in our empirical knowledge. If our evidence for the truth of propositions about **extra-mental** material reality is always restricted to mental content, content immediately before the mind, how can we ever be certain that the extra-mental reality is not other than we represent it as being? The solution Descartes puts forward to this problem depends on our having prior and certain knowledge of God. In fact, Descartes argues that *all* human knowledge (not only knowledge of the material world through the senses) depends on metaphysical knowledge of God.

However **dubious** Descartes' grounding of all scientific knowledge in metaphysical knowledge of God, his system contributes significantly to the advance of natural science in the period. He attacks the long-standing assumptions of the scholastic-aristotelians whose intellectual dominance stood in the way of the development of the new science; he developed a conception of matter that enabled mechanical explanation of physical phenomena; and he developed some of the fundamental mathematical resources – in particular, a way to employ algebraic equations to solve geometrical problems – that enabled the physical domain to be explained with precise, simple mathematical formulae. Furthermore, his grounding of physics, and all knowledge, in a relatively simple and elegant rationalist metaphysics provides a model of a **rigorous** and complete secular system of knowledge. Though it is typical of the Enlightenment thinkers of the 18th century (for example Voltaire in his *Letters on the English Nation*, 1734) to embrace Newton's physical system in preference to Descartes', Newton's system itself depends on Descartes' earlier work, a dependence of which Newton himself was aware.

Cartesian philosophy is also foundational for the Enlightenment through **igniting** various controversies in the latter decades of the 17th century that provide the context of intellectual **tumult** out of which the Enlightenment springs. Among these controversies are the following: Are mind and body two distinct sorts of substances, as Descartes argues, and if so, what is the nature of each, and how are they related to each other, both in the human being (which presumably “has” both



a mind and a body) and in a unified world system? If matter is **inert** (as Descartes claims), what can be the source of motion and the nature of causality in the physical world? And of course the various epistemological problems: the problem of objectivity, the role of God in **securing** our knowledge, the doctrine of innate ideas, et cetera<sup>3</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to undertake – совершать, предпринимать;  
to exemplify – пояснять, служить примером;  
dubitable – сомнительный, спорный;  
domain – область, сфера;  
allegedly – как утверждают, якобы;  
to commune – общаться;  
extra-mental – находящийся за пределами ментального;  
dubious – сомнительный, двусмысленный;  
rigorous – строгий, точный;  
to ignite – пробуждать;  
tumult – переполох, волнения;  
inert – инертный;  
to secure – сохранять, закреплять;

### Questions:

1. Whose rationalist system of philosophy is foundational for the Enlightenment?
2. What foundation did Descartes lay under all the sciences?
3. What does his famous method of doubt consist of?
4. What is Descartes' attitude towards God and the immaterial soul?
5. What is the main point of his doctrine of dualism?
6. What central epistemological problem does Descartes establish?
7. What solution to this problem does Descartes suggest?
8. What conception of matter did he develop?
9. What fundamental mathematical resources was Descartes the author of?
10. Why is Cartesian philosophy considered to be foundational for the Enlightenment?

**Read the text and give the written translation of the part about Leibniz.**

### Part II.

**Baruch Spinoza's** systematic rationalist metaphysics, which he develops in his *Ethics* (1677) in part in response to problems in the Cartesian system, is also an

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<sup>3</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

important basis for Enlightenment thought. Spinoza develops, in contrast to Cartesian dualism, an ontological monism according to which there is not only one *kind* of substance, but one substance, God or nature, with two attributes, corresponding to mind and body. Spinoza's denial, on the basis of strict philosophical reasoning, of the existence of a transcendent supreme being, his identification of God with nature, gives strong **impetus** to the strands of atheism and naturalism that thread through Enlightenment philosophy. Spinoza's rationalist principles also lead him to assert a strict determinism and to deny any role to final causes or teleology in explanation.

The rationalist metaphysics of **Leibniz** (1646–1716) is also foundational for the Enlightenment, particularly the German Enlightenment (*die Aufklärung*), which is founded to a great extent on the Leibnizean rationalist system of **Christian Wolff** (1679–1754). Leibniz **articulates**, and places at the head of metaphysics, the great rationalist principle, the principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything that exists has a sufficient reason for its existence. This principle exemplifies the faith, so important for the Enlightenment, that the universe is fully **intelligible** to us through the exercise of our natural powers of reason. The problem arises, in the face of skeptical questioning, of how this principle itself can be known or grounded. Wolff attempts to derive it from the logical principle of non-contradiction (in his *First Philosophy or Ontology*, 1730). Criticism of this **alleged** derivation gives rise to the general question of how formal principles of logic can possibly serve to ground substantive knowledge of reality. Whereas Leibniz **exerts** his influence through scattered writings on various topics, some of which elaborate plans for a systematic metaphysics which are never executed by Leibniz himself, Wolff exerts his influence on the German Enlightenment through his development of a rationalist system of knowledge in which he attempts to demonstrate all the propositions of science from first principles, known a priori.

**Wolff's** rationalist metaphysics is characteristic of the Enlightenment by virtue of the **pretensions** of human reason within it, not by reason's success in establishing its claims. Much the same could be said of the great rationalist philosophers of the 17th century. Through their articulation of the *ideal* of scientia, of a complete science of reality, composed of propositions derived demonstratively from a priori first principles, these philosophers exert great influence on the Enlightenment. But they fail, rather spectacularly, to realize this ideal. To the contrary, what they **bequeath** to the 18th century is metaphysics, in the words of Kant, as “a battlefield of endless controversies.” However, the controversies themselves – regarding the nature of God, mind, matter, substance, cause, et cetera, and the relations of each of these to the others – provide **tremendous** fuel to Enlightenment thought<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

## Vocabulary

impetus – импульс, толчок;  
Christian Wolff – Христиан Вольф;  
to articulate – четко формулировать;  
intelligible – интеллигибельный, умопостигаемый;  
alleged – предполагаемый;  
to exert – развивать, обнаруживать;  
pretension – претензия, притязание;  
to bequeath – завещать, оставить в наследство;  
tremendous – огромный, гигантский.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### 1.3 Empiricism and the Enlightenment.

#### **Part I.**

Despite the confidence in and enthusiasm for human reason in the Enlightenment – it is sometimes called “the Age of Reason” – the rise of empiricism, both in the practice of science and in the theory of knowledge, is characteristic of the period. The enthusiasm for reason in the Enlightenment is not for the faculty of reason as an independent source of knowledge (at least not primarily), which is actually put on the defensive in the period, but rather for the human cognitive faculties generally. The Age of Reason contrasts with an age of religious faith, not with an age of sense experience. Of course, as outlined above, the great 17th century rationalist metaphysical systems of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz **exert** significant influence on philosophy in the Enlightenment. Moreover, the 18th-century Enlightenment has a rationalist **strain**, perhaps best exemplified by the system of **Christian Wolff**. Still, that the *Encyclopedia* of Diderot and **D'Alembert** is dedicated to three empiricists, Francis Bacon, John Locke and Isaac Newton, indicates the general **ascendency** of empiricism in the period.

If the founder of the rationalist strain of the Enlightenment is Descartes, then the founder of the empiricist strain is **Francis Bacon** (1561–1626). Though Bacon's work belongs to the Renaissance, the revolution he undertook to effect in the sciences inspires and influences Enlightenment thinkers. The Enlightenment, as the age in which experimental natural science **matures** and comes into its own, admires Bacon as “the father of experimental philosophy”. Bacon's revolution (enacted in, among other works, *The New Organon*, 1620) involves conceiving the new science as: 1) founded on empirical observation and experimentation; 2) arrived at through the method of induction; and 3) as ultimately aiming at, and as confirmed by, **enhanced** practical capacities (hence the Baconian motto, “knowledge is power”).

Though each of these elements of Bacon's revolution is significant for natural science in the Enlightenment, the point about method deserves special emphasis. **Granted** that Newton's work stands as the great exemplar of the accomplishments of natural science for the 18th century, the most **salient** contrast between Newton's work and that of the great rationalist systems lies in their methods. Whereas the great rationalist philosophers of the 17th century conceive of scientific knowledge of nature as consisting in a system in which statements expressing the observable phenomena of nature are *deduced* from first principles, known a priori, Newton's method begins with the observed phenomena of nature and reduces its multiplicity to unity by induction, that is, by finding mathematical laws or principles from which the observed phenomena can be **derived** or explained. The contrast between the great success of Newton's **“bottom-up”** procedure and the seemingly endless and fruitless conflicts among philosophers regarding the meaning and validity of first principles of reason naturally favors the rise of the Newtonian (or Baconian) method of acquiring knowledge of nature in the 18th century.

The tendency of natural science toward progressive independence from metaphysics in the 18th century is correlated with this point about method. The rise of modern science in the 16th and 17th centuries proceeds through its separation from the **presuppositions**, doctrines and methodology of theology. Natural science in the 18th century **proceeds** to separate itself from metaphysics as well. Newton proves the capacity of natural science to succeed independently of a priori, clear and certain first principles. The characteristic Enlightenment suspicion of all **allegedly** authoritative claims the validity of which is obscure, which is directed first of all against religious dogmas, extends to the claims of metaphysics as well. While there are significant Enlightenment thinkers who are metaphysicians – again, one thinks of Christian Wolff – the general **thrust** of Enlightenment thought is anti-metaphysical<sup>5</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to exert - развивать, обнаруживать;

strain – происхождение;

Christian Wolff – Христиан Вольф;

D'Alembert – Жан Лерон Д'Аламбер.

ascendency – доминирующее влияние;

to mature – совершенствоваться;

enhanced – увеличенный, улучшенный;

granted – при условии, принимая во внимание;

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<sup>5</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

salient – заметный, яркий;  
to derive – происходить;  
“bottom-up” – выполняемый снизу вверх;  
presupposition – предположение, исходная предпосылка;  
to proceed – продолжать, развиваться;  
allegedly – якобы, будто бы;  
thrust – идея.

### Questions:

1. What is the characteristic feature of the Enlightenment?
2. What are the relations between the Age of Reason and a religious faith?
3. Who is the founder of the rationalist strain of the Enlightenment?
4. How did the philosophers of the Enlightenment call Francis Bacon?
5. What are three main points of Bacon's conceiving the new science?
6. What was Bacon's motto?
7. What are the important facts about Baconian method?
8. What was the tendency of natural science in the 18<sup>th</sup> century?

### Give the written translation of the text.

#### Part II.

**John Locke's** *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) exerts tremendous influence on the age, in good part through the epistemological **rigor** that it displays, which is at least implicitly anti-metaphysical. Locke undertakes in this work to examine the human understanding in order to determine the limits of human knowledge. He thereby institutes a prominent pattern of Enlightenment epistemology. Locke finds the source of all our ideas, the ideas out of which human knowledge is constructed, in the senses and argues influentially against the rationalists' doctrine of innate ideas. Locke's sensationalism exerts great influence in the French Enlightenment, primarily through being taken up and radicalized by the *philosophe*, **Abbé de Condillac**. In his *Treatise on Sensations* (1754), Condillac attempts to explain how all human knowledge arises out of sense experience. Locke's epistemology, as developed by Condillac and others, contributes greatly to the emerging science of psychology in the period.

Locke and Descartes both **pursue** a method in epistemology that brings with it the epistemological problem of objectivity. Both examine our knowledge by way of examining the ideas we **encounter** directly in our consciousness. This method comes to be called “the way of ideas”. Though neither for Locke nor for Descartes do *all* of our ideas represent their objects by way of *resembling* them (e.g., our idea of God does not represent God **by virtue of** resembling God), our **alleged** knowledge of our environment through the senses does depend largely on ideas that **allegedly** resemble external material objects. The way of ideas implies the epistemological problem of how we can know that these ideas do in fact resemble

their objects. How can we be sure that these objects do not appear one way before the mind and exist in another way (or not at all) in reality outside the mind? **George Berkeley**, an empiricist philosopher influenced by John Locke, avoids the problem by asserting the metaphysics of idealism: the (apparently material) objects of perception are nothing but ideas before the mind. However, Berkeley's idealism is less influential in, and characteristic of, the Enlightenment, than the opposing positions of materialism and Cartesian dualism. **Thomas Reid**, a prominent member of the Scottish Enlightenment, responds to this epistemological problem in a way more characteristic of the Enlightenment in general. He attacks the way of ideas and argues that the immediate objects of our (sense) perception are the common (material) objects in our environment, not ideas in our mind. Reid mounts his defense of naïve realism as a defense of common sense over against the doctrines of the philosophers. The defense of common sense, and the related idea that the results of philosophy ought to be of use to common people, are characteristic ideas of the Enlightenment, particularly pronounced in the Scottish Enlightenment<sup>6</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to exert – развивать, обнаруживать;  
rigor – оцепенение;  
Abbé de Condillac – аббат Этьен Бонно де Кондильяк;  
to pursue – следовать, заниматься;  
to encounter – обнаруживать, встречать;  
by virtue of – посредством, в соответствии с;  
alleged – предполагаемый;  
allegedly – якобы, как будто бы;  
George Berkeley – Джордж Беркли;  
Thomas Reid – Томас Рид;

**Read the text and give the summary of it.**

### 1.4 Skepticism in the Enlightenment .

#### **Part I.**

Skepticism **enjoys** a remarkably strong place in Enlightenment philosophy, given that confidence in our intellectual capacities to achieve systematic knowledge of nature is a leading characteristic of the age. This **oddity** is at least softened by the point that much skepticism in the Enlightenment is merely

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<sup>6</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

methodological, a tool meant to serve science, rather than a philosophical position **embraced** on its own account. The instrumental role for skepticism is exemplified prominently in Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641), in which Descartes employs radical skeptical doubt to attack prejudices derived from learning and from sense experience and to search out principles known with certainty which may serve as a secure foundation for a new system of knowledge. Given the negative, critical, suspicious attitude of the Enlightenment towards doctrines traditionally regarded as well founded, it is not surprising that Enlightenment thinkers employ skeptical **tropes** (drawn from the ancient skeptical tradition) to attack traditional dogmas in science, metaphysics and religion.

However, skepticism is not merely a methodological tool in the hands of Enlightenment thinkers. The skeptical **cast of mind** is one prominent manifestation of the Enlightenment spirit. The influence of **Pierre Bayle**, another founding figure of the Enlightenment, testifies to this. Bayle was a French Protestant, who, like many European philosophers of his time, was forced to live and work in politically liberal and tolerant Holland in order to avoid censorship and prison. Bayle's *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1697), a strange and wonderful book, **exerts** great influence on the age. The form of the book is intimidating: a biographical dictionary, with long scholarly entries on obscure figures in the history of culture, interrupted by long scholarly footnotes, which are in turn interrupted by further footnotes. Rarely has a work with such intimidating scholarly pretensions exerted such radical and liberating influence in the culture. It exerts this influence through its skeptical questioning of religious, metaphysical, and scientific dogmas. Bayle's **eclecticism** and his tendency to follow arguments without pre-arranging their conclusions make it difficult to categorize his thought. But it is the attitude of inquiry that Bayle displays, rather than any doctrine he **espouses**, that mark his as distinctively Enlightenment thought. He is fearless and **presumptuous** in questioning all manner of dogma. His attitude of inquiry resembles both that of Descartes' meditator and that of the person undergoing enlightenment as Kant defines it, the attitude of coming to think for oneself, of daring to know. This epistemological attitude, as manifest in distrust of authority and reliance on one's own capacity to judge, expresses the Enlightenment valuing of individualism and self-determination<sup>7</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to enjoy – зд. получать;

oddity – странность;

to embrace – заключать в себе;

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<sup>7</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

trope – образное выражение;  
cast of mind – склад ума;  
Pierre Bayle – Пьер Бейль;  
to exert - развивать, обнаруживать;  
eclecticism – эклектика, эклектизм;  
to espouse – поддерживать, признавать;  
presumptuous – самонадеянный;

**Read the text, answer the questions and give a short summary of it.**

## **Part II.**

This skeptical/critical attitude underlies a significant tension in the age. While it is common to conceive of the Enlightenment as **supplanting** the authority of tradition and religious dogma with the authority of reason, in fact the Enlightenment is characterized by a crisis of authority regarding any belief. This is perhaps best illustrated with reference to **David Hume's** skepticism, as developed in Book One of *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40) and in his later *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding* (1748). While one might take Hume's skepticism to imply that he is an **outlier** with respect to the Enlightenment, it is more convincing to see Hume's skepticism as a flowering of a crisis regarding authority in belief that is internal to the Enlightenment. Hume articulates a variety of skepticisms. His “skepticism with regard to the senses” is structured by the epistemological problem bound up with the way of ideas, described above. Hume also articulates skepticism with regard to reason in an argument that is anticipated by Bayle. Hume begins this argument by noting that, though rules or principles in demonstrative sciences are certain or **infallible**, given the fallibility of our faculties, our applications of such rules or principles in demonstrative **inferences yield** conclusions that cannot be regarded as certain or infallible. On reflection, our conviction in the conclusions of demonstrative reasoning must be qualified by an assessment of the likelihood that we made a mistake in our reasoning. Thus, Hume writes, “all knowledge degenerates into probability” (*Treatise*, I.iv.i). Hume argues further that, given this degeneration, for any judgment, our assessment of the likelihood that we made a mistake, and the corresponding **diminution** of certainty in the conclusion, is another judgment about which we ought make a further assessment, which leads to a further diminution of certainty in our original conclusion, leading “at last [to] a total **extinction** of belief and evidence”. Hume also famously questions the justification of inductive reasoning and causal reasoning. According to Hume's argument, since in causal reasoning we take our past observations to serve as evidence for judgments regarding what will happen in relevantly similar circumstances in the future, causal reasoning depends on the **assumption** that the future course of nature will resemble the past; and there is no non-circular justification of this essential assumption. Hume concludes that we have no rational justification for our causal or inductive judgments. Hume's



skeptical arguments regarding causal reasoning are more radical than his skeptical questioning of reason as such, insofar as they call into question even *experience itself* as a ground for knowledge and implicitly challenge the **credentials** of Newtonian science itself, the very pride of the Enlightenment. The question implicitly raised by Hume's powerful skeptical arguments is whether *any* epistemological authority at all can **withstand** critical scrutiny. The Enlightenment begins by unleashing skepticism in attacking limited, **circumscribed** targets, but once the skeptical genie is out of the bottle, it becomes difficult to maintain conviction in any authority. Thus, the despairing attitude that Hume famously expresses in the conclusion to Book One of the *Treatise*, as the consequence of his epistemological inquiry, while it **clashes** with the self-confident and optimistic attitude we associate with the Enlightenment, in fact reflects an essential possibility in a distinctive Enlightenment problematic regarding authority in belief<sup>8</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to supplant – вытеснить;

outlier – резко отличающийся от остальных;

infallible – непогрешимый;

inference – вывод, заключение;

to yield – производить;

diminution – уменьшение, сокращение;

extinction – угасание, исчезновение;

assumption – предположение;

credentials – документы, верительные грамоты;

to withstand – выдержать, устоять;

circumscribed – ограниченный;

to clash – дисгармонировать.

### Questions:

1. What does the Enlightenment supplant the authority of tradition and religious dogma with?
2. What crisis is the Enlightenment characterized by?
3. What philosophical position was David Hume the adherent of?
4. What was the main point of Hume's "skepticism with regard to reason"?
5. What is characteristic of Hume's "skepticism with regard to reason"?
6. What is Hume's position concerning the inductive and causal reasoning?

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<sup>8</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

7. What attitude towards Enlightenment did Hume express in the conclusion to Book One of the *Treatise*?

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### **1.5 Science of Man and Subjectivism in the Enlightenment.**

#### **Part I.**

Though Hume finds himself struggling with skepticism in the conclusion of Book One of the *Treatise*, the project of the work as he outlines it is not to advance a skeptical viewpoint, but to establish a science of the mind. Hume is one of many Enlightenment thinkers who **aspire** to be the “Newton of the mind”. He aspires to establish the basic laws that govern the elements of the human mind in its operations. Alexander Pope's famous couplet in *An Essay on Man* (1733) (“Know then thyself, presume not God to scan/ The proper study of mankind is man”) expresses well the intense interest humanity gains in itself within the context of the Enlightenment, as a partial substitute for its traditional interest in God and the transcendent domain. Just as the sun replaces the earth as the center of our cosmos in Copernicus' cosmological system, so humanity itself replaces God at the center of humanity's consciousness in the Enlightenment. Given the Enlightenment's passion for science, the self-directed attention naturally takes the form of the rise of the scientific study of humanity in the period.

The enthusiasm for the scientific study of humanity in the period **incorporates** a tension or paradox concerning the place of humanity in the cosmos, as the cosmos is re-conceived in the context of Enlightenment philosophy and science. Newton's success early in the Enlightenment of **subsuming** the phenomena of nature under universal laws of motion, expressed in simple mathematical formulae, encourages the conception of nature as a very complicated machine, whose parts are material and whose motions and properties are fully accounted for by deterministic causal laws. But if our conception of nature is of an exclusively material **domain** governed by deterministic, mechanical laws, and if we at the same time deny the place of the supernatural in the cosmos, then how does humanity itself fit into the cosmos? On the one hand, the achievements of the natural sciences in general are the great pride of the Enlightenment, manifesting the excellence of distinctively human capacities. The pride and self-assertiveness of humanity in the Enlightenment expresses itself, among other ways, in humanity's making the study of itself its central concern. On the other hand, the study of humanity in the Enlightenment typically yields a portrait of us that is the opposite of flattering or **elevating**. Instead of being represented as occupying a privileged place in nature, as made in the image of God, humanity is represented typically in the Enlightenment as a fully natural creature, devoid of free will, of an immortal soul, and of a non-natural faculty of intelligence or reason. The very title of **J.O. de La Mettrie's** *Man a Machine* (1748), for example, seems designed to

**deflate** humanity's self-conception, and in this respect it is characteristic of the Enlightenment “science of man”. It is true of a number of works of the Enlightenment, perhaps especially works in the more radical French Enlightenment – notable here are **Helvétius's** *Of the Spirit* (1758) and **Baron d'Holbach's** *System of Nature* (1770) – that they at once express the remarkable self-assertiveness of humanity characteristic of the Enlightenment in their scientific aspirations while at the same time painting a portrait of humanity that dramatically deflates its traditional self-image as occupying a privileged position in nature.

The methodology of epistemology in the period reflects a similar tension. Given the epistemological role of Descartes' famous “*cogito, ergo sum*” in his system of knowledge, one might see Descartes' epistemology as already marking the transition from an epistemology privileging knowledge of God to one that privileges self-knowledge instead. However, in Descartes' epistemology, it remains true that knowledge of God serves as the necessary foundation for all human knowledge. Hume's *Treatise* displays such a re-orientation less ambiguously. As noted, Hume means his work to comprise a science of the mind or of man. In the Introduction, Hume describes the science of man as effectively a foundation for all the sciences since all sciences “lie under the **cognizance** of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties.” In other words, since all science is human knowledge, scientific knowledge *of humanity* is the foundation of the sciences. Hume's placing the science of man at the foundation of all the sciences both exemplifies the privilege afforded to “mankind's study of man” within the Enlightenment and provides an interpretation of it. But Hume's methodological privileging of humanity in the system of sciences contrasts sharply with what he says in the body of his science about humanity. In Hume's science of man, reason as a faculty of knowledge is skeptically attacked and **marginalized**; reason is attributed to other animals as well; belief is shown to be grounded in custom and habit; and free will is denied. So, even as knowledge of humanity **supplants** knowledge of God as the keystone of the system of knowledge, the scientific perspective on humanity starkly challenges humankind's self-conception as occupying a privileged position in the order of nature<sup>9</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to aspire – стремиться, претендовать;

to incorporate – включать;

to subsume – включать/относить к какой-либо категории;

domain – область, сфера;

elevating – возвышающий;

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<sup>9</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

J.O. de La Mettrie – Жюльен Офре де Ламетри;  
to deflate – опровергать;  
Helvétius – Клод Адриан Гельвеций;  
Baron d'Holbach – Поль Анри Тири (Барон) Гольбах;  
cognizance – компетенция;  
to marginalize – игнорировать, исключать;  
to supplant – вытеснять;

### Questions:

1. Who was called the “Newton of the mind”?
2. What basic laws does Hume aspire to establish?
3. What famous couplet expresses the interest of the humanity within the context of the Enlightenment?
4. What replaces God at the center of humanity’s consciousness in the Enlightenment?
5. What conception of nature does Newton’s success encourage?
6. How is humanity represented in the Enlightenment?
7. What is the characteristic feature of epistemology in the period?
8. What attitude to reason is represented in Hume’s science of man?
9. What happens to belief and free will in Hume’s science of man?

### Read the text and give the summary of it.

#### Part II.

Immanuel Kant explicitly enacts a revolution in epistemology modeled on the Copernican in astronomy. As characteristic of Enlightenment epistemology, Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, second edition 1787) undertakes both to determine the limits of our knowledge, and at the same time to provide a foundation of scientific knowledge of nature, and he attempts to do this by examining our human **faculties of knowledge** critically. Even as he draws strict limits to rational knowledge, he attempts to defend reason as a faculty of knowledge, as playing a necessary role in natural science, in the face of skeptical challenges that reason faces in the period. According to Kant, scientific knowledge of nature is not merely knowledge of what *in fact* happens in nature, but knowledge of the causal laws of nature according to which what in fact happens *must* happen. But how is knowledge of necessary causal connection in nature possible? Hume's investigation of the idea of cause had made clear that we cannot know causal necessity through experience; experience teaches us at most what in fact happens, not what *must* happen. In addition, Kant's own earlier critique of principles of rationalism had convinced him that the principles of (“general”) logic also cannot justify knowledge of *real* necessary connections (in nature); the formal principle of **non-contradiction** can ground at best the deduction of one *proposition* from another, but not the claim that

one *property* or *event* must follow from another in the course of nature. The generalized epistemological problem Kant addresses in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is: how is science possible (including natural science, mathematics, metaphysics), given that all such knowledge must be (or include) knowledge of real, substantive (not merely logical or formal) necessities. Put in the terms Kant defines, the problem is: how is synthetic, a priori knowledge possible?

According to the Copernican Revolution in epistemology which Kant presents as the solution to this problem, objects must **conform** themselves to human knowledge rather than knowledge to objects. According to Kant's arguments, certain cognitive forms lie ready in the human mind – prominent examples are the pure concepts of substance and cause and the forms of intuition, space and time; given sensible representations must conform themselves to these forms in order for human experience (as empirical knowledge of nature) to be possible at all. According to Kant's epistemological revolution, we can acquire scientific knowledge of nature because we constitute it a priori according to certain cognitive forms; for example, we can know nature as a causally ordered domain because we originally synthesize a priori the given **manifold** of sensibility according to the category of causality, which has its source in the human mind.

Kant saves rational knowledge of nature by limiting rational knowledge to nature. According to Kant's argument, we can have rational knowledge only of the domain of possible experience, not of **supersensible** objects such as God and the soul. Moreover Kant's solution brings with it a kind of idealism: given the mind's role in constituting objects of experience, we know objects only as *appearances*, only as they are for us, not as they are in themselves. This is the subjectivism of Kant's epistemology. Kant's epistemology exemplifies Enlightenment thought by replacing the **theocentric** conception of knowledge of the rationalist tradition with an anthropocentric conception.

However, Kant means his system to make room for humanity's practical and religious aspirations toward the transcendent as well. According to Kant's idealism, the realm of nature is limited to a realm of appearances, and we can intelligibly think supersensible objects such as God, freedom and the soul, though we cannot have knowledge of them. Through the postulation of a realm of unknowable noumena (things in themselves) over against the realm of nature as a realm of appearances, Kant manages to make place for practical concepts that are central to our understanding of ourselves even while grounding our scientific knowledge of nature as a domain governed by **deterministic** causal laws. Though Kant's idealism is highly controversial from the outset, it represents the Enlightenment's most serious attempt to understand the cosmos in such a way that the Enlightenment's conception of nature and the Enlightenment's conception of ourselves (as morally free, as having dignity, as **perfectible**, et cetera) fit together in a single system<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

## Vocabulary

faculty of knowledge – область знания;  
non-contradiction – непротиворечивость;  
to conform – приспособлять(ся);  
manifold – многообразие;  
supersensible – сверхчувственный;  
appearance – данное в чувствах, впечатлениях;  
theocentric – теоцентрический;  
deterministic – детерминистский;  
perfectible – способный к совершенствованию;

**Give the written translation of the text.**

### 1.6 Aesthetics in the Enlightenment.

Modern systematic philosophical aesthetics not only first emerges in the context of the Enlightenment, but also flowers brilliantly there. As Ernst Cassirer notes, the 18th century not only thinks of itself as the “century of philosophy”, but also as “the age of criticism,” where criticism is centrally (though not only) art and literary criticism. Philosophical aesthetics flourishes in the period because of its strong **affinities** with the tendencies of the age. Alexander Baumgarten, the German philosopher in the school of Christian Wolff, founds systematic aesthetics in the period, in part through giving it its name. “Aesthetics” is derived from the Greek word for “senses”, because for Baumgarten a science of the beautiful would be a science of the sensible, a science of sensible cognition. The Enlightenment in general re-discovers the value of the senses, not only in cognition, but in human lives in general, and so, given the intimate connection between beauty and human sensibility, the Enlightenment is naturally particularly interested in aesthetics. Also, the Enlightenment includes a general recovery and **affirmation** of the value of pleasure in human lives, against the past of Christian asceticism, and the flourishing of the arts, of the criticism of the arts and of the philosophical theorizing about beauty, promotes and is promoted by this recovery and affirmation. The Enlightenment also enthusiastically embraces the discovery and **disclosure** of rational order in nature, as manifest most clearly in the development of the new science. It seems to many theorists in the Enlightenment that the faculty of taste, the faculty by which we **discern** beauty, reveals to us some part of this order, a distinctive harmony, unities **amidst** variety. Thus, in the phenomenon of aesthetic pleasure, human sensibility **discloses** to us rational order, thus binding together two **enthusiasms** of the Enlightenment<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

## Vocabulary

affinity – родство, сходство;  
affirmation – заявление, утверждение;  
disclosure – обнаружение, разоблачение;  
to discern – различать;  
amidst – среди;  
to disclose – показывать;  
enthusiasms – зд. увлечения, страсти.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### 1.7 French Classicism and German Rationalism.

In the early Enlightenment, especially in France, the emphasis is upon the **discernment** of an objective rational order, rather than upon the subject's sensual aesthetic pleasure. Though Descartes' philosophical system does not include a theory of taste or of beauty, his mathematical model of the physical universe **inspires** the aesthetics of French classicism. French classicism begins from the classical maxim that the beautiful is the true. **Nicolas Boileau** writes in his influential didactic poem, *The Art of Poetry* (1674), in which he **lays down** rules for good **versification** within different genres, that “Nothing is beautiful but the true, the true alone is lovable”. In the period the true is **conceived** of as an objective rational order. According to the classical conception of art that dominates in the period, art *imitates* nature, though not nature as given in disordered experience, but the *ideal* nature, the ideal in which we can **discern** and enjoy “unity in multiplicity”. In French classicism, aesthetics is very much under the influence of, and indeed modeled on, systematic, rigorous theoretical science of nature. Just as in Descartes' model of science, where knowledge of all particulars depends on prior knowledge of the principle from which the particulars are **deduced**, so also in the aesthetics of French classicism, the demand is for systematization under a single, universal principle. The **subjection** of artistic phenomena to universal rules and principles, the quest for system is expressed, for example, in the title of **Charles Batteaux's** main work, *The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle* (1746), as well as in Boileau's rules for good versification.

In Germany in the 18th century, **Christian Wolff's** systematic rationalist metaphysics forms the basis for much of the reflection on aesthetics, though sometimes as a set of doctrines to be argued against. For Wolff, the classical **dictum** that beauty is truth holds good; beauty is truth perceived through the feeling of pleasure. Wolff understands beauty to consist in the perfection in things, which he understands in turn to consist in a harmony or **order of a manifold**. We

judge something beautiful through a feeling of pleasure when we sense in it this harmony or perfection. Beauty is, for Wolff, the sensitive cognition of perfection. Thus, for Wolff, beauty corresponds to objective features of the world, but judgments of beauty are relative to us also, insofar as they are based on the human faculty of sensibility<sup>12</sup>.

### Vocabulary

discernment – распознавание, различение;  
to inspire – вдохновлять;  
Nicolas Boileau – Никола Буало;  
to lay down – закладывать, устанавливать;  
versification – переложение;  
to conceive – постигать;  
to discern – распознавать;  
to deduce – выводить;  
subjection – подчинение;  
Charles Batteaux – Шарль Беттё;  
Christian Wolff – Христиан Вольф;  
dictum – изречение;  
order of a manifold – порядок многообразия.

### Questions:

1. What philosophical system inspires the aesthetics of French classicism?
2. What is the maxim of French classicism?
3. How is the true conceived in the period?
4. What is the classical conception of art in the Enlightenment?
5. What influenced aesthetics in French classicism?
6. What system forms the basis for reflection on aesthetics in Germany in the 18<sup>th</sup> century?
7. How does Wolff understand beauty?

**Give the written translation of the text.**

### 1.8 Empiricism and Subjectivism.

#### Part I.

Though philosophical rationalism forms the basis of aesthetics in the early Enlightenment in France and Germany, thinkers in the empiricist tradition in

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<sup>12</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>



England and Scotland introduce many of the **salient** themes of Enlightenment aesthetics. In particular, with the rise of empiricism and subjectivism in this **domain**, attention shifts to the ground and nature of the subject's experience of beauty, the subject's aesthetic response, and this focus is characteristic of Enlightenment aesthetics. **Lord Shaftesbury**, though not himself an empiricist or subjectivist in aesthetics, makes significant contributions to this development. Shaftesbury **reiterates** the classical equation, “all beauty is truth”, but the truth that beauty is for Shaftesbury is not an objective rational order that could also be known conceptually. Though beauty is, for Shaftesbury, a kind of harmony that is independent of the human mind, under the influence of **Plotinus**, he understands the human being's **immediate intuition** of the beautiful as a kind of participation in the original harmony. Shaftesbury focuses attention on the nature of the subject's response to beauty, as elevating the person, also morally. He maintains that aesthetic response consists in a *disinterested* unegoistic pleasure. The discovery of this capacity for disinterested pleasure in harmony shows the way for the development of his ethics that has a similar grounding. And, in fact, in seeing aesthetic response as elevating oneself above self-interested **pursuits**, through cultivating one's **receptivity** to disinterested pleasure, Shaftesbury ties tightly together aesthetics and ethics, morality and beauty, and in that respect also contributes to a trend of the period. Also, in placing the emphasis on the subject's response to beauty, rather than on the objective characteristics of the beautiful, Shaftesbury makes aesthetics belong to the general Enlightenment interest in human nature. Thinkers of the period find in our receptivity to beauty a key both to understanding distinctively human nature and to its **perfection**<sup>13</sup>.

### Vocabulary

salient – яркий, выдающийся;

domain – сфера, область;

Lord Shaftesbury – Лорд Шефтсбери (Энтони Эшли Купер, 3-й граф Шефтсбери);

to reiterate – повторять;

Plotinus – Плотин;

immediate intuition – непосредственное восприятие;

pursuit – поиск, стремление;

receptivity – восприимчивость;

perfection – совершенствование.

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<sup>13</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

**Read the text and give the summary of it.**

## **Part II.**

**Francis Hutcheson** follows Shaftesbury in his emphasis on the subject's aesthetic response, on the distinctive sort of pleasure that the beautiful **elicits** in us. Partly because of the Neo-Platonic influence, so **pronounced** in Shaftesbury's aesthetics, is **washed out** of Hutcheson's, to be replaced by a more **thoroughgoing** empiricism, Hutcheson understands this distinctive aesthetic pleasure as more **akin** to a secondary quality. Thus, Hutcheson's aesthetic work raises the prominent question whether "beauty" refers to something objective at all or whether beauty is "nothing more" than a human idea or experience. As in the domain of Enlightenment ethics, so with Enlightenment aesthetics too, the step from Shaftesbury to Hutcheson marks a step toward subjectivism. Hutcheson writes in one of his *Two Treatises*, his *Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design* (1725) that "the word 'beauty' is taken for the *idea raised in us*, and a *sense of beauty for our power of receiving this idea*". However, though Hutcheson understands beauty to be an idea in us, he takes this idea to be "excited" or "**occasioned**" in us by distinctive objective qualities, in particular by objects that display "*uniformity amidst variety*". In the very title of Hutcheson's work above, we see the importance of the classical ideas of rational order and harmony in Hutcheson's aesthetic theory, even as he sets the **tenor** for much Enlightenment discussion of aesthetics through placing the emphasis on the subjective idea and aesthetic response.

**David Hume's** famous essay on "the standard of taste" raises and addresses the epistemological problem raised by subjectivism in aesthetics. If beauty is an idea in us, rather than a feature of objects independent of us, then how do we understand the possibility of correctness and incorrectness – how do we understand the possibility of standards of judgment – in this domain? The problem is **posed** more clearly for Hume because he intensifies Hutcheson's subjectivism. He writes in the *Treatise* that "pleasure and pain...are not only necessary attendants of beauty and **deformity**, but constitute their very essence" (*Treatise*, Book II, part I, section viii). But if a judgment of taste is based on, or expresses, subjective sentiments, how can it be incorrect? In his response to this question, Hume accounts for the expectation of agreement in judgments of taste by appealing to the fact that we share a common human nature, and he accounts for "objectivity" or expertise in judgments of taste, within the context of his subjectivism, by appealing to the normative responses of **well-placed** observers. Both of these points (the **commonality** of human nature and the securing of "objectivity" in judgments based on sentiments by appeal to the normative responses of appropriately placed observers) are typical of the period more generally, and especially of the strong empiricist **strain** in the Enlightenment. Hume develops the empiricist line in aesthetics to the point where little remains of the classical emphasis on the order or harmony or truth that is, according to the French classicists, **apprehended** and

appreciated in our aesthetic responses to the beautiful, and thus, according to the classicists, the ground of aesthetic responses<sup>14</sup>.

### Vocabulary

Francis Hutcheson – Фрэнсис Хатчесон;  
to elicit – выявлять, извлекать;  
to pronounce – провозглашать, заявлять;  
to wash out – вымывать;  
thorough-going – бескомпромиссный, радикальный;  
akin – родственный, сходный;  
occasioned – вызванный;  
tenor – направление;  
to pose – формулировать;  
deformity – уродство, безобразие;  
well-placed – находящийся в выгодном положении;  
commonality – общность;  
strain – черта, склонность;  
to apprehend – предчувствовать, предвидеть.

**Read the text, answer the questions and give a short summary of it.**

#### **1.9 Late Enlightenment Aesthetics.**

##### **Part I.**

**Immanuel Kant** faces **squarely** the problem of the normativity of judgments of taste. Influenced by Hutcheson and the British empiricist tradition in general, Kant understands judgments of taste to be founded on a distinctive sort of feeling, a *disinterested* pleasure. In taking judgments of taste to be subjective (they are founded on the subject's feeling of pleasure) and non-cognitive (such judgments do not **subsume** representations under concepts and thus do not **ascribe** properties to objects), Kant breaks with the German rationalist school. However Kant continues to maintain that judgments of beauty are like cognitive judgments in making a **legitimate** claim to universal agreement – in contrast to judgments of the agreeable. The question is how to **vindicate** the legitimacy of this demand. Kant argues that the distinctive pleasure underlying judgments of taste is the experience of the harmony of the **faculties** of the imagination and the understanding, a harmony that arises through their “free play” in the process of cognizing objects on the basis of given sensible intuition. The harmony is “free” in

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<sup>14</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

an experience of beauty in the sense that it is not forced by rules of the understanding, as is the agreement among the faculties in acts of cognition. The order and harmony that we experience in the face of the beautiful is subjective, according to Kant; but it is at the same time universal and normative, by virtue of its relation to the conditions of human cognition.

The emphasis Kant places on the role of the activity of the imagination in aesthetic pleasure and **discernment** typifies a trend in Enlightenment thought. Whereas early in the Enlightenment, in French classicism, and to some extent in Christian Wolff and other figures of German rationalism, the emphasis is on the more-or-less static rational order and proportion and on rigid universal rules or laws of reason, the trend during the development of Enlightenment aesthetics is toward emphasis on the *play* of the imagination and its **fecundity** in generating associations<sup>15</sup>.

### Vocabulary

squarely – непосредственно;

to subsume – относить к категории, включать в категорию;

to ascribe – приписывать, назначать;

legitimate – законный, обоснованный;

to vindicate – доказать, подтвердить;

faculty – зд. область;

discernment – распознавание, различение;

fecundity – плодородность.

### Questions:

1. How does Kant understand judgments of taste? Who influenced him concerning this question?
2. What points made Kant break with the German rationalist school?
3. How does Kant define the distinctive pleasure?
4. What does Kant think about order and harmony that we experience in the face of the beautiful?
5. Where does Kant place emphasis in the Enlightenment thought?

### Give the written translation of the text.

#### Part II.

**Denis Diderot** is an important and influential author on aesthetics. He wrote the entry “On the Origin and Nature of the Beautiful” for the *Encyclopedia* (1752).

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<sup>15</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

Like Lessing in Germany, Diderot not only philosophized about art and beauty, but also wrote plays and influential art criticism. Diderot is strongly influenced in his writings on aesthetics by the empiricism in England and Scotland, but his writing is not limited to that **standpoint**. Diderot repeats the classical **dictum** that art should imitate nature, but, whereas, for French classicists, the nature that art should imitate is *ideal* nature – a static, universal rational order – for Diderot, nature is dynamic and productive. For Diderot, the nature the artist ought to imitate is the *real* nature we experience, **warts and all** (as it were), in its particularity. The **particularism** and realism of Diderot's aesthetics is based on a critique of the standpoint of French classicism. According to this critique, the artistic rules that the French classicists represent as universal rules of reason are exposed as being nothing more than *conventions* marking what is considered *proper* within a certain tradition. In other words, the prescriptions within the French classical tradition are *artificial*, not *natural*, and the means of liberation from the **fetters** which Diderot takes them to represent to artistic genius is exactly to turn to the task of observing and imitating *actual nature*. Diderot's emphasis on the **primeval** productive power and **abundance** of nature in his aesthetic writings contributes to the trend toward focus on artistic creation and expression (as opposed to artistic appreciation and **discernment**) that is a characteristic of the late Enlightenment and the **transition** to Romanticism<sup>16</sup>.

### Vocabulary

Denis Diderot – Дени Дидро;  
standpoint – точка зрения, позиция;  
dictum – изречение;  
warts and all – несмотря на недостатки, без прикрас;  
particularism – исключительная приверженность;  
fetters – оковы, узы;  
primeval – первобытный, первозданный;  
abundance – изобилие;  
discernment – распознавание, различение;  
transition – переход.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### Part III.

**Lessing's** aesthetic writings play an important role in elevating the aesthetic category of expressiveness. In his famous *Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry* (1766), Lessing argues, by comparing the famous Greek

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<sup>16</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

statue with the representation of **Laocoön's** suffering in **Virgil's** poetry, that the aims of poetry and of the visual arts are not the same; he argues that the aim of poetry is not beauty, but expression. In elevating the aesthetic category of expressiveness, Lessing challenges the notion that all art is imitation of nature. His argument also challenges the notion that all the various arts can be **deduced** from a single principle. Lessing's argument in *Laocoön* supports the contrary thesis that the distinct arts have distinct aims and methods, and that each should be understood on its own terms, not in terms of an abstract general principle from which all arts are to be deduced. For some, especially for critics of the Enlightenment, in this point Lessing is already beyond the Enlightenment, given that it is characteristic of the Enlightenment to know the particular through its **subsumption** under the universal law (of reason). Certainly it is true that the emphasis on the individual or particular, over against the universal, which one finds in other late Enlightenment thinkers, is in tension with Enlightenment **tenets**. **Herder** argues that each individual *artobject* has to be understood in its own terms, as a totality complete unto itself. With Herder's **stark** emphasis on individuality in aesthetics, over against universality, the **supplanting** of the Enlightenment with Romanticism and Historicism is well advanced. But, according to the point of view taken in this **entry**, the conception of the Enlightenment according to which it is distinguished by its **prioritization** of the order of abstract, universal laws and principles, over against concrete particulars and the differences amongst them, is too narrow; it fails **to account for** much of the characteristic richness in the thought of the period. Indeed aesthetics itself, as a discipline, which, as noted, is founded in the Enlightenment by the German rationalist, **Alexander Baumgarten**, owes its existence to the tendency in the Enlightenment to search for and discover distinct laws for distinct kinds of phenomena (as opposed to insisting that all phenomena be made **intelligible** through the same set of general laws and principles). Baumgarten founds aesthetics as a 'science' through the attempt to establish the sensible **domain** as **cognizable** in a way different from that which prevails in metaphysics. Aesthetics in Germany in the 18th century, from Wolff to Herder, both typifies many of the trends of the Enlightenment and marks the field where the Enlightenment yields to competing worldviews<sup>17</sup>.

### Vocabulary

Lessing – Готфрид Эфраим Лессинг;

Лаосоон – Лаокоон (в греческой мифологии жрец бога Аполлона в г. Трое);

Virgil – Вергилий;

to deduce – выводить;

subsumption – отнесение к;

tenets – убеждения;

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<sup>17</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>

Herder – Иоган Готфрид Гердер;  
stark – решительный;  
to supplant - вытеснять;  
entry – вступление;  
prioritization – присваивание приоритетов;  
to account for – объяснять;  
intelligible – умопостигаемый, интеллигибельный;  
domain – сфера, область;  
cognizable – познаваемый;

**Questions:**

1. What played an important role in elevating the aesthetic category of expressiveness?
2. What is the aim of poetry according to Lessing?
3. What did Lessing think about art?
4. Where can all the various arts be deduced from?
5. What emphasis did Herder make in aesthetics?
6. Who founded aesthetics as a discipline in the Enlightenment era?
7. What did Baumgarten think of aesthetics on the whole?

## Unit II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY.

Read the text and give the written translation of the last paragraph.

### 2.1 Introduction to 19<sup>th</sup> century Philosophy.

#### Part I.

In the 18th century the philosophies of the Enlightenment began to have a dramatic effect, the **landmark** works of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau influencing a new generation of thinkers. In the late 18th century a movement known as Romanticism sought to combine the formal rationality of the past, with a greater and more immediate emotional and organic sense of the world. Key ideas that **sparked** this change were evolution, as postulated by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, **Erasmus Darwin**, and Charles Darwin and what might now be called **emergent** order, such as the free market of Adam Smith. Pressures for **egalitarianism**, and more rapid change culminated in a period of revolution and **turbulence** that would see philosophy change as well.

With the **tumultuous** years of 1789-1815, European culture was transformed by revolution, war and **disruption**. By ending many of the social and cultural **props** of the previous century, the stage was set for dramatic economic and political change. European philosophy participated in, and drove, many of these changes.

The last third of the 18th century produced a host of ideas and works which both systematized previous philosophy, and presented a deep challenge to the basis of how philosophy had been systematized. Immanuel Kant is a name that most would mention as being among the most important of influences, as is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. While both of these philosophers were products of the 18th century and its **assumptions**, they pressed at the boundaries. In trying to explain the nature of the state and government, Rousseau challenged the basis of government with his declaration that "Man is born free, but is everywhere in chains". Kant, while attempting to preserve **axiomatic** skepticism, was forced to argue that we do not see true reality, nor do we speak of it. All we know of reality is **appearances**. Since all we can see of reality is appearances, Kant postulates the idea of an **unknowable**. Hegel's distinction between the unknowable and the **circumstantially** unknown can be seen as the beginnings of Hegel's rational system of the universe. A fairly simple **refutation** in that for Kant to conceive that there is an unknowable operating behind the appearances is to demonstrate some knowledge of its existence. Quite simply, to know that it exists is to know it<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> <http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/135949>



## Vocabulary

landmark – знаменательный;  
to spark - воодушевлять, побуждать;  
Erasmus Darwin – Эразм Дарвин;  
emergent – стихийный;  
egalitarianism – эгалитаризм;  
turbulence – нестабильность, потрясения;  
tumultuous – беспокойный;  
disruption – дестабилизация;  
props – свойства;  
assumption – исходная предпосылка;  
axiomatic – постулированный;  
appearance – явление (данное в чувствах или впечатлениях);  
unknowable – непознаваемое;  
circumstantially – случайно;  
refutation – опровержение.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### Part II.

There is by no means an exhaustive list of philosophical schools and tendencies in the 19th-century philosophy. One of the first philosophers to attempt to **grapple** with Kant's philosophy was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose development of Kantian metaphysics became a source of inspiration for the Romantics. In “Wissenschaftslehre”, Fichte argues that the self **posits** itself and is a self-producing and changing process.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, a student of Fichte, continued to develop many of the same ideas and was also assimilated by the Romantics as something of an official philosopher for their movement. But it was another of Fichte's students, and former roommate of Schelling, who would rise to become the most prominent of the post-Kantian idealists: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Arthur Schopenhauer, **rejecting** Hegel, called for a return to Kantian idealism.

In early 19th century Britain, **Jeremy Bentham** and **John Stuart Mill** promoted the idea that actions are right as they maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Bentham believed actions were right as they maximized an individual's pleasure, whereas Mill believed that one's actions were right or wrong depending on whether they maximized pleasure collectively.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels represented the branch of Marxism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Existentialism as a philosophical movement is properly a 20th-century movement, but its major **antecedents**, Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche wrote long before the rise of existentialism. In the 1840s, academic philosophy in Europe, following Hegel, was almost completely divorced from the concerns of individual human life, in favour of **pursuing** abstract metaphysical

systems. Kierkegaard sought to reintroduce to philosophy, in the spirit of Socrates: subjectivity, **commitment**, faith, and passion, all of which are parts of the human condition.

Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche saw the moral values of 19th-century Europe **disintegrating** into nihilism (Kierkegaard called it the “leveling” process). Nietzsche attempted to undermine traditional moral values by exposing its foundations. To that end, he distinguished between master and slave moralities, and claimed that man must turn from the **meekness** and **humility** of Europe’s slave-morality.

Both philosophers are **precursors** to existentialism for their importance on the “great man” against the age. Kierkegaard wrote of 19th-century Europe, “Each age has its own characteristic **depravity**. Ours is perhaps not pleasure or **indulgence** or sensuality, but rather a **dissolute pantheistic** contempt for the individual man” (*Kierkegaard, Søren. “Concluding Unscientific Postscript”*).

**Auguste Comte**, the self-professed founder of modern sociology, put forward the view that the **rigorous** ordering of **confirmable** observations alone ought to constitute the realm of human knowledge. He had hoped to order the sciences in increasing degrees of complexity from mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and a new discipline called “sociology”, which is the study of the “dynamics and statics of society” (*Comte, Auguste. “Course on Positive Philosophy”*).

The American philosophers **C.S. Peirce** and William James developed the pragmatist philosophy in the late 19th century.

The twilight years of the 19th-century in Britain saw the rise of British idealism, a revival of interest in the works of Kant and Hegel.

Transcendentalism was rooted in Immanuel Kant's transcendence and German idealism, lead by **Ralph Waldo Emerson** and **Henry David Thoreau**. The main belief was in an ideal spiritual state that “transcends” the physical and empirical and is only realized through the individual's intuition, rather than through the doctrines of established religions<sup>19</sup>.

## Vocabulary

to grapple – бороться, сражаться;

to posit – утверждать, постулировать;

to reject – отвергать;

Jeremy Bentham – Джереми Бентам;

John Stuart Mill – Джон Стюарт Милль;

antecedent – предшественник;

to pursue – гоняться;

commitment – приверженность;

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<sup>19</sup> <http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/135949>

to disintegrate – разрушаться, распадаться;  
meekness – смиренность, покорность;  
humility – скромность;  
precursor – предшественник, прототип;  
depravity – порочность, греховность;  
indulgence – потакание своим слабостям;  
dissolute – распутный, развратный;  
pantheistic – пантеистический;  
Auguste Comte – Огюст Конт;  
rigorous – строгий, неумолимый;  
confirmable – подтверждаемый;  
C.S. Peirce – Charles Sanders Pierce, Чарльз Сандерс Пирс;  
Ralph Waldo Emerson – Ральф Уолдо Эмерсон;  
Henry David Thoreau – Генри Дэвид Торо.

### Questions:

1. Who was one of the first philosophers to attempt to grapple with Kant's philosophy?
2. What position did Fichte argue about Kantian metaphysics?
3. What was the value of Schelling for the movement of Romantics?
4. Who is considered to be the most prominent of the post-Kantian idealists?
5. What was the position of Arthur Schopenhauer in this respect?
6. What was the idea of rightness of actions, represented by J. Bentham and J. S. Mill?
7. Who represented the branch of Marxism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century?
8. What was Kierkegaard's position in the philosophy of that time?
9. What did Nietzsche say about the moral values of 19<sup>th</sup>-century Europe?
10. Who considered himself to be the founder of modern sociology?
11. What views did A. Comte promote?
12. Who developed the pragmatist philosophy in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century?
13. What was the main belief of transcendentalism, led by R.W. Emerson and H. D. Thoreau?

**Read the text and give the summary of the part about J. G. Fichte.**

### 2.2 German Idealism.

German idealism was a speculative philosophical movement that emerged in Germany in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. It reacted against Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and was closely linked with both romanticism and the revolutionary politics of the Enlightenment. The most notable thinkers in the movement were Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, while **Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Gottlob**

**Ernst Schulze, Karl Leonhard Reinhold**, and Friedrich Schleiermacher were also major contributors.

The word "idealism" has more than one meaning. The philosophical meaning of idealism here is that the properties we discover in objects depend on the way that those objects appear to us as perceiving subjects, and not something they possess "in themselves", apart from our experience of them. The very notion of a "thing in itself" should be understood as an **option** of a set of functions for an operating mind, such that we consider something that appears without respect to the specific manner in which it appears. The question of what properties a thing might have "independently of the mind" is thus **incoherent** for idealism.

## **Part I.**

**Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)** is often perceived as a figure whose philosophy forms a bridge between the ideas of Kant and those of the German Idealist G. W. F. Hegel. Recently, philosophers and scholars have begun to appreciate Fichte as an important philosopher in his own right due to his original insights into the nature of self-consciousness or self-awareness. Like Descartes and Kant before him, he was motivated by the problem of subjectivity and consciousness. Fichte also wrote works of political philosophy and is considered one of the fathers of German nationalism.

Fichte did not **endorse** Kant's argument for the existence of noumena, of "things in themselves", the **supra-sensible** reality beyond the categories of human reason. Fichte saw the rigorous and systematic separation of "things in themselves" (noumena) and things "as they appear to us" (phenomena) as an invitation to skepticism. Rather than invite such skepticism, Fichte made the radical suggestion that we should throw out the notion of a noumenal world and instead accept the fact that consciousness does not have a grounding in a so-called "real world". In fact, Fichte achieved fame for originating the argument that consciousness is not grounded in *anything* outside of itself. The phenomenal world as such, arises from self-consciousness, the activity of the ego, and moral awareness.

In his work *Foundations of Natural Right* (1796), Fichte argued that self-consciousness was a social phenomenon – an important step and perhaps the first clear step taken in this direction by modern philosophy. A necessary condition of every subject's self-awareness, for Fichte, is the existence of other rational subjects. These others call or **summon** the subject or self out of its unconsciousness and into an awareness of itself as a free individual. Mutual recognition of rational individuals turns out to be a condition necessary for the individual "I" in general. This argument for *intersubjectivity* is central to the conception of selfhood developed in the *Doctrine of Science*. In Fichte's view consciousness of the self depends upon resistance or a check by something that is understood as not part of the self, yet is not immediately **ascribable** to a particular sensory perception. In his later lectures (his *Nova Methodo*), Fichte incorporated it

into his revised presentation of the very foundations of his system, where the **summons** takes its place alongside original feeling<sup>20</sup>.

### Vocabulary

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi – Фридрих Генрих Якоби;  
Gottlob Ernst Schulze – Готлоб-Эрнст Шульце;  
Karl Leonhard Reinhold – Карл Леонгард Рейнгольд;  
option – выбор;  
incoherent – неподходящий, непоследовательный;  
to endorse – одобрять;  
supra-sensible – сверхчувственный;  
to summon – призывать;  
ascribable – приписываемый;  
summons – требование, вызов.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

#### Part II.

**Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854)** is one of the great German philosophers of the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century. While initiating the Post-Kantian Idealism of the Subject, Schelling went on to exhibit in his later works the limit and dissolution of such a systemic metaphysics of the Subject.

The real importance of Schelling's later works lies in the exposure of the dominant systemic metaphysics of the Subject to its limit rather than in its confirmation. In this way, the later works of Schelling demand from the students and philosophers of German Idealism a re-assessment of the notion of German Idealism itself. In that sense, the importance and influence of Schelling's philosophy has remained "untimely." In the wake of Hegelian rational philosophy that was the official philosophy of that time, Schelling's later works was not influential and fell onto deaf ears. Only in the 20th century when the question of the legitimacy of the philosophical project of modernity had come to be the concern for philosophers and thinkers, did Schelling's radical opening of philosophy to "post-metaphysical" thinking receive renewed attention.

This is because it is perceived that the task of philosophical thinking is no longer the foundational act of the systematic metaphysics of the Subject. In the wake of "end of philosophy," the philosophical task is understood to be the **inauguration** of new thinking beyond metaphysics. In this context, Schelling has again come into prominence as someone who in the **heyday** of German Idealism has opened up the possibility of a philosophical thinking beyond the **closure** of the metaphysics of the Subject. The importance of Schelling for such post-

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<sup>20</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann\\_Gottlieb\\_Fichte](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_Gottlieb_Fichte)

metaphysical thinking is rightly emphasized by Martin Heidegger in his lecture on Schelling of 1936. In this manner Heidegger prepares the possibility of understanding Schelling's works in an entirely different manner. Heidegger's reading of Schelling in turn has immensely influenced the Post-Heideggerian French philosophical turn to the question of "the exit from metaphysics". But this Post-Structuralist and deconstructive reading of Schelling is not the only reception of Schelling. Philosophers like Jürgen Habermas, whose doctorate work was on Schelling, would like to insist on the continuation of the philosophical project of modernity, and yet attempt to view reason beyond the instrumental functionality of reason at the service of domination and **coercion**. Schelling is seen from this perspective as a "post-metaphysical" thinker who has widened the concept of reason beyond its self-grounding projection. During the last half of the last century, Schelling's works have tremendously influenced the post-Subject oriented philosophical discourses. During recent times, Schelling scholarship has remarkably increased both in the Anglo-American context and the Continental philosophical context<sup>21</sup>.

### Vocabulary

inauguration – торжественное открытие, ознаменование начала;

heyday – расцвет;

closure – завершение, закрытие;

coercion – сдерживание, ограничение;

### Questions:

1. What position in the philosophy did F. Schelling exhibit?
2. What is the real importance of Schelling's later works?
3. What did Schelling open up in the context of German Idealism?
4. Who emphasizes the importance of Schelling in his lecture in 1936?
5. How did M. Heidegger understand Schelling's works?
6. What was the view of J. Habermas on Schelling?

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### Part III.

**Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)** was a German philosopher, whose historicist and idealist account of reality revolutionized European philosophy and was an important **precursor** to Continental philosophy and Marxism.

Hegel developed a comprehensive philosophical framework, or "system", of absolute idealism to **account** in an integrated and developmental way for the

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<sup>21</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/schellin/>

relation of mind and nature, the subject and object of knowledge, psychology, the state, history, art, religion, and philosophy. In particular, he developed the concept that mind or spirit manifested itself in a set of contradictions and oppositions that it ultimately integrated and united, without **eliminating** either pole or reducing one to the other. Examples of such contradictions include those between nature and freedom, and between **immanence** and transcendence.

Hegel's thinking can be understood as a constructive development within the broad tradition that includes Plato and Immanuel Kant. He regarded freedom or self-determination both as real and as having important ontological implications, for soul or mind or divinity.

In his discussion of “Spirit” in his *Encyclopedia*, Hegel praises Aristotle's *On the Soul* as “by far the most admirable, perhaps even the **sole**, work of philosophical value on this topic”. In his *Phenomenology of Spirit* and his *Science of Logic*, Hegel's concern with Kantian topics such as freedom and morality, and with their ontological implications, is **pervasive**. Rather than simply rejecting Kant's dualism of freedom versus nature, Hegel aims to **subsume** it within “true infinity”, the “concept” or “notion”, “spirit”, and “ethical life” in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered **intelligible**, rather than remaining a **brute** “given”.

Hegel intends to defend the **germ** of truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like those of materialism and empiricism. Kant pursues the mind's ability to question its felt inclinations or appetites and to come up with a standard of “duty” which transcends bodily **restrictiveness**. Hegel preserves this essential Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite, the universal going beyond the particular (in the Concept), and Spirit going beyond Nature. And Hegel renders these dualities *intelligible* by his argument in the “Quality” chapter of the “Science of Logic”. The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole.

The result of this argument is that finite and infinite – and, by extension, particular and universal, nature and freedom – don't face one another as two independent realities, but instead the latter (in each case) is the *self-transcending* of the former. Rather than stress the distinct singularity of each factor that complements and conflicts with others – without explanation – the relationship between finite and infinite (and particular and universal, and nature and freedom) becomes intelligible as a progressively developing and self-perfecting whole<sup>22</sup>.

### Vocabulary

precursor – предшественник;  
to account – считать, рассматривать;  
to eliminate – устранять, исключать;

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<sup>22</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg\\_Wilhelm\\_Friedrich\\_Hegel](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel)

immanence – имманентность;  
sole – единственный;  
pervasive – сквозной;  
to subsume – относить или включать в какую-либо категорию;  
intelligible – интеллигибельный, умопостигаемый;  
brute – бессознательный;  
germ – зачаток, зародыш;  
restrictiveness – ограниченность.

### Questions:

1. What were the main points of Hegel's philosophy that revolutionized European philosophy?
2. What system did Hegel develop?
3. What concept did Hegel represent?
4. What are the examples of Hegel's contradictions?
5. How can Hegel's thinking be understood?
6. How did Hegel regard freedom or self-determination?
7. What did Hegel say about Aristotle's *On the Soul*?
8. What concern is pervasive in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and his *Science of Logic*?
9. What interpretation did Kant's dualism of freedom versus nature gain in Hegelian system?
10. What did Hegel intend to defend in Kantian dualism?
11. In what form did Hegel preserve the essential Kantian concern?
12. What happens to the idea of the absolute in Hegelian system?
13. What are the relations between finite and infinite in Hegel's philosophy?

**Give the written translation of the text.**

### 2.3 Utilitarianism.

**Utilitarianism** is one of the most powerful and persuasive approaches to normative ethics in the history of philosophy. Though not fully articulated until the 19<sup>th</sup> century, proto-utilitarian positions can be **discerned** throughout the history of ethical theory. Though there are many varieties of the view discussed, utilitarianism is generally held to be the view that the morally right action is the action that produces the most good. There are many ways to spell out this **general claim**. One thing to note is that the theory is a form of **consequentialism**: the right action is understood entirely in terms of consequences produced. What distinguishes utilitarianism from egoism has to do with the scope of the relevant consequences. On the utilitarian view one ought to maximize the overall good – that is, consider the good of others as well as one's own good. The Classical Utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, identified the good with



pleasure, so, like Epicurus, were **hedonists** about value. They also held that we ought to maximize the good, that is, bring about “the greatest amount of good for the greatest number”. Utilitarianism is also distinguished by **impartiality** and agent-neutrality. Everyone's happiness counts the same. When one maximizes the good, it is the good *impartially* considered. All of these features of this approach to moral evaluation and/or moral decision-making have proven to be somewhat controversial and subsequent controversies have led to changes in the Classical version of the theory<sup>23</sup>.

### Vocabulary

Utilitarianism – утилитаризм;

to discern – различать, распознавать;

general claim – основное требование;

consequentialism – консеквенциализм;

hedonist – гедонист (гедонизм, учение, согласно которому удовольствие является высшим благом и целью жизни);

impartiality – беспристрастность;

**Give the written translation of the text.**

#### Part I.

**Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)** was an English philosopher and political radical. He is primarily known today for his moral philosophy, especially his principle of utilitarianism, which evaluates actions based upon their consequences. The relevant consequences, in particular, are the overall happiness created for everyone affected by the action. Influenced by many enlightenment thinkers, especially empiricists such as John Locke and David Hume, Bentham developed an ethical theory grounded in a largely empiricist account of human nature. He **famously** held a hedonistic account of both motivation and value according to which what is fundamentally valuable and what ultimately motivates us is pleasure and pain. Happiness, according to Bentham, is thus a matter of experiencing pleasure and lack of pain.

Although he never practiced law, Bentham wrote a great deal of philosophy of law, spending most of his life critiquing the existing law and strongly **advocating** legal reform. Throughout his work, he critiques various natural **accounts** of law which **claim**, for example, that liberty, rights, and so on exist independent of government. In this way, Bentham arguably developed an early form of what is now often called “legal positivism”. Beyond such critiques, he ultimately maintained that putting his moral theory into consistent practice would **yield** results in legal theory by providing justification for social, political, and legal institutions.

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<sup>23</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/>

Bentham's influence was minor during his life. But his impact was greater in later years as his ideas were carried on by followers such as John Stuart Mill, **John Austin**, and other consequentialists<sup>24</sup>.

### Vocabulary

famously – отлично, превосходно;  
to advocate – поддерживать, защищать;  
account – основание;  
to claim – требовать, утверждать;  
to yield – приносить, давать;  
John Austin – Джон Остин.

**Read the text and give the summary of it.**

#### Part II.

**John Stuart Mill** (1806-1873) **profoundly** influenced the shape of 19th century British thought and political discourse. His **substantial corpus** of works includes texts in logic, epistemology, economics, social and political philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, religion, and **current affairs**. Among his most well-known and significant are *A System of Logic*, *Principles of Political Economy*, *On Liberty*, *Utilitarianism*, *The Subjection of Women*, *Three Essays on Religion*, and his *Autobiography*. Mill's education at the hands of his **imposing** father, James Mill, **fostered** both intellectual development (Greek at the age of three, Latin at eight) and a **propensity** towards reform. James Mill and Jeremy Bentham led the "Philosophic Radicals", who **advocated** for rationalization of the law and legal institutions, universal **male suffrage**, the use of economic theory in political decision-making, and a politics oriented by human happiness rather than natural rights or conservatism. In his twenties, the younger Mill felt the influence of historicism, French social thought, and Romanticism, in the form of thinkers like Coleridge, **the St. Simonians**, Thomas Carlyle, Goethe, and **Wordsworth**. This led him to begin searching for a new philosophic radicalism that would be more sensitive to the limits on reform imposed by culture and history and would emphasize the **cultivation** of our humanity, including the cultivation of dispositions of feeling and imagination (something he thought had been lacking in his own education).

None of Mill's major writings remain independent of his moral, political, and social **agenda**. Even the most abstract works, such as the *System of Logic* and his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, serve polemical purposes in the fight against the German, or *a priori*, school otherwise called "**intuitionism**". On Mill's view, intuitionism needed to be defeated in the realms

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<sup>24</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/>

of logic, mathematics, and philosophy of mind if its **pernicious** effects in social and political discourse were to be **mitigated**.

In his writings, Mill argues for a number of controversial principles. He defends radical empiricism in logic and mathematics, suggesting that basic principles of logic and mathematics are generalizations from experience rather than known *a priori*. The principle of utility – that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” – was the centerpiece of his ethical philosophy. *On Liberty* puts forward the “harm principle” that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” In *The Subjection of Women*, he compares the legal status of women to the status of slaves and argues for equality in marriage and under the law<sup>25</sup>.

### Vocabulary

John Stuart Mill – Джон Стюарт Милль;  
profoundly – глубоко, серьезно;  
substantial corpus – фундаментальное собрание;  
current affairs – актуальная проблематика;  
subjection – подчинение, порабощение;  
imposing – представительный;  
to foster – благоприятствовать;  
propensity – склонность, стремление;  
to advocate – защищать, пропагандировать;  
male suffrage – избирательное право для мужчин;  
the St. Simonians – секта симониан;  
Wordsworth – Уильям Вордсворт;  
cultivation – самосовершенствование;  
agenda – курс;  
intuitionism – интуитивизм;  
pernicious – губительный;  
to mitigate – уменьшать.

**Read the text, answer the questions and give the summary of it.**

#### 2.4 Marxism.

**Marxism** is a worldview and method of **societal** analysis based on attention to class-relations and societal conflict, on a materialist interpretation of historical development, and on a dialectical view of social transformation. Marxist methodology informs economic and sociopolitical **enquiry** applying to the

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/milljs/>

analysis and critique of the development of capitalism and the role of class struggle in systemic economic change.

In the mid-to-late 19th century, the **intellectual tenets** of Marxism were inspired by two German philosophers: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marxist analyses and methodologies have influenced multiple political ideologies and social movements throughout history. Marxism **encompasses** an economic theory, a sociological theory, a philosophical method, and a revolutionary view of social change.

There is no single definitive Marxist theory. Marxist analysis has been applied to diverse subjects and has been **misconceived** and modified during the course of its development, resulting in numerous and sometimes contradictory theories that fall under the rubric of Marxism or Marxian analysis. Marxism builds on a materialist understanding of societal development, taking as its starting point the necessary economic activities required by human society to provide for its material needs. The form of economic organization or mode of production is understood to be the basis from which the majority of other social phenomena – including social relations, political and legal systems, morality and ideology – arise (or at the least by which they are directly influenced). These social relations form the superstructure, for which the economic system forms the base. As the forces of production (most notably technology) improve, existing forms of social organization become **inefficient** and **stifle** further progress. These inefficiencies manifest themselves as social contradictions in the form of class struggle.

According to Marxist analysis, class conflict within capitalism arises due to intensifying contradictions between highly productive mechanized and socialized production performed by the proletariat, and private ownership and private appropriation of the **surplus product** in the form of surplus value (profit) by a small minority of private owners called the bourgeoisie. As the contradiction becomes apparent to the proletariat, **social unrest** between the two antagonistic classes intensifies, culminating in a social revolution. The eventual long-term outcome of this revolution would be the establishment of socialism – a socioeconomic system based on cooperative ownership of the means of production, distribution based on one's contribution, and production organized directly for use. Karl Marx **hypothesized** that, as the productive forces and technology continued to advance, socialism would eventually give way to a communist stage of social development. Communism would be a classless, **stateless**, humane society erected on **common ownership** and the principle of “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxism>

## Vocabulary

societal – социальный, общественный;  
enquiry – изучение, исследование;  
intellectual tenets – интеллектуальные убеждения;  
to encompass – охватывать;  
to misconceive – неправильно истолковывать;  
inefficient – неэффективный;  
to stifle – сдерживать;  
surplus product – избыточный, излишний продукт;  
social unrest – социальная напряженность;  
to hypothesize – делать предположение;  
stateless – лишенный государственности;  
common ownership – общественная собственность.

### Questions:

1. What is Marxism based on?
2. What does Marxist methodology inform?
3. Who inspired the intellectual tenets of Marxism?
4. What has Marxist methodology influenced throughout history?
5. What does Marxism encompass?
6. What understanding does Marxism build on?
7. What is the basis from which the majority of social phenomena arise?
8. What happens to the existing forms of social organization as the forces of production improve?
9. Why does class conflict within capitalism arise according to Marxist analysis?
10. What is the outcome of social unrest?
11. What would be the eventual long-term outcome of the social revolution?
12. What does socialism mean according to Marxist system?
13. What will happen to socialism according to K. Marx, when the productive forces and technology continue to advance?
14. What does communism represent on its own?

**Give the written translation of the text.**

## 2.5 Existentialism.

### **Part I.**

Existentialism is a **catch-all** term for those philosophers who consider the nature of the **human condition** as a key philosophical problem and who share the view that this problem is best addressed through ontology. Those philosophers considered existentialists are mostly from the continent of Europe, and date from the 19th and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Outside philosophy, the existentialist movement is probably the most well-known philosophical movement, and at least two of its

members are among the most famous philosophical personalities and widely read philosophical authors. It has certainly had **considerable** influence outside philosophy, for example on psychological theory and on the arts. Within philosophy, though, it is safe to say that this loose movement considered as a whole has not had a great impact, although individuals or ideas **counted** within it remain important. Moreover, most of the philosophers **conventionally** grouped under this heading either never used, or actively **disavowed**, the term “existentialist”. Even Sartre himself once said: “Existentialism? I don’t know what that is”. So, there is a case to be made that the term – insofar as it leads us to ignore what is distinctive about philosophical positions and to **conflate** together significantly different ideas – does more harm than good<sup>27</sup>.

### Vocabulary

catch-all – всеобъемлющий;  
human condition – человеческая природа;  
considerable – существенный;  
to count – считать;  
conventionally – традиционно, обычно;  
to disavow – отрицать, отрекаться;  
to conflate – соединять.

### Read the text and give the summary of it.

#### Part II.

**Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855)** is an **outsider** in the history of philosophy. His peculiar authorship comprises a **baffling array** of different narrative points of view and disciplinary subject matter, including aesthetic novels, works of psychology and Christian dogmatics, satirical prefaces, philosophical “scraps” and “postscripts”, literary reviews, **edifying discourses**, Christian polemics, and retrospective self-interpretations. His arsenal of rhetoric includes irony, satire, parody, humor, polemic and a dialectical method of “indirect communication” – all designed to deepen the reader’s subjective passionate engagement with ultimate existential issues. Like his **role models** Socrates and Christ, Kierkegaard takes how one lives one’s life to be the prime criterion of being in the truth<sup>28</sup>.

Kierkegaard was generally considered the “father” of existentialism. He has been associated with a notion of truth as subjective (or personal). This idea of “subjective truth” will have serious consequences to the philosophical understanding of man. Traditionally defined as *animale rationale* (the rational animal) by Aristotle and for a long time **worshiped** as such by generations of philosophical minds, Kierkegaard comes now to redefine the human as the

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/>

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/kierkega/>

“**passionate** animal”. What counts in man is the intensity of his emotions and his willingness to believe (*contra* the once all powerful reason) in that which cannot be understood. The opening up by Kierkegaard of this *terra incognita* of man’s inner life will come to play a major role for later existentialists (most importantly for Nietzsche) and will bring to light the failings and the weaknesses of an **over-optimistic** (because modelled after the Natural sciences) model of philosophy which was taught to *talk* a lot concerning the “truth” of the human, when all it understood about the human was a **mutilated** version<sup>29</sup>.

### Vocabulary

outsider – неспециалист, любитель;  
baffling array – загадочное множество;  
edifying discourses – назидательные речи;  
role model – пример, образец для подражания;  
to worship – почитать, поклоняться;  
passionate – подверженный страстям;  
over-optimistic – чересчур оптимистичный;  
mutilated – искаженный.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

#### Part III.

**Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)** was a German philosopher, essayist, and cultural critic. His writings on truth, morality, language, aesthetics, cultural theory, history, nihilism, power, consciousness, and the meaning of existence have **exerted** an enormous influence on Western philosophy and intellectual history.

Nietzsche spoke of “the death of God,” and foresaw the **dissolution** of traditional religion and metaphysics. Some interpreters of Nietzsche believe he embraced nihilism, rejected philosophical reasoning, and promoted a literary exploration of the **human condition**, while not being concerned with gaining truth and knowledge in the traditional sense of those terms. However, other interpreters of Nietzsche say that in attempting to **counteract** the predicted rise of nihilism, he was engaged in a positive program to **reaffirm** life, and so he called for a radical, naturalistic rethinking of the nature of human existence, knowledge, and morality. On either interpretation, it is agreed that he suggested a plan for “becoming what one is” through the **cultivation** of instincts and various cognitive faculties, a plan that requires constant struggle with one’s psychological and intellectual **inheritances**.

Nietzsche claimed the **exemplary** human being must craft his/her own identity through self-realization and do so without relying on anything

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<sup>29</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/#SH2a>

**transcending** that life – such as God or a soul. This way of living should be affirmed even were one to adopt, most problematically, a radical vision of eternity, one suggesting the “eternal **recurrence**” of all events. According to some commentators, Nietzsche advanced a cosmological theory of “will to power.” But others interpret him as not being **overly** concerned with working out a general cosmology. Questions regarding the **coherence** of Nietzsche’s views – questions such as whether these views could all be taken together without contradiction, whether readers should **discredit** any particular view if proven incoherent or incompatible with others, and the like – continue to draw the attention of contemporary intellectual historians and philosophers<sup>30</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to exert – влиять;

dissolution – разделение;

human condition – человеческая природа;

to counteract – противодействовать;

to reaffirm – вновь подтверждать;

cultivation – работа над собой, самосовершенствование;

inheritance – наследие;

exemplary – типичный;

to transcend – выходить за пределы;

recurrence – повторение;

overly – чрезмерно;

coherence – согласованность;

to discredit – подвергать сомнению.

### Questions:

1. What writings of F. Nietzsche exerted on enormous influence on Western philosophy?
2. What opinions do the interpreters of Nietzsche share about his philosophy?
3. What plan did Nietzsche suggest?
4. What was one of his most important claims?
5. What theory did Nietzsche advance?

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/nietzsch/>



**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

## **2.6 Positivism.**

**Positivism** is a philosophy of science based on the view that information derived from logical and mathematical treatments and reports of sensory experience is the exclusive source of all authoritative knowledge, and that there is **valid** knowledge (truth) only in scientific knowledge. **Verified** data received from the senses are known as empirical evidence. This view holds that society, like the physical world, operates according to general laws. Introspective and intuitive knowledge is rejected. Although the positivist approach has been a **recurrent** theme in the history of Western thought, the modern sense of the approach was developed by the philosopher and founding sociologist **Auguste Comte** in the early 19th century. Comte argued that, much as the physical world operates according to gravity and other absolute laws, so also does society.

The English noun *positivism* was re-imported in the 19th century from the French word *positivisme*, derived from *positif* in its philosophical sense of “**imposed** on the mind by experience”. The corresponding adjective (lat. *positivus* “**arbitrarily** imposed”, from *pono* “put in place”) has been used in similar sense to discuss law (positive law compared to natural law) since the time of Chaucer.

Positivism is part of a more general ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, notably laid out by Plato and later reformulated as a quarrel between the sciences and the humanities, Plato **elaborates** a critique of poetry from the point of view of philosophy in his dialogues *Phaedrus*, *Symposium* and others.

The consideration that laws in physics may not be absolute but relative, and, if so, this might be truer of social sciences, was stated, in different terms, by G. B. Vico in 1725. Vico, in contrast to the positivist movement, **asserted** the superiority of the science of the human mind (the humanities, in other words), on the grounds that natural sciences tell us nothing about the inward aspects of things.

Positivism states that all authentic knowledge allows **verification** and that all authentic knowledge assumes that the only valid knowledge is scientific. Enlightenment thinkers such as **Henri de Saint-Simon** (1760-1825), **Pierre-Simon Laplace** (1749-1827) and Auguste Comte (1798-1859) believed the scientific method, the circular dependence of theory and observation, must replace metaphysics in the history of thought. **Émile Durkheim** (1858-1917) reformulated sociological positivism as a foundation of social research.

In the early 20th century, logical positivism – a **descendant** of Comte's basic thesis but an independent movement – sprang up in Vienna and grew to become one of the dominant schools in Anglo-American philosophy and the analytic tradition. Logical positivists (or “neopositivists”) reject metaphysical speculation and attempted to reduce statements and propositions to pure logic.

Strong critiques of this approach by philosophers such as Karl Popper, **Willard Van Orman Quine** and **Thomas Kuhn** have been highly influential, and led to the development of postpositivism<sup>31</sup>.

### Vocabulary

valid – действительный;  
verified – проверенный;  
recurrent – повторяющийся;  
Auguste Comte – Огюст Конт;  
to impose – накладывать;  
arbitrarily – произвольно;  
to elaborate – тщательно разрабатывать;  
to assert – утверждать;  
verification – подтверждение;  
Henri de Saint-Simon – Анри де Сен-Симон;  
Pierre-Simon Laplace – Пьер Симон Лаплас;  
Émile Durkheim – Эмиль Дюркгейм;  
descendant – потомок, преемник;  
Willard Van Orman Quine – Уиллард Ван Орман Куайн;  
Thomas Kuhn – Томас Кун.

### Questions:

1. What is positivism as a philosophical movement?
2. What knowledge is considered valid in positivism?
3. What is empirical evidence according to this view?
4. What view does positivism hold about society?
5. What kind of knowledge is rejected?
6. Who developed the positivist approach in the 19<sup>th</sup> century?
7. What does the English noun “positivism” mean?
8. What are the historical roots of positivism?
9. What consideration did G. B. Vico state according to the laws in physics?
10. What sciences did G. B. Vico consider superior?
11. What did positivism state about authentic knowledge?
12. What did Enlightenment thinkers say about the scientific method?
13. When did logical positivism appear?
14. What was the main point of logical positivism?

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<sup>31</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positivism>

**Read the text, answer the questions and give a short summary of it.**

## **2.7 Pragmatism.**

Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an ideology or proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that unpractical ideas are to be rejected. Pragmatism originated in the United States during the latter quarter of the 19th century. It also has significantly influenced non-philosophers – notably in the fields of law, education, politics, sociology, psychology, and literary criticism.

The term “pragmatism” was first used in print to designate a philosophical outlook about a century ago when William James (1842-1910) pressed the word into service during an 1898 address entitled “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results”, delivered at the University of California (Berkeley). James scrupulously swore, however, that the term had been coined almost three decades earlier by his compatriot and friend **C. S. Peirce** (1839-1914). (Peirce, eager to distinguish his doctrines from the views **promulgated** by James, later relabeled his own position “pragmaticism” – a name, he said, “ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers”). The third major figure in the classical pragmatist pantheon is **John Dewey** (1859-1952), whose wide-ranging writings had considerable impact on American intellectual life for a half-century. After Dewey, however, pragmatism lost much of its **momentum**.

There has been a recent resurgence of interest in pragmatism, with several high-profile philosophers exploring and selectively appropriating themes and ideas embedded in the rich tradition of Peirce, James, and Dewey. While the best-known and most controversial of these so-called “neo-pragmatists” is **Richard Rorty**, the following contemporary philosophers are often considered to be pragmatists: **Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Jürgen Habermas, Susan Haack, Robert Brandom, and Cornel West**<sup>32</sup>.

**C.S. Peirce (1839-1914)** was a scientist and philosopher best known as the earliest proponent of pragmatism. An influential and **polymathic** thinker, Peirce is among the greatest of American minds. His thought was a **seminal** influence on William James, his lifelong friend, and John Dewey, his one time student. James and Dewey went on to popularize pragmatism thereby achieving what Peirce’s inability to gain lasting academic employment prevented him from doing. A lifelong practitioner of science, Peirce applied scientific principles to philosophy but his understanding and admiration of Kant also colored his work. Peirce was analytic and scientific, devoted to logical and scientific **rigor**, and an **architectonic** philosopher in the **mold** of Kant or Aristotle. His best-known theories, pragmatism and the account of inquiry, are both scientific and experimental but form part of a

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<sup>32</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/pragmati/>

broad architectonic scheme. Long considered an eccentric figure whose contribution to pragmatism was to provide its name and whose importance was as an influence upon James and Dewey, Peirce's significance in his own right is now largely accepted<sup>33</sup>.

### Vocabulary

C. S. Peirce – Чарльз Сандерс Пирс;  
to promulgate – провозглашать;  
John Dewey – Джон Дьюи;  
momentum – движущая сила, импульс;  
Richard Rorty – Ричард Рорти;  
Hilary Putnam – Хилари Патнэм;  
Nicholas Rescher – Николас Решер;  
Susan Haack – Сьюзен Хаак;  
Robert Brandom – Роберт Брэндом;  
Cornel West – Корнел Уэст;  
polymathic – эрудированный, всесторонне образованный;  
seminal – прототворный;  
rigor – строгость, суровость;  
architectonic – конструктивный;  
mold – характер.

### Questions:

1. What is pragmatism as a philosophical movement?
2. When and where did pragmatism originate?
3. What fields has pragmatism influenced?
4. When was the term “pragmatism” first used?
5. How did C. S. Peirce label his own position?
6. Who was the third major figure in the classical pragmatism pantheon?
7. Who represents the movement of the so-called “neo-pragmatism”?
8. What were the characteristic features of Peirce's philosophy?

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<sup>33</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/PeirceBi/>

**Give the written translation of the text.**

## **2.8 British Idealism.**

### **Part I.**

A **species** of absolute idealism, British idealism was a philosophical movement that was influential in Britain from the mid-19th century to the early 20th century. The leading figures in the movement were **T. H. Green** (1836–1882), **F. H. Bradley** (1846–1924), and **Bernard Bosanquet** (1848–1923). They were succeeded by the second generation of **J. M. E. McTaggart** (1866–1925), H. H. Joachim (1868–1938), and J. H. Muirhead (1855–1940). The last major figure in the tradition was G. R. G. Mure (1893–1979). The doctrines of early British idealism so provoked the young Cambridge philosophers **G. E. Moore** and Bertrand Russell that they began a new philosophical tradition, analytic philosophy.

Though much more **variegated** than some commentaries would seem to suggest, British idealism was generally marked by several broad tendencies: a belief in an Absolute (a single **all-encompassing** reality that in some sense formed a coherent and all-inclusive system); the **assignment** of a high place to reason as both the **faculty** by which the Absolute's structure is grasped and as that structure itself; and a fundamental unwillingness to accept a **dichotomy** between thought and object, reality consisting of thought-and-object together in a strongly coherent unity.

British idealism largely developed from the German idealist movement – particularly such philosophers as Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel, who were characterized by Green, among others, as the salvation of British philosophy after the **alleged demise** of empiricism. The movement was certainly a reaction against the thinking of John Locke, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, **Henry Sidgwick**, and other empiricists and utilitarians. Some of those involved would have denied any specific influence, particularly in respect of Hegel. Nevertheless, **James Hutchison Stirling's** book *The Secret of Hegel* is believed to have won significant converts in Britain<sup>34</sup>.

### **Vocabulary**

species – разновидность;

T. H. Green – Томас Хилл Грин;

F. H. Bradley – Фрэнсис Герберт Брэдли;

Bernard Bosanquet – Бернард Бозанкет;

J. M. E. McTaggart – Джон Эллис Мак-Таггарт;

G. E. Moore – Джордж Эдвард Мур;

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<sup>34</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British\\_idealism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_idealism)

variegated – разнообразный;  
all-encompassing – всеобъемлющий;  
assignment – назначение;  
faculty – зд. способность;  
dichotomy – дихотомия, раздвоение, разделение на две части;  
alleged demise – предполагаемый закат, крах;  
Henry Sidgwick – Генри Сиджвик;  
James Hutchison Stirling – Джеймс Хатчисон Стирлинг.

**Read the text and give the summary of it.**

### **Part II.**

British idealism was influenced by Hegel at least in broad **outline**, and undeniably adopted some of Hegel's terminology and doctrines. Examples include not only the aforementioned Absolute, but also a doctrine of internal relations, a **coherence** theory of truth, and a concept of a **concrete universal**. Some commentators have also pointed to a sort of dialectical structure in e.g. some of the writings of Bradley. But few of the British idealists adopted Hegel's philosophy wholesale, and his most significant writings on logic seem to have found no **purchase** whatsoever in their thought. On the other hand, Mure was “a deep student of Hegel” who “was committed to Hegel’s “central ontological thesis” all his life”.

On its political side, the British idealists were largely concerned to **refute** what they regarded as a **brittle** and “atomistic” form of individualism, as **espoused** by e.g. Herbert Spencer. In their view, humans are fundamentally social beings in a manner and to a degree not adequately recognized by Spencer and his followers. The British Idealists did not, however, **reify** the State in the manner that Hegel apparently did; Green in particular spoke of the individual as the sole **locus** of value and **contended** that the State's existence was justified only insofar as it contributed to the realization of value in the lives of individual persons.

The hold of British idealism in the United Kingdom weakened when Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, who were educated in the British idealist tradition, turned against it. Moore in particular delivered what quickly came to be accepted as conclusive arguments against Idealism. In the late 1950s G. R. G. Mure, in his *Retreat From Truth* (Oxford 1958), criticized Russell, Wittgenstein, and aspects of analytic philosophy from an idealist point of view.

British idealism's influence in the United States was somewhat limited. The early thought of **Josiah Royce** had something of a neo-Hegelian **cast**, as did that of a handful of his less famous contemporaries. The American rationalist Brand Blanshard was so strongly influenced by Bradley, Bosanquet, and Green (and other

British philosophers) that he could almost be classified as a British philosopher himself. Even this limited influence, though, did not last out the 20th century<sup>35</sup>.

### Vocabulary

outline – основные принципы;  
coherence – согласованная;  
concrete universal – реальное универсальное;  
purchase – точка опоры;  
to refute – опровергать;  
brittle – сдержанный, нестабильный;  
to espouse – поддерживать;  
to reify – овеществлять, материализовать;  
locus – месторасположение;  
to contend – бороться, сражаться, настаивать;  
Josiah Royce – Джозия Ройс;  
cast – оттенок.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### 2.9 Transcendentalism.

#### Part I.

Transcendentalism is a religious and philosophical movement that was developed during the late 1820s and 1830s in the Eastern region of the United States as a protest against the general state of **spirituality** and, in particular, the state of intellectualism at Harvard University and the doctrine of the **Unitarian church** taught at Harvard **Divinity School**. Among the transcendentalists' core beliefs was the **inherent** goodness of both people and nature. Transcendentalists believe that society and its institutions – particularly organized religion and political parties – **ultimately corrupt** the purity of the individual. They have faith that people are at their best when truly “**self-reliant**” and independent. It is only from such real individuals that true community could be formed.

Transcendentalism first arose among New England **congregationalists**, who differed from orthodox Calvinism on two issues. They rejected **predestination**, and they emphasized the unity instead of the trinity of God. Following the skepticism of David Hume, the transcendentalists took the **stance** that empirical proofs of religion were not possible.

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<sup>35</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British\\_idealism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_idealism)

The publication of **Ralph Waldo Emerson's** 1836 essay *Nature* is usually considered the watershed moment at which transcendentalism became a major cultural movement. Emerson wrote in his 1837 speech “The American Scholar”: “We will walk on our own feet; we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own minds... A nation of men will for the first time exist, because each believes himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires all men”. Emerson closed the essay by calling for a revolution in human consciousness to **emerge** from the brand new idealist philosophy:

*So shall we come to look at the world with new eyes. It shall answer the endless inquiry of the intellect, – What is truth? and of the affections, – What is good? by **yielding** itself passive to the educated Will. ...Build, therefore, your own world. As fast as you conform your life to the pure idea in your mind, that will unfold its great proportions. A correspondent revolution in things will attend the **influx** of the spirit<sup>36</sup>.*

### Vocabulary

spirituality – духовность;

Unitarian church – унитарная церковь;

Divinity School – школа богословия;

inherent – врожденный;

ultimately – безусловно, окончательно;

to corrupt – портить;

self-reliant – самодостаточный;

congregationalist – конгрегационалист, радикальная ветвь английского кальвинизма, утверждавшая автономию каждой поместной общины;

predestination – предопределение, судьба;

stance – положение, позиция;

Ralph Waldo Emerson – Ральф Уолдо Эмерсон;

to emerge – появляться;

to yield – сдаваться;

influx – приток, прилив.

### Questions:

1. What is transcendentalism as a philosophical movement?
2. When and where was transcendentalism developed?
3. What were the transcendentalists' core beliefs?
4. What did transcendentalism say about society and its institutions?
5. What is the basis for the true community?
6. When did transcendentalism first arise?

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<sup>36</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendentalism>



7. What is considered the watershed moment at which transcendentalism became a major cultural movement?

**Give the written translation of the text.**

### **Part II.**

In the same year, transcendentalism became a coherent movement with the founding of the Transcendental Club in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on September 8, 1836, by prominent New England intellectuals including **George Putnam** (1807–1878; the Unitarian minister in Roxbury), **Ralph Waldo Emerson**, and **Frederic Henry Hedge**. From 1840, the group published frequently in their journal *The Dial*, along with other venues.

By the late 1840s, Emerson believed the movement was dying out, and even more so after the death of **Margaret Fuller** in 1850. There was, however, a second wave of transcendentalists, including Moncure Conway, Octavius Brooks Frothingham, Samuel Longfellow and Franklin Benjamin Sanborn. Notably, the **transgression** of the spirit, most often evoked by the poet's prosaic voice, is said to **endow** in the reader a sense of **purposefulness**. This is the underlying theme in the majority of transcendentalist essays and papers – all of which are centered on subjects which assert a love for individual expression.

Transcendentalism was rooted in English and German Romanticism, the Biblical criticism of Herder and Schleiermacher, the skepticism of Hume, and the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant (and of German Idealism more generally), interpreting Kant's a priori categories as a priori knowledge. The transcendentalists were largely unacquainted with German philosophy in the original, and relied primarily on the writings of Thomas Carlyle, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, **Victor Cousin**, **Germaine de Staël**, and other English and French commentators for their knowledge of it. In contrast, they were intimately familiar with the English Romantics, and the transcendental movement may be partially described as a slightly later American **outgrowth** of Romanticism<sup>37</sup>.

### **Vocabulary**

George Putnam – Джордж Патнэм;  
Ralph Waldo Emerson – Ральф Уолдо Эмерсон;  
Frederic Henry Hedge – Фредерик Генри Хедж;  
Margaret Fuller – Маргарет Фуллер;  
transgression – прегрешения;  
to endow – наделять, обеспечивать;  
purposefulness – целеустремленность;

<sup>37</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendentalism>

Victor Cousin – Виктор Кузен;  
Germaine de Staël – Жермен де Сталь;  
outgrowth – естественное развитие, разрастание.

Саратовский государственный университет имени Н. Г. Чернышевского

## Unit III. PHILOSOPHY OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY.

### 3.1 Introduction to the 20<sup>th</sup> century Philosophy.

20th-century philosophy saw the development of a number of new philosophical schools including logical positivism, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, existentialism and poststructuralism. In terms of the eras of philosophy, it is usually labelled as *contemporary philosophy* (**succeeding** modern philosophy which runs roughly from the time of Descartes until the 20th-century).

As with other academic disciplines, philosophy increasingly became professionalized in the 20th century, and a **split** emerged between philosophers who considered themselves to be part of either the “analytic” or “continental” traditions. However, there have been disputes regarding both the terminology and the reasons behind the divide, as well as philosophers who see themselves as bridging the divide. In addition, philosophy in the 20th century became increasingly technical and harder to read by the **layman**.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

#### **Part I.**

**Analytic philosophy** is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century. In the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Scandinavia, Australia, and New Zealand, the overwhelming majority of university philosophy departments identify themselves as “analytic” departments.

**Epistemology** in the Anglo-American tradition was radically shaken up by the publication of **Edmund Gettier's** 1963 paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” which provided **counter-examples** to the traditional formulation of knowledge going back to Plato. A huge number of responses to the Gettier problem were formulated, generally falling into internalist and externalist camps, the latter including work by philosophers like Alvin Goldman, Fred Dretske, David Malet Armstrong and Alvin Plantinga.

**Logical positivism** (also known as logical empiricism, scientific philosophy, and neo-positivism) is a philosophy that combines empiricism – the idea that **observational** evidence is **indispensable** for knowledge – with a version of rationalism incorporating mathematical and logico-linguistic **constructs** and deductions of epistemology.

**Neopragmatism**, sometimes called linguistic pragmatism is a recent philosophical term for philosophy that reintroduces many concepts from pragmatism. The Blackwell dictionary of Western philosophy (2004) defines “Neo-pragmatism” as follows: “A postmodern version of pragmatism developed by the American philosopher Richard Rorty and **drawing inspiration** from authors such as John Dewey, Martin Heidegger, Wilfrid Sellars, Quine, and Jacques

Derrida. It **repudiates** the notion of universal truth, epistemological foundationalism, representationalism, and the notion of **epistemic objectivity**. It is a **nominalist** approach that denies that natural kinds and linguistic entities have substantive ontological **implications**".

*Ordinary language philosophy* is a philosophical school that approaches traditional philosophical problems as rooted in misunderstandings which philosophers develop by **distorting** or forgetting what words actually mean in everyday use. This approach typically involves **eschewing** philosophical "theories" in favour of close attention to the details of the use of everyday, "ordinary" language. Sometimes called "Oxford philosophy", it is generally associated with the work of a number of mid-century Oxford professors: mainly J.L. Austin, but also Gilbert Ryle, H.L.A. Hart, and Peter Strawson. The later Ludwig Wittgenstein is ordinary language philosophy's most celebrated **proponent** outside the Oxford circle. Second generation figures include Stanley Cavell and John Searle<sup>38</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to succeed – следовать;

split – разделение;

layman – обыватель, неспециалист;

Edmund Gettier – Эдмонд Геттье;

counter-example – противоречащий пример;

observational – эмпирический, наблюдаемый;

indispensable – необходимый, обязательный;

constructs – образы;

to draw inspiration – черпать вдохновение;

to repudiate – отречься, не принимать;

epistemic objectivity – гносеологическая объективность;

nominalist – номиналистический;

implications – последствия;

Ordinary language philosophy – Философия обыденного языка;

to distort – исказить;

to eschew – воздерживаться, отказываться;

proponent – сторонник, защитник.

### Questions:

1. What movements does analytic philosophy include?
2. When and where was analytic philosophy developed?

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<sup>38</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20th-century\\_philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20th-century_philosophy)

3. What development did epistemology gain in the Anglo-American tradition?
4. What is the meaning of logical positivism as a philosophical movement?
5. What does neopragmatism mean? What are the main points of this movement?
6. What does the philosophical school named ordinary language philosophy mean?
7. What works is this school usually associated with?

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

## **Part II.**

**Continental philosophy**, in contemporary usage, refers to a set of traditions of 19th and 20th century philosophy from mainland Europe. This sense of the term originated among English-speaking philosophers in the second half of the 20th century, who used it to refer to a range of thinkers and traditions outside the analytic movement. It includes the following movements: German idealism, phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism, French feminism, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and related branches of Western Marxism, and psychoanalytic theory.

**Existentialism** is generally considered to be the philosophical and cultural movement which holds that the starting point of philosophical thinking must be the individual and the experiences of the individual, that moral thinking and scientific thinking together do not **suffice** to understand human existence, and, therefore, that a further set of categories, governed by the norm of **authenticity**, is necessary to understand human existence. *Authenticity*, in the context of existentialism, is the degree to which one is true to one's own personality, spirit, or character.

**Marxism**, in terms of 20th-century philosophy, generally describes the writings of Marxist theoreticians, mainly based in Western and Central Europe; this stands in contrast with the Marxist philosophy in the Soviet Union. While **György Lukács's** *History and Class Consciousness* and **Karl Korsch's** *Marxism and Philosophy*, first published in 1923, are often seen as the works which **inaugurated** this current, the phrase itself was **coined** much later by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

**Phenomenology** is the study of the structure of experience. It is a broad philosophical movement founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl. Phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. This phenomenological ontology can be clearly differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another.

**Post-structuralism** is a label formulated by American academics to denote the **heterogeneous** works of a series of French intellectuals who came to international **prominence** in the 1960s and '70s. The label primarily encompasses

the intellectual developments of prominent mid-20th-century French and continental philosophers and theorists.

**Structuralism** is a theoretical paradigm that emphasizes that elements of culture must be understood in terms of their relationship to a larger, **overarching** system or “structure”. Alternately, as summarized by philosopher Simon Blackburn, structuralism is “the belief that phenomena of human life are not **intelligible** except through their interrelations. These relations constitute a structure, and behind local variations in the surface phenomena there are constant laws of abstract culture”<sup>39</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to suffice – удовлетворять, быть достаточным;

authenticity – подлинность, достоверность;

György Lukács – Дьёрдь Лукач;

Karl Korsch – Карл Корш;

to inaugurate – открывать, начинать;

to coin – придумывать;

heterogeneous – разнородный;

prominence – известность;

overarching – всеобъемлющий;

intelligible – интеллигибельный, умопостигаемый.

### Questions:

1. What movements does continental philosophy include?
2. Where was this sense of the term originated?
3. What position does existentialism hold?
4. What is the meaning of *authenticity* in the context of existentialism?
5. What does Marxism generally describe?
6. What studies phenomenology?
7. Who was the founder of phenomenology?
8. What is phenomenology primarily concerned with?
9. What is post-structuralism referred to?
10. What are the main points of structuralism?
11. How does S. Blackburn define structuralism?

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<sup>39</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20th-century\\_philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20th-century_philosophy)

**Read the text and give the summary of it.**

### **3.2 Analytic Philosophy.**

#### **Part I.**

The school of analytic philosophy has dominated academic philosophy in various regions, most notably Great Britain and the United States, since the early 20th century. It originated around the turn of the 20th century as G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell broke away from what was then the dominant school in the British universities, Absolute Idealism. Many would also include **Gottlob Frege** as a founder of analytic philosophy in the late 19th century. When Moore and Russell articulated their alternative to Idealism, they used a linguistic idiom, frequently basing their arguments on the “meanings” of terms and **propositions**. Additionally, Russell believed that the grammar of natural language often is philosophically **misleading**, and that the way to **dispel** the illusion is to re-express propositions in the ideal formal language of symbolic logic, thereby **revealing** their true logical form. Because of this emphasis on language, analytic philosophy was widely, though perhaps mistakenly, taken to involve a turn toward language as the **subject matter** of philosophy, and it was taken to involve an accompanying methodological turn toward linguistic analysis. Thus, on the traditional view, analytic philosophy was born in this *linguistic turn*. The linguistic conception of philosophy was rightly seen as **novel** in the history of philosophy. For this reason analytic philosophy is **reputed** to have originated in a philosophical revolution on the grand scale – not merely in a **revolt** against British Idealism, but against traditional philosophy on the whole.

Analytic philosophy underwent several internal micro-revolutions that divide its history into five phases. The first phase runs approximately from 1900 to 1910. It is characterized by the **quasi-Platonic** form of realism initially **endorsed** by Moore and Russell as an alternative to Idealism. Their realism was expressed and defended in the idiom of “propositions” and “meanings,” so it was taken to involve a turn toward language. But its other significant feature is its turn away from the method of doing philosophy by proposing grand systems or broad syntheses and its turn toward the method of offering narrowly focused discussions that **probe** a specific, isolated issue with **precision** and attention to detail. By 1910, both Moore and Russell had **abandoned** their propositional realism – Moore in favor of a realistic philosophy of *common sense*, Russell in favor of a view he developed with Ludwig Wittgenstein called *logical atomism*. The turn to logical atomism and to *ideal-language analysis* characterizes the second phase of analytic philosophy, approximately 1910-1930. The third phase, approximately 1930-1945, is characterized by the rise of *logical positivism*, a view developed by the members of the Vienna Circle and popularized by the British philosopher A. J. Ayer. The fourth phase, approximately 1945-1965, is characterized by the turn to *ordinary-language analysis*, developed in various ways by the Cambridge philosophers

Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Wisdom, and the Oxford philosophers Gilbert Ryle, John Austin, Peter Strawson, and Paul Grice<sup>40</sup>.

## Vocabulary

Gottlob Frege – Готлоб Фреге;  
proposition – предположение, утверждение;  
misleading – вводящий в заблуждение;  
to dispel – разгонять, развеять;  
to reveal – открывать, обнаруживать;  
subject matter – предмет изучения;  
novel – что-то новое;  
to reputed – полагать, отзываться, считать;  
revolt – протест;  
quasi-Platonic – якобы относящийся к Платону;  
to endorse – поддерживать;  
to probe – исследовать, обследовать;  
precision – точность, четкость;  
to abandon – отказываться.

**Give the written translation of the text.**

### Part II.

During the 1960s, criticism from within and without caused the analytic movement to **abandon** its linguistic form. Linguistic philosophy gave way to the philosophy of language, the philosophy of language gave way to metaphysics, and this gave way to a variety of philosophical sub-disciplines. Thus the fifth phase, beginning in the mid 1960s and continuing beyond the end of the 20th century, is characterized by *eclecticism* or pluralism. This post-linguistic analytic philosophy cannot be defined in terms of a common set of philosophical views or interests, but it can be **loosely** characterized in terms of its style, which tends to emphasize **precision** and **thoroughness** about a narrow topic and to **deemphasize** the imprecise or **cavalier** discussion of broad topics.

Even in its earlier phases, analytic philosophy was difficult to define in terms of its **intrinsic** features or fundamental philosophical **commitments**. Consequently, it has always relied on contrasts with other approaches to philosophy – especially approaches to which it found itself fundamentally opposed – to help clarify its own nature. Initially, it was opposed to British Idealism, and then to “traditional philosophy” at large. Later, it found itself opposed both to classical Phenomenology (for example, Husserl) and its **offspring**, such as

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/analytic/>



Existentialism (Sartre, Camus, and so forth) and also “Continental” or “Postmodern” philosophy (Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida). Though classical Pragmatism bears some similarity to early analytic philosophy, especially in the work of C. S. Peirce and C. I. Lewis, the pragmatists are usually understood as **constituting** a separate tradition or school<sup>41</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to abandon – отказываться.

eclecticism- эклектизм, эклектицизм;

loosely – в общих чертах;

precision – точность, четкость;

thoroughness – основательность;

to deemphasize – ослаблять, преуменьшать значение;

cavalier – легкомысленный;

intrinsic – подлинный, истинный;

commitments – взгляды;

offspring – потомок, детище;

to constitute – составлять.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### 3.3 Continental Philosophy.

#### Part I.

The term “continental philosophy”, like “analytic philosophy”, lacks clear definition and may mark merely a **family resemblance** across **disparate** philosophical views. **Simon Glendinning** has suggested that the term was originally more **pejorative** than descriptive, functioning as a label for types of western philosophy rejected or disliked by analytic philosophers. **Babette Babich** emphasizes the political basis of the distinction, still an issue when it comes to appointments and book contracts. Nonetheless, Michael E. Rosen has ventured to identify common themes that typically characterize continental philosophy.

First, continental philosophers generally reject **scientism**, the view that the natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding phenomena. This contrasts with many analytic philosophers who consider their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences. Continental philosophers often argue that science depends upon a “pre-theoretical substrate of experience” (a version of Kantian conditions of possible experience or

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<sup>41</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/analytic/>

the phenomenological “**lifeworld**”) and that scientific methods are inadequate to fully understand such conditions of **intelligibility**.

Second, continental philosophy usually considers these conditions of possible experience as **variable**: determined at least partly by factors such as context, space and time, language, culture, or history. Thus continental philosophy tends toward historicism. Where analytic philosophy tends to treat philosophy in terms of **discrete** problems, capable of being analyzed apart from their historical origins (much as scientists consider the history of science inessential to scientific inquiry), continental philosophy typically suggests that “philosophical argument cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its **historical emergence**”.

Third, continental philosophy typically holds that **human agency** can change these conditions of possible experience: “if human experience is a **contingent** creation, then it can be recreated in other ways”. Thus continental philosophers tend to take a strong interest in the unity of theory and practice, and often see their philosophical inquiries as closely related to personal, moral, or political transformation. This tendency is very clear in the Marxist tradition, but is also central in existentialism and post-structuralism.

A final characteristic trait of continental philosophy is an emphasis on metaphilosophy. In the wake of the development and success of the natural sciences, continental philosophers have often sought to redefine the method and nature of philosophy. In some cases (such as German idealism or phenomenology), this manifests as a renovation of the traditional view that philosophy is the first, foundational, *a priori* science. In other cases (such as hermeneutics, critical theory, or structuralism), it is held that philosophy investigates a **domain** that is **irreducibly** cultural or practical. And some continental philosophers (such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the later Heidegger, or Derrida) doubt whether any conception of philosophy can coherently achieve its stated goals.

Ultimately, the **foregoing** themes derive from a broadly Kantian thesis that knowledge, experience, and reality are bound and shaped by conditions best understood through philosophical reflection rather than exclusively empirical inquiry<sup>42</sup>.

## Vocabulary

family resemblance – семейное сходство;

disparate – разрозненные;

Simon Glendinning – Симон Глендиннинг;

pejorative – уничижительный;

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<sup>42</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental\\_philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_philosophy)

Babette Babich – Бабетта Бабич;  
scientism – сциентизм;  
lifeworld – жизненный мир человека;  
intelligibility – интеллигибельность, доступность для понимания;  
variable – изменчивый, непостоянный;  
discrete – отвлеченный, абстрактный;  
emergence – появление;  
human agency – человеческий фактор;  
contingent – зависящий от обстоятельств;  
domain – сфера, область;  
irreducibly – неизменно;  
foregoing – предшествующий.

### Questions:

1. What does the term “continental philosophy” generally mean?
2. What is the attitude of continental philosophers towards scientism?
3. What view does scientism share?
4. What does science depend upon according to continental philosophy?
5. What do continental philosophers think about scientific methods?
6. What conditions of possible experience do they consider variable?
7. What is the opinion of continental philosophers towards historicism and philosophical argument?
8. What position do continental philosophers hold about human agency?
9. What is a final characteristic trait of continental philosophy?

**Read the text and give the summary of it.**

### Part II.

The term “continental philosophy”, in the above sense, was first widely used by English-speaking philosophers to describe university courses in the 1970s, **emerging** as a collective name for the philosophies then widespread in France and Germany, such as phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, and post-structuralism.

However, the term (and its **approximate** sense) can be found at least as early as 1840, in John Stuart Mill's 1840 essay on Coleridge, where Mill contrasts the Kantian-influenced thought of “Continental philosophy” and “Continental philosophers” with the English empiricism of Bentham and the 18th century generally. This notion **gained prominence** in the early 20th century as figures such as Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore advanced a vision of philosophy closely **allied** with natural science, progressing through logical analysis. This tradition, which has come to be known broadly as “analytic philosophy”, became dominant in Britain and America from roughly 1930 onward. Russell and Moore made a **dismissal** of Hegelianism and its philosophical relatives a distinctive part of their new

movement. Commenting on the history of the distinction in 1945, Russell distinguished “two schools of philosophy, which may be broadly distinguished as the Continental and the British respectively”, a division he saw as **operative** “from the time of Locke”.

Since the 1970s, however, many philosophers in America and Britain have taken interest in continental philosophers since Kant, and the philosophical traditions in many European countries have similarly **incorporated** many aspects of the “analytic” movement. Self-described analytic philosophy flourishes in France, including philosophers such as Jules Vuillemin, **Vincent Descombes**, **Gilles Gaston Granger**, **François Recanati**, and Pascal Engel. Likewise, self-described “continental philosophers” can be found in philosophy departments in the United Kingdom, North America, and Australia, and some well-known analytic philosophers claim to conduct better scholarship on continental philosophy than self-identified programs in continental philosophy, particularly at the level of graduate education. “Continental philosophy” is thus defined in terms of a family of philosophical traditions and influences rather than a geographic distinction<sup>43</sup>.

### Vocabulary

to emerge – появляться;

approximate – приблизительный;

to gain prominence – завоевать известность;

allied – связанный;

dismissal – отрешение;

operative – действующий;

to incorporate – включать, учитывать;

Vincent Descombes – Венсан Декомб;

Gilles Gaston Granger – Жиль Гастон Грейнджер;

François Recanati – Франсуа Реканати.

**Read the text and answer the questions after it.**

### 3.4 The History of Continental Philosophy.

#### **Part I.**

The history of continental philosophy (taken in its narrower sense) is usually thought to begin with German idealism. Led by figures like Fichte, Schelling, and later Hegel, German idealism developed out of the work of Immanuel Kant in the 1780s and 1790s and was closely linked with romanticism and the revolutionary

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<sup>43</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental\\_philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_philosophy)

politics of the Enlightenment. Besides the central figures listed above, important contributors to German idealism also included **Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi**, **Gottlob Ernst Schulze**, **Karl Leonhard Reinhold**, and Friedrich Schleiermacher.

As the institutional roots of “continental philosophy” in many cases directly **descend** from those of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl has always been a canonical figure in continental philosophy. Nonetheless, Husserl is also a respected subject of study in the analytic tradition. Husserl's notion of a *noema*, the non-psychological content of thought, his correspondence with **Gottlob Frege** and his investigations into the nature of logic continue to generate interest among analytic philosophers.

J.G. Merquior argued that a distinction between analytic and continental philosophies can be first clearly identified with Henri Bergson (1859-1941), whose **wariness** of science and **elevation** of intuition paved the way for existentialism. Merquior wrote: “the most prestigious philosophizing in France took a very **dissimilar** path [from the Anglo-Germanic analytic schools]. One might say it all began with Henri Bergson”.

An illustration of some important differences between “analytic” and “continental” styles of philosophy can be found in **Rudolf Carnap's** *Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language* (originally published in 1932), a paper some observers have described as particularly polemical. Carnap's paper argues that Heidegger's lecture *What Is Metaphysics?* **violates** logical syntax to create **nonsensical** pseudo-statements. Moreover, Carnap claimed that many German metaphysicians of the era were similar to Heidegger in writing statements that were not merely false, but **devoid of** any meaning.

With the rise of Nazism, many of German philosophers, especially those of Jewish **descent** or **leftist** or liberal political sympathies (such as many in the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School), fled to the English-speaking world. Those philosophers who remained – if they remained in **academia** at all – had to **reconcile themselves** to Nazi control of the universities. Others, such as Martin Heidegger, among the most prominent German philosophers to stay in Germany, **embraced** Nazism when it came to power<sup>44</sup>.

### Vocabulary

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi – Фридрих Генрих Якоби;

Gottlob Ernst Schulze – Готлоб-Эрнст Шульце;

Karl Leonhard Reinhold - Карл Леонгард Рейнгольд;

to descend – спускаться;

Gottlob Frege - Готлоб Фреге;

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<sup>44</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental\\_philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_philosophy)

wariness – осторожность, осмотрительность;  
elevation – возвышение;  
dissimilar – отличный;  
Rudolf Carnap – Рудольф Карнап;  
to violate – нарушать;  
nonsensical – бессмысленный;  
devoid of – лишенный;  
descent – происхождение;  
leftist – левоцентрист;  
academia – научные круги;  
to reconcile oneself – примиряться;  
to embrace – принимать.

### Questions:

1. When does the history of continental philosophy begin?
2. What did German idealism develop out of? What was it closely linked with?
3. Why is Edmund Husserl considered to be a canonical figure in continental philosophy?
4. When can a distinction between analytic and continental philosophies be identified?
5. Who paved the way to existentialism?
6. Where can we find an illustration of some important differences between “analytic” and “continental” styles of philosophy?
7. What happened to German philosophers with the rise of Nazism?

### Give the written translation of the text.

#### Part II.

Both before and after World War II there was a growth of interest in German philosophy in France. A new interest in communism translated into an interest in Marx and Hegel, who became for the first time studied extensively in the politically conservative French university system of the Third Republic. At the same time the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger became increasingly influential, perhaps owing to its **resonances** with those French philosophies which placed great **stock** in the first-person perspective (an idea found in divergent forms such as Cartesianism, spiritualism, and Bergsonism). Most important in this popularization of phenomenology was the author and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, who called his philosophy existentialism. Another major strain of continental thought is structuralism and post-structuralism. Influenced by the structural linguistics of **Ferdinand de Saussure**, French philosophers such as Claude Lévi-Strauss began to apply the structural paradigm to the humanities. In the 1960s and '70s, post-structuralists developed various

critiques of structuralism. Post-structuralist thinkers include **Jacques Lacan**, Jacques Derrida, **Michel Foucault** and **Gilles Deleuze**.

From the early 20th century until the 1960s, continental philosophers were only **intermittently** discussed in British and American universities, despite an **influx** of continental philosophers, particularly German Jewish students of Nietzsche and Heidegger, to the United States on account of the **persecution** of the Jews and later World War II. Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Theodor W. Adorno, and Walter Kaufmann are probably the most notable of this wave, arriving in the late 1930s and early 1940s. However, philosophy departments began offering courses in continental philosophy in the late 1960s and 1970s. With the rise of postmodernism in the 1970s and 1980s, some British and American philosophers became more **vocally** opposed to the methods and conclusions of continental philosophers.

American university departments in literature, the fine arts, film, sociology, and political theory have increasingly **incorporated** ideas and arguments from continental philosophers into their curricula and research. Continental Philosophy features prominently in a number of British and Irish Philosophy departments, for instance at the University of Essex, Warwick and Sussex, Manchester Metropolitan, Kingston University and others<sup>45</sup>.

### Vocabulary

resonance – резонанс, важность, значение;

stock – исходный материал;

Ferdinand de Saussure – Фердинанд де Соссюр;

Jacques Lacan – Жак Лакан;

Michel Foucault – Мишель Фуко;

Gilles Deleuze – Жиль Делёз;

intermittently – периодически;

influx – приток;

persecution – преследование, репрессия;

vocally – громко;

to incorporate – включать;

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<sup>45</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental\\_philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_philosophy)